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Building on Local Successes: The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program and 
its Lessons for Federal Climate Policy 
Siobhan Watson 
 
 The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) Program, funded by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009, holds important lessons for United States 
climate policy. A one-time infusion of funding given primarily to local governments to for the 
purpose of reducing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, the policy had important but 
uneven effects. Most recipients were able to show progress on energy efficiency goals to meet 
program requirements. But communities with pre-existing interest in and experience with climate 
and energy programs tended to multiply the effects of the funding, using it to launch long-term 
efforts or prove concepts in order to secure further funding and support. The dissertation shows 
the value of communities’ participation in voluntary policy initiatives related to climate and 
energy, as municipalities with even a small amount of related experience were better positioned 
to turn a one-time infusion of federal funding into long-lasting programs. At the same time, the 
program’s outcomes demonstrate the enduring power and influence of the federal government in 
achieving more widespread success, as municipalities that had not previously participated in 
climate and energy planning were generally unable to continue their work once federal funding 
 
 
was removed, even in the presence of local champions and demonstrated successes. The program 
also demonstrates that using federal grants-in-aid to accomplish policy goals has important 
limitations. Though EECBG grants often had a major impact on local policies, their uneven 
impact exposes the risk that grants-in-aid may further stratify local governments’ capacities in 
the policy areas to which they are applied. Rather than evening out the playing field, it is 
possible for such programs to increase the disparities between policy leaders and the rest. The 
dissertation points to the importance of tailoring federal programs to varying local needs and to 
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 The study of climate and energy policy in the United States can be disorienting: on the one 
hand, many savvy, entrepreneurial city and state governments have gone to great lengths to 
advance energy efficiency, climate policy, and climate adaptation policies. On the other hand, 
Congress has been unable to pass comprehensive climate policy, and executive action related to 
climate has zig-zagged in opposite directions with changes in the party of the president. For 
those who wish to see robust national climate policy, it is natural to wish to replicate the 
experiences of local climate policy leaders on a broader scale. This dissertation argues, though, 
that while understanding the experience of local climate policy leaders is essential to developing 
effective federal climate policy, it is equally important to understand the needs and limitations of 
local governments that are not leaders in this area. Federal policy should not assume that the 
lessons learned from climate leaders will be equally successful in places that are not leaders, but 
instead should tailor programs to the different needs of places that have been unable to 
implement similar programs in their jurisdictions. 
 The experiences of climate leaders are well-documented. Cities that have developed 
climate change and sustainability plans position themselves as leaders in the effort to develop 
local policies that reduce carbon emissions. They describe their policies as models that can be 
adopted in other jurisdictions. Similarly, scholars who examine city climate change policy-
making often discuss best practices and factors that predict success, extracting advice for other 
cities from these leaders’ experiences and justifying the need for research on local-level 
successes by presenting such successes as potential models for applying climate change policy 
more broadly. Local plans that have received the most attention tend to come from large, 
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prominent cities that have taken aggressive action on climate change. Less knowledge exists, 
however, about how well the advice extracted from climate success stories works for places that 
have less inclination and capacity to take on climate change aggressively on their own.  
 This gap results from the fact that no comprehensive nationwide climate policy has been 
promulgated. We therefore know little about how the “best practices” developed by climate 
leaders work when applied more broadly. This dissertation draws lessons from the experience of 
a program that attempted to spread the innovative policies of local climate leaders to all 
municipalities in the United States: the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant 
(EECBG) program, which was funded one time through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 and was implemented from approximately 2009 to 2012. Though it 
was a grant program, EECBG functioned almost like a mandate. The depth of the recession in 
2009 meant that few local governments were willing to turn money down, even if it was intended 
to fund programs that were not of particular local interest. Of over 1200 municipalities that were 
eligible to receive funding directly from the federal government, just three did not accept it. The 
program, therefore, gives us some of the best information we have yet generated about how the 
ideas of climate leaders work, or do not work, in places that adopt them more reluctantly. 
 This dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the patterns in nationwide 
data on the EECBG program as well as the experiences of those who implemented the program 
at the federal and local levels. The effects of the EECBG program were impressive, but uneven, 
with the municipalities that had already done the most being most able to turn the one-time 
EECBG funding into new and lasting programs. Municipalities that had already put a great deal 
of thought into energy efficiency and climate mitigation programs had ideas on the backburner 
that they were able to turn quickly into programs and policies. These municipalities often used 
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EECBG funding strategically to prove a concept or build support for initiatives that were too 
new or untested to seem worth funding with local tax dollars. Municipalities without such 
experience were just as likely to achieve the energy savings and greenhouse gas emissions goals 
they set out to achieve—perhaps even more so, as they had not yet done the kind of “low-
hanging fuit” projects that achieved results quickly and cheaply as more experienced 
municipalities. But municipalities that were not leaders in climate and energy efficiency policy 
described much less ongoing, lasting programming resulting from EECBG funds. 
 The findings of this dissertation point to the importance of the extensive infrastructure that 
has developed to build local-level capacity and skill around climate and energy initiatives. The 
US Conference of Mayors, ICLEI, C40 Cities, ACEEE, and other organizations work with local 
leaders to seed sustainability as a goal of local government. Federal policy is undeniably 
essential to achieving larger and more widespread climate policy results, but the implementation 
of climate policy will inevitably fall, at least in part, to the local level. Even if local leaders have 
not yet been able to implement robust sustainability policies, their exposure to these ideas and 
experience implementing them at any scale will enable their local governments to achieve more 
once federal policy is layered onto existing local initiatives.  
 This dissertation also contributes to an understanding of how institutional and individual 
factors work together in local policy leadership. Some scholars of environmental policy point to 
“policy entrepreneurs”—people who know their local government structure and are committed to 
pushing environmental policies over their unique local hurdles—as a key to effective local 
policy. Others emphasize the institutional factors that determine what a community can get done 
well. This dissertation shows that policy entrepreneurs exist in many local governments, even 
where lasting results were not achieved. However, without a local government with the capacity 
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to expand its scope beyond what is strictly required, many of these policy entrepreneurs were 
powerless to continue robust energy and climate programs, in spite of a high level of skill and 
commitment to the problem. Policy leadership results from a combination of institutional 
prerequisites and devoted individuals’ work. 
 To be effective across the complex landscape of climate leaders, laggards, and everything 
in between, federal climate policy needs to be tailored to the needs of local governments with 
vastly different capacities and levels of experience with climate policy. This dissertation shows 
how the EECBG program affected different kinds of local governments in very differents ways, 
and shows that federal policymakers should take time to understand how national-level policies 
that will be carried out locally can best meet local needs.  
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation uses the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant to ask what we 
can learn from the federal government’s attempt to build on local climate policy and energy 
efficiency ideas that were conceived of and developed at the local level. Three major questions 
shape the study. First, how did those implementing this program attempt to make a single policy 
work for the many, highly varied communities in the United States? Did the shape of the 
program, and the constraints and freedoms built into it, help or hinder their efforts? Second, how 
did communities’ use of funds and success in using them vary across the highly uneven 
landscape of experience with climate policy at the local level in the United States? Once the 
ideas contained within the program exited the realm of policy diffusion and entered the realm of 
coerced policy transfer, did they have the same impacts? And finally, under what conditions 
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were municipalities able to translate this one-time infusion of cash into long-term changes in 
energy and climate planning?  
 Chapter 1 explains the historical context in which the Energy Efficiency and Block Grant 
program was created, showing that the program’s conception in the 1970’s and its 
implementation in 2009 in much the same form resulted not only from local climate leadership 
but also from long-standing federal environmental policy gridlock. Funding local solutions was a 
way of getting around intractable policy disputes, both in the 1970’s and more recently. 
 Chapter 2 shows how the diffusion of policies among local governments results in an 
uneven policy landscape, and discusses how theories of multilevel governance and the delegation 
of policy implementation responsibilities account for policy diffusion dynamics.  
 Chapter 3 describes how the research questions emerge from relevant theory and history, 
and explains the dissertation’s approach to answering them. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the administration of the EECBG program at the federal level. It 
shows how the specific requirements of the legislation enabling and funding EECBG shaped and 
constrained the program’s implementation. Through interviews with federal government 
employees and stakeholders in the EECBG program, it describes challenges faced and 
opportunities presented through the program’s unique structure.  
 Chapter 5 uses federal program data on grants made to municipalities, along with data 
about recipient communities, to analyze how communities used EECBG funds and how their use 
of the money and the outcomes they achieved varied by community characteristics.  
 Chapter 6 uses interviews with those who implemented the program locally to examine 
how the goals, experience, and lasting effects of the program varied in municipalities of different 
sizes and political leanings. 
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 The conclusion of the dissertation argues that the EECBG program provides a useful map 






Chapter 1: Local Environmental Policy History & Context 
The development of active local programs focused on climate and energy in the United States is 
somewhat counterintuitive, given the global scale of the climate challenge and the traditional 
focus of municipalities on problems that have more local effects. This chapter examines the role 
of local government in United States environmental policy. It traces the history of the 
relationship between federal, state, and local governments with regard to both anti-pollution 
regulation and energy policy, arguing that the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant 
emerged from a contested policy area, taking the shape it did as a result of decades-long 
indecision about how to approach energy policy.  
 
Local Climate Leadership in Context 
 In attempting to explain the surprisingly large role local governments have taken on in US 
climate policy, scholars have generally converged on three primary causes. First, experience with 
the cooperative federalism model of anti-pollution regulation since the 1970’s gave state and 
local governments environmental expertise, a sense of ownership over their own environmental 
policies, and resentment that increased in proportion to local expertise of the rigidity of 
nationally determined environmental priorities. This experience prompted a desire for more local 
control over environmental priorities. Second, the federal government in the United States 
largely abdicated its role in creating climate change policy throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s, 
leaving state and local governments to fill the void, and in some cases giving them an 
opportunity to contrast their leadership abilities with those of a gridlocked federal government. 
Third, the rise of entrepreneurialism as a central feature of city governments has allowed climate 
policy to become an important part of certain cities’ images. Branding themselves as “green” has 
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become an economic development strategy that works well for cities wishing to attract 
businesses and well-to-do residents through an emphasis on a high urban quality of life--though 
recent scholarship has pointed out that this strategy can also exacerbate displacement due to 
gentrification). 
 
Cooperative Federalism and Devolution in Anti-Pollution Regulation 
 The prominence of state and local climate initiatives is particularly surprising given that 
the United States’ cornerstone environmental laws of the 1970’s resulted largely from an 
inability of state and local governments to resolve environmental problems that had become 
increasingly pressing. Until the 1970’s, environmental policy at the national level in the United 
States was primarily concerned with the management of natural resources, not regulating 
environmental quality (Andrews 2006). Air and water pollution were considered local problems 
with local solutions. In the 19th century, a sanitation movement had drawn attention to the public 
health dangers posed by inadequate waste removal, contamination of water supplies, and other 
urban environmental ills, but the solutions to these problems were almost always provided by 
local governments. The construction of sanitary sewers and public water supply systems, the 
institution of laws to maintain basic standards of environmental quality, and regular street-
cleaning and trash pickup were widely undertaken by municipal governments. The result of this 
local-level provision of public sanitary services was an improvement of environmental quality in 
cities, but a sharp deterioration of the quality of the bodies of water that received cities’ 
wastewater, as cities’ sewers simply dumped sewage into the nearest river, ocean, or lake. Many 
cities also dumped trash into local water bodies—otherwise they dumped it in open landfills, 
contaminating land and creating problems for those who lived nearby, or burned it, creating air 
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pollution. Furthermore, cities often displaced their environmental burdens onto their neighbors, 
contaminating downstream water supplies or land in other communities. Nuisance lawsuits 
proved inadequate to the task of solving the problems created by pollution displacement. 
Industrial pollution was also a major problem, and one that local governments were unlikely to 
take on on their own, since they would risk losing local employment if they created harsh rules 
that encouraged industry to relocate elsewhere. Again, nuisance lawsuits were inadequate 
remedies for the pollution problems created by industrial operations.  
 It was in the context of this history of local control over, and local failure to solve, 
pollution problems that the environmental movement of the 1960’s emerged. Its focus on 
Congressional action regulating pollution nationwide can be seen as a reaction to the problems 
that local control created. The movement also emerged during a time of unprecedented federal 
ambition in urban affairs more generally. Roger Biles (2011), tracing the history of federal 
involvement with cities, points out that under Lyndon Johnson, urban America received more 
attention than it had under any other president in the twentieth century. The War on Poverty, the 
Civil Rights Act, and vast expansion in federal grants to cities all embodied a commitment to 
attempting to solve urban problems.  
 Between 1970 and 1980, a raft of environmental legislation was passed at the national level 
that dramatically changed how environmental problems are regulated. The statutes passed at that 
time became and have since remained the foundation of US environmental policy. Key laws 
included the National Environmental Policy Act (1970), the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean 
Water Act (1972), the Endangered Species Act (1973), the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (1976), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(1980).  All created entirely new processes for pollution control and ecological preservation, 
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with most statutes specifying minimum standards and regulations that apply nationwide 
(Andrews 2006). Congress gave the newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the 
authority to enforce these standards and regulations, vastly expanding the role of the federal 
government in a number of policy arenas that had previously been the exclusive responsibility of 
state and local governments.  
 Richard Andrews (2006) provides a compelling description of the changing relationship 
between federal, state, and local governments in the aftermath of the environmental legislation of 
the 1970’s. Initially, he argues, state governments experienced both burdens and benefits from 
their new roles: the EPA delegated some of its authority to state governments, relying on them to 
implement and enforce the laws jointly with the federal government. These massive new 
administrative duties, along with the requirement for states’ own activities to comply with 
environmental regulations, were onerous. On the other hand, many state governments had 
wished to take action on environmental quality but had found it politically untenable to do so 
because of the power of polluting industries in their states. The EPA’s authority allowed states to 
limit pollution without bearing political responsibility for imposing economic costs on business. 
Cities experienced environmental regulation as more uniformly positive, according to Andrews. 
Cities had borne the brunt of the impacts of environmental pollution, and had had little ability to 
act unilaterally to improve conditions. Cities, too, were required to develop new administrative 
capacity to implement environmental statutes when it was delegated by states, but the 
requirements came with funding from the EPA that enabled them to deal with pollution problems 
that had previously been ignored, and that cities wanted to see resolved. In the case of both state 




 An interesting challenge to Andrews’ portrayal of local governments’ attitudes towards the 
new regulations comes from a 1977 analysis of local governments’ efforts to implement the 
programs (Magazine 1977). Magazine conducted a survey of local environmental managers 
between 1973 and 1974, along with in-depth interviews with a subset, and identifies substantial 
resistance to Congress’ rigid enumeration of environmental priorities, and the rigorous standards 
with which local governments needed to comply. Magazine is clearly convinced by his subjects 
that Congress has overstepped its place, granting that the nature of pollution warrants 
Congressional action, but wondering: “could it have been, and can it be in the future, handled in 
a more equitable and reasonable manner? Is it necessary to use the big stick, to be coercive, in 
dealing with state and local governments in order to solve environmental problems?” (Magazine 
1977, p.93). Local governments, according to his research, were not hampered by motivation, 
but by lack of funding, lack of technical expertise, an unclear division of authority between 
levels of government, and unrealistic federal standards. Congress should, says Magazine, trust 
local and state governments to a greater extent to set their own priorities and respond to local 
environmental problems rather than complying with a uniform national set of priorities. A 1981 
review dismisses Magazine’s book as showing just a snapshot of the chaos that inevitably came 
about when a completely new system for environmental management was created (Detwiler 
1981); the lack of expertise and need for clarity were, accordinte to Detwiler, simply growing 
pains. Nevertheless, Magazine demonstrates that for as long as the laws have existed, there has 
also existed an undercurrent of local resentment of the national pollution control agenda. Judy 
Layzer (2012) traces the growth of this type of resentment in her history of conservatives’ 
opposition to environmental regulation. Even as the celebrated “environmental decade” (the 
1970’s) secured major environmental victories, Layzer shows that an anti-regulatory storyline 
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was building.  Even as the “environmental decade” continued and the major environmental 
statutes were implemented, uncertainty grew about whether the cooperative federalism model 
they embraced was the right one.  
 As state and local governments gained more experience with environmental regulations, 
they pushed for more autonomy, and received it in some arenas, with waivers available in some 
cases for states to go beyond federal requirements. For example, California received a waiver 
that allowed it to heighten the air quality standards that automobiles had to meet under the Clean 
Air Act (Andrews 2006). Tensions sometimes arose between states and cities, with states 
preempting cities from enacting stricter requirements than were applicable statewide. A major 
shift came, though, during the Reagan administration, when the EPA experienced severe budget 
cuts as part of a more general move to reduce the size and scope of the federal government, and 
funding for state programs was reduced. The EPA’s chief under Reagan pushed to transfer as 
much authority as possible to the states, in spite of inadequate resources at the state level to 
implement programs and enforce regulations. The devolution of responsibility that the EPA 
promoted during that time constituted an effort to ease the burden environmental statutes without 
going through the formal process of rolling back the still-popular environmental laws of the 
1970’s (Layzer 2012).  
 In practice, cities and states experienced continuing requirements to implement 
environmental laws without adequate funding to do so. The Clean Water Act, for example, was 
reauthorized in the 1980’s with reduced appropriations to fund programs, so cities and states still 
had to meet high standards for reducing water pollution, but with much lower levels of funding 
(Weiland 1998). At the same time, local and state governments had gained a great deal of 
expertise and felt entitled to more flexibility from the EPA in terms of setting priorities within 
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their jurisdictions (Andrews 2006).  A more contentious relationship developed between state 
and federal governments, as well as between local and state governments, regarding who should 
pay for programs and who should be able to make decisions about funding priorities and levels 
of enforcement.  
 Opposition to the imposition of “unfunded mandates” became politically significant in the 
early 1990’s. The term represented the unfair burden that state and local governments felt they 
were subject to when requirements from higher levels of government didn’t come with enough 
funding to cover the entire cost of carrying them out (Weiland 1998). The US Conference of 
Mayors declared October 27, 1993 to be “National Unfunded Mandates Day,” using it to build 
support for the National Unfunded Mandates Reform Act that was passed by Congress soon 
thereafter. Budget cuts for EPA programs continued to sour the EPA’s relationship with the 
states throughout the 1990’s—in 1986, EPA grants still covered about 40% of states’ 
environmental programs, but by 2000, they covered less than 25% (Scheberle 2004). In spite of 
states’ responsibilities for funding most of their own programs, they were strictly overseen by the 
EPA, and resented the rigidity of that control. Because of the difficulty of measuring immediate 
environmental results, EPA overseers tended to judge state programs by more measurable 
actions—the number of permits issued, inspections conducted, or enforcement actions taken. To 
local and state program managers, the EPA seemed more concerned with bureaucratic “bean-
counting” than with the more important question of whether the local programs were achieving 
positive environmental results.  
 In the 1990’s, scholars and other observers also wondered if the first generation of 
environmental laws could effectively continue to expand environmental protection (Scheberle 
2004). In spite of the tremendous success of the laws in cleaning up air, water, and land in their 
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first two decades, scholars foresaw diminishing returns from increasingly tight controls on 
pollution from industrial sources. So-called “second-generation” environmental problems were 
caused by the accumulation of diffuse actions rather than by a smaller number of major polluters 
that could be regulated relatively easily. Some felt that pollution caused by runoff, land use 
conversion, wetland loss, and other non-point sources would be more difficult to address at the 
national level. Advocates of greater flexibility at the state and local level argued that, for these 
problems, variation in local conditions and causes meant that those closest to the problems were 
best suited to developing locally tailored solutions. 
 
Federal Inaction on Climate Change  
 State and local governments have been further pushed to see themselves as more effective 
environmental policymakers than the federal government as Congress has largely failed to pass 
new environmental legislation, or substantially modify previous laws, since the 1980’s. The 1990 
Clean Air Act amendments are a major exception: those amendments tackled the acid rain 
problem using cap and trade, a market-based mechanism. A reverence for reliance on markets 
that had taken hold in the 1980’s (Rodgers 2011) meant that cap and trade was politically more 
palatable than the uniform national standards (termed “command and control” by detractors on 
the right) that constituted the first generation of environmental laws (Layzer 2012). Legislative 
gridlock has not stopped environmental policymaking at the federal level, but it has pushed most 
activity out of the legislative arena. Instead, most environmental policy-making since the passage 
of the major environmental laws has happened through administrative actions such as executive 
orders, changes in regulatory language, and other means available to the executive branch, as 
well as through changes in judicial interpretations of environmental laws (Klyza and Sousa 
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2013). With a largely stagnant set of federal environmental laws, state and local governments 
have often stepped in to add additional protections in response to local demand.  
 Congress continued its state of gridlock as climate change became a more prominent, well-
recognized environmental problem. The Clinton administration wished to take action on climate 
change, but faced a hostile Congress that became increasingly opposed to requiring carbon 
emissions reductions, and even to acknowledging the mounting evidence that carbon emissions 
were causing climate change, throughout the 1990’s (Layzer 2012). Clinton administration 
officials worked with other countries on the development of a treaty to be signed at the UN 
meeting on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 in hopes that the United States would ratify 
it.  The Senate, though, had became so opposed to entering any international agreement that it 
passed a resolution with a 95-0 vote opposing any treaty that did not also require developing 
countries to limit their emissions. The Clinton administration agreed to the Kyoto protocols 
developed at the UN meeting, but in the face of what seemed to be insurmountable opposition 
from the Senate, never submitted the treaty for ratification. The administration of George W. 
Bush was initially unclear about its position on climate change policy, but soon after entering 
office, the new president announced that he would not support the Kyoto protocols and pursued a 
largely anti-regulatory agenda with respect to the environment for much of his presidency 
(Layzer 2012).  
 The United States has been roundly condemned by environmentalists for its failure to sign 
on to the Kyoto protocols or to pass federal climate change legislation. The conspicuous failure 
to reach consensus on a climate change strategy at the federal level, though, has contributed to 
the conditions that have given state and local governments more important roles. Rabe (2007), in 
fact, argues that the loud disagreements about climate policy at the national level led state 
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initiatives addressing climate change to go largely unnoticed by the media and climate change 
detractors. This, he claims, gave states “political cover,” keeping the “anguished, often moralistic 
rhetoric” (Rabe 2007, p.431) out of state-level debates and allowing policy-makers to focus on 
developing effective policy rather than battling over the existence of climate change.   
 Initially, state action on climate change seems to have been motivated by a desire to 
influence the national-level policy that was widely seen as being inevitable. Until the late 1990’s, 
state governments’ experience with environmental regulation had been primarily related to 
enforcement of federal pollution-control statutes. But throughout the 1990’s, state governments 
began to develop and implement initiatives related to climate change, without a federal push to 
do so (Rabe 2004). In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, many state governments instituted 
requirements for increased reliance on renewable energy, levied charges on electricity to fund 
energy efficiency and renewable energy, and made statewide commitments to specific levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions. State governments’ unexpectedly active involvement in 
climate change policies flew in the face of what many scholars of public policy would have 
expected.  
 Conventional wisdom, Rabe explains, expects state-level policymakers to take a passive 
role with regard to environmental protection, and would never predict the large gains they have 
made in recent years. This view, he claims, ignores the role that state and municipal governments 
have played throughout the United States’ history in establishing models for national programs, 
and underestimates the capacity for policy entrepreneurs at the state level to conceive of and 
implement innovative policy that is tailored to local circumstances. It also rests on an outdated 
conception of state governments’ attitudes toward environmental protection. In the 1960’s and 
‘70’s, environmentalists maintained extreme distrust of state and local jurisdictions’ capacity to 
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take on environmental regulation without aggressive federal mandates and enforcement (Rabe 
2004). They assumed that state and local governments were driven almost exclusively by a 
desire to protect local industries, and that they would see environmental protection and economic 
growth as opponents in a zero-sum game. For states that are heavily reliant on polluting 
industries, this was and still is a major factor in opposition to certain types of environmental 
regulation, but state governments have developed a more nuanced view. Most importantly, they 
see economic growth opportunity in climate change policy: diversifying energy supplies, 
increasing agricultural productivity, reducing traffic congestion, and improving local quality of 
life are important spillover benefits that often motivate support for state-level environmental 
initiatives. Particularly in states that have been seen as environmental laggards in the past, 
projecting an image of environmental progress is important for states’ ability to attract new 
businesses and residents. States have also continued to be motivated by a desire to influence the 
eventual form of a national policy on greenhouse gas emissions, as efforts to create one have 
arisen periodically. 
 
Local Entrepreneurship and International Policy Networks 
 Somewhat later than state governments, local governments entered the climate policy game 
in large numbers beginning around 2005 (Krause et al. 2016). The Kyoto protocol, though signed 
by most countries in 1997, did not take effect until 2005; when this date came about, a group of 
mayors in the United States signed the Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement, which set goals 
for their own cities paralleling the Kyoto agreement’s targets. Though a few pioneering cities 
had been involved in local climate policy before this, Rachel Krause and colleagues show that 
local governments in the United States did not sign on to such agreements in large numbers 
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before 2005. After that date, the popularity of signing the Mayors’ Climate Protection 
Agreement picked up quickly, and many cities joined ICLEI and began to work on local 
sustainability plans. In fact, almost all large cities in the United States implemented plans tied to 
emissions reductions targets in the mid- to late-2000’s (Portney 2013). 
 Cities see economic opportunity in climate change policy. The co-benefits that greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction strategies bring, such as the creation of new local industries based on 
energy efficiency compliance and renewable energy development, have been important in 
motivating cities to pursue these policies (Gore and Robinson 2009).  
 Cities’ recognition of the potential branding and economic development benefits of 
leadership on climate change policy reflects a movement toward local government 
entrepreneurialism that is broader than the environmental arena. Though states may show 
entrepreneurship and tendencies toward marketing and branding to some extent, the effect is 
much more pronounced in cities. Since the 1980’s, cities have increasingly taken on the task of 
aggressively marketing themselves to lure service and information businesses, as well as well-to-
do residents (Hall 2014). This drive to marketing and branding the quality of life in cities is 
motivated by the loss of industrial jobs and an economic imperative to regain an urban tax base. 
Local governments’ joining an international network of cities working toward climate policy 
demonstrates the increasing prominence of local governments internationally as well as in the 
United States. The movement toward greater decentralization in United States environmental 
policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s mirrored a broader international tendency. In parallel with the 
Reagan administration’s move to decentralize governmental functions in the United States in the 
1980’s, the UK embraced decentralization and privatization through its “New Public 
Management,” moving to narrow the scope of government programs, limit the discretion of 
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street-level bureaucrats, and increase accountability within the bureaucracy (Sabel 2011). 
Throughout the developing world, donors pushed for decentralization as a condition for aid, 
believing that accountability is greater at the local level and embracing the distrust for 
centralized governments that underlies the desire for decentralization in the US and the UK as 
well (Tendler 1997).  
 It was in this context that efforts to promote sustainable development on the local level 
began to take hold internationally. In the early 1970’s, the United Nations formed its 
Environment Programme in response to concerns about overpopulation and the idea of 
ecological limits (Pezzoli 1997). Books such as The Limits to Growth and The Population Bomb 
popularized the idea that humans needed to sharply reduce their levels of consumption and/or 
population growth. The UN approach to environmental issues shifted toward searching for ways 
to pair human development with respect for ecological consequences with the 1987 publication 
of Our Common Future (commonly referred to as the Brundtland Report). The report was the 
work of the World Commission on the Environment and Development, a committee established 
by the UN in 1983 that held public hearings on five continents for three years. The report 
emphasized the need for a linked strategy regarding the environment and development, 
integrating thinking about ecological limits as well as fair distribution of resources amongst the 
world’s populations. A series of international conferences followed, most notably the Rio Earth 
Summit in 1992, bringing the nexus between the environment and development into the 
spotlight. Sustainable development, encompassing environmental goals as well as social equity 
and economic development, became a dominant way of thinking about environmental 
challenges. At the Rio Conference, a document spelling out initiatives to be put in place  before 
the year 2000 was adopted. Called Agenda 21, one of its most widely adopted chapters was a 
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guide for local governments to develop plans to institute sustainable development practices, 
using participatory processes. Local Agenda 21 has been influential worldwide in fostering 
action at the local level, and the enthusiasm for local sustainability and climate change plans in 
the United States can largely be attributed to the advocacy for local action that came out of it. 
ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection, a not-for-profit organization that works with local 
governments to develop strategies and milestones for locally tailored sustainable development, 
emerged in the aftermath of the Rio Conference. 
 Cities in the United States that have adopted climate policy goals have been influenced 
heavily by the national and international networks of cities to which they belong. The US 
Conference of Mayors, ICLEI and its Cities for Climate Protection campaign, the C40 intiative, 
and others have been instrumental in spurring action and promoting the spread of urban 
sustainability policy ideas. Through these networks, city elected officials and administrators 
learn about policy initiatives undertaken elsewhere and are inculcated with the view that taking 
action on climate change is the right thing for cities to do (Gore & Robinson 2009).  
 
Energy Efficiency as a Policy Path 
 Cities’ climate and sustainability plans have varied widely, but regardless of the specific 
components included, cities usually place a great deal of focus on energy efficiency as a strategy. 
The history of renewable energy and energy efficiency policy, though inextricably tied to 
environmental conditions, has quite a different history than anti-pollution and ecological 
protection regulations. The United States’ interest in promoting energy efficiency began with the 
Arab oil embargo in the early 1970’s. The resulting energy crisis created pressure to reduce 
dependence on foreign oil, and made energy efficiency part of policy discussions at every level 
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of government in some form (Brown & Wang 2015). The federal government asked states to 
assist in oil allocation programs that were begun in response to the crisis, and many state energy 
offices were established at that time, bringing state involvement into federal energy efficiency 
policy from its very beginning (Lee 1983). The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 and 
the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 established two categorical grant programs 
for state energy programs, both of which strengthened the focus of state energy offices on 
longer-term conservation programs, shifting away from the crisis management focus with which 
they had begun. The federal government has funded state energy programs (SEPs) through the 
Department of Energy since that time, and states have conducted activities encouraging energy 
efficiency with those funds continuously (Deitchman 2017). 
 Local governments, too, were involved in energy efficiency efforts beginning in the 
1970’s. Several municipalities garnered media attention and praise by showing that local efforts 
could make a major difference in cities’ energy consumption (Lee 1983). Los Angeles reduced 
its electrical consumption by twenty percent through conservation programs, and the small city 
of Fitchburg, MA gained nationwide recognition for its success in weatherizing a huge number 
of homes and producing large energy savings.  
 Since the 1970’s, energy efficiency has remained a common policy goal at various levels 
of government, but the motivations for pursuing it have shifted through time. In addition to 
reducing dependence on foreign oil, a major motivator has been keeping energy prices low: this 
was especially true after nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island decreased the 
viability of developing new nuclear power plants, and policymakers recognized that reducing 
energy demand could prevent the need for construction of new, costly power plants (Brown and 
Wang 2015). In the 1990’s, attention to acid rain and urban air pollution problems gave a more 
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explicitly environmental motivation to energy efficiency efforts, and a major blackout in the 
northeastern US in 2003 brought attention to the need to stabilize the electric grid, partially 
through management of energy demand.  
 Finally, efforts to fight climate change change gave energy efficiency renewed relevance, 
with the 2007 IPCC report calling energy efficiency the “fastest, cheapest, cleanest” way to 
address climate change (Brown & Wang 2015). Scholars of climate policy pointed out that 
climate policy did not have to wait for new technology: simple, low-tech actions could reduce 
carbon emissions enormously. In a 2009 article, Dietz and colleagues (2009) presented 
calculations showing that the United States could reduce its carbon emissions by 7.4% if most 
households made a series of small, cost-effective changes, such as weatherizing their homes, 
upgrading to more efficient heating and cooling equipment, conducting routine auto 
maintenance, and lowering their laundry temperature, among other actions. These kinds of 
arguments were not new: Morris Udall wrote in the New Republic in 1973 that “We could keep 
most of the comforts and conveniences of our present high living standards and ‘the American 
way of life’ and still cut home and personal energy consumption by one-third” (Udall 1973). But 
they had new resonance in the era of climate change and experienced a renewed enthusiasm. 
 Cities pursuing climate and sustainability plans have been particularly interested in the 
potential energy efficiency gains available in the building sector. Local governments traditionally 
maintain control over land use and building codes, and are able to develop energy-related policy 
in those areas in ways that they are not over vehicle and appliance standards and other areas 
(Klass 2010), providing the opportunity for local action. A movement of industry groups, 
nonprofits, and policy analysts had come together in promoting “green buildings” as a local 
policy that could achieve both climate benefits and economic development opportunities. The 
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fundamental idea behind the green building movement is that most buildings could provide the 
services required of them while consuming many fewer resources, or even producing excess 
resources. A “net energy positive” building, for example, would produce more energy than its 
operation requires through renewable energy generation. A variety of non-profit organizations 
and industry associations have developed certification systems, standards, and codes that attempt 
to define exactly what constitutes green building. The Building Research Establishment 
Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM) in the United Kingdom was the first widely 
used green building standard, launched in 1990, followed by the French High Quality 
Environmental (HQE) standard (Reed 2009). The U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) system was introduced in 2000 and quickly became 
the most popular building-rating tool in the United States. Other voluntary environmental 
certification systems include Green Star in Australia, Green Globes in the U.S., and the Living 
Building Challenge led by international collaborators in the U.S. and Canada. The World Green 
Building Council, which works to support and coordinate green building efforts globally, 
reported in 2013 that it was working in nearly 100 countries with various local green building 
councils (WorldGBC 2013).  
 Some scholars are skeptical about the power of energy efficiency programs: Sanquist and 
colleagues (2012) criticize the idea that the physical shell of a building determines the energy use 
of occupants, claiming that the extensive building weatherization programs of the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s achieved no more than a 0.2% reduction in household energy use after five years. 
They argue that energy efficiency programs are selectively adopted by high-income, 
conservation-oriented households and don’t make a real difference to energy use on a national 
level. Many economists argue that energy efficency programs are rarely successful because 
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energy consumers make changes regardless of these programs if the energy savings are really 
worth it (Brown and Wang 2015). Energy scholar Henry Lee (1983) pointed out that there was 
more promised success in the power of local energy efficiency programs of the 1970’s than was 
ever delivered in reality. He  pointed out at the time that although certain high-capacity local 
governments had show that it is possible to achieve major energy savings through local 
programs, those gains had not translated well beyond a few leading municipalities.  
 But proponents of energy efficiency programs and policies point out the persistent gap 
between the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level of energy efficiency that is 
typically realized (Brown & Wang 2015). They point out that there are multiple barriers to more 
widespread adoption of energy efficiency improvements, including a lack of knowledge, a high 
upfront cost, and deeply ingrained habits (Dietz et al. 2009). Interventions most effective at 
realizing energy efficiency gains, therefore, are those that combine multiple policy tools, such as 
combining mass media campaigns, financial incentives, and efforts to ease the logistical burden 
of undertaking improvements. As part of local climate and sustainability plans developed 
beginning in the early 2000’s, many cities took on these challenges, reinvigorating local energy 
efficiency efforts.  
 
An Old Idea for a New Era 
 In the 2006 mid-term elections, both the House of Representatives and the Senate changed 
hands as Democrats won record numbers of seats in each. President George W. Bush’s 
popularity was low, and Democrats were eager to make progress on a variety of issues that had 
stagnated under Republican control. One of those issues was climate change: during the Bush 
presidency, opposition to policy action related to climate change had solidified within the 
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Republican party, and federal inaction on climate change had become a source of intense 
frustration for democrats who cared about the issue. At the state and local level, though, climate 
policy had been developing rapidly. Local policymakers had become particularly enthusiastic 
about energy efficiency policies, and when Democratic control of Congress allowed climate and 
energy issues to come to the forefront, local energy efficiency policies were incorporated. The 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program was included in the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Title V, Subtitle E, Public Law 110-140). The preamble 
to the law describes its purpose as being “To move the United States toward greater energy 
independence and security, to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to protect 
consumers, to increase the efficiency of products, buildings, and vehicles, to promote research on 
and deploy greenhouse gas capture and storage options, and to improve the energy performance 
of the Federal Government, and for other purposes”. EISA authorized the program, but no funds 
were appropriated for it at that time, and the program was not enacted until it was funded by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  
 
EECBG Origins 
 The idea of a federal program designed to build on local climate policy initiatives, with a 
focus on energy efficiency, seems tailor-made for the moment at which it was authorized, with a 
increasing local energy for climate and sustainability issues and a particular enthusiasm for 
locally driven energy efficiency initiatives. In fact, though, Washington, D.C.-based advocates of 
local government had had this idea on their policy agenda since the 1970’s. Len Simon, an 
employee of the US Conference of Mayors in the 1970’s and now a lobbyist on behalf of local 
governments in Washington, describes advocating for the Energy Management Partnership Act, 
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a bill that would have created a local energy grant program program, in the summer of 1979 (Len 
Simon, telephone interview, 2018). The program was modeled on the Community Development 
Block Grant program that had been in place for just five years at the time, which provided cities 
with funds to address distressed neighborhoods. The concept of the energy block grant program, 
according to Simon, came out of a survey of 100 cities that the Conference of Mayors had 
conducted in 1979, and would have provided local governments with funds to develop local 
energy conservation and energy efficiency programs. Simon relates his frustration at having had 
the Energy Management Partnership Act pass the Senate, but run into problems in the House just 
before the beginning of the Reagan Presidency. Once Reagan took office, says Simon, new 
programs requiring federal funding had little chance of success, and advocates focused on 
avoiding cuts to existing programs rather than pushing for new programs.  
 Henry Lee, an energy policy scholar, wrote about the demise of the Energy Management 
Partnership Act in somewhat different terms soon after the fact (Lee 1983). Advocates for local 
governments such as the US Conference of Mayors, Lee claims, battled with advocates for State 
energy programs, and ended up each undermining the rationale for the other’s role in national 
energy policy. States, frustrated with their role solely as implementers of federal environmental 
and energy policy, wished to continue to receive energy grants while exercising more control 
over the programs they funded, and argued that they possessed the right balance between 
knowledge of local concerns and an understanding of the needs of federal governments. Grants 
given directly to local governments, said advocates such as the National Governors Association, 
would be duplicative and wasteful compared to steering all energy grants through the states. 
Local governments, on the other hand, showcased the several leading cities that had gained 
national media attention for local energy programs, and painted states as having been ineffective 
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implementers of energy programs and having sidelined the involvement of local governments. 
Cities and towns, they argued, were much more sensitive to residents’ needs and were better 
positioned to build consensus in favor of programs that would work locally. In the end, neither a 
bill that would have strengthened the state energy grant programs of the 70’s, nor the program 
that would have explicitly outlined a role for local governments, passed before the beginning of 
the Reagan presidency. Equally important, argued Lee, no compelling vision of how states and 
local governments could work in complementary ways to implement and build on national 
energy initiatives was developed.  
 Broad disagreements over the goals of United States energy policy in the 1970’s further 
eroded the potential for a comprehensive national policy with well-defined roles for states and 
cities. Unlike the case of anti-pollution regulation, where a forceful environmental movement 
pushed a Democratic Congress to broad support of the regulation of industrial polluters, 
perspectives on energy policy were deeply divided, even within the Democratic party (Eizenstat 
2018). Consumers’ rights advocates fought to ensure low energy prices, while environmentalists 
wished to see reductions in energy use. Oil-producing states were more interested, meanwhile in 
maintaining predictable energy prices. A lack of consensus on the overall direction of energy 
policy in the United States, along with disagreements about the effectiveness of states, cities, and 
the federal government in implementing energy policy, contributed to a deferral of action that 
lasted for decades. 
 
Authorization 
 Though the idea of a local energy grant program was put aside once President Reagan 
came into office, Len Simon and Kevin McCarty, the manager of the US Conference of Mayors’ 
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climate center and a longtime advocate for local governments in Washington, would periodically 
come back to it in conversation, discussing it once or twice a year even if only as part of a joke 
right up until the idea became a viable once again (Simon, telephone interview, 2018). 
Throughout the 1980’s, 90’s, and early 2000’s, energy was not a priority issue, but with the 
emergence of local leadership on climate change planning in the early 2000’s, the US 
Conference of Mayors returned to the idea of a local energy grant program as a way of building 
on local efforts. Debra DeHaney-Howard, who worked at the Conference of Mayors at the time 
and has since moved on to a lobbying firm that works on behalf of local governments, recounts 
holding three national summits on energy and the environment for mayors throughout the 
country (Debra DeHaney-Howard, interview, Washington D.C., 2018). “What we heard over and 
over again,” says DeHaney-Howard, “was if we had the same types of resources we’d be doing 
the same programs as the Boulders, the Seattles…” The mayor of Camden, New Jersey, she says, 
was eager to take on ambitious environmental initiatives, but the city was in receivership at the 
time, and without an external funding source the city would simply have had no means of 
starting new energy-related progams. Leaders of smaller, less well-resourced governments 
expressed frustration that the same “leader” cities were continually recognized for their progress 
on climate and energy issues, while those outside of that group had the same desire for action but 
faced hard financial limits on what they could do. 
 The US Conference of Mayors had an ongoing climate task force, and had been working 
with mayors throughout the country on developing ideas and initiatives that could include 
municipalities beyond the small group of leader municipalities that were receiving a great deal of 
their attention for their climate work. The organization hosted three summits on climate issues 
between 2006 and 2007, focusing each on a different topic and hosting each in a different city. 
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The block grant program that the group lobbied for, and the EECBG legislation that was 
ultimately passed, contained a set of activities that would be eligible for funding through the 
grants, including the creation of local climate protection plans, performance of energy audits, 
provision of financial incentives for energy efficiency improvements in residences and 
businesses, and the development and implementation of building and energy codes. The ideas 
proposed by the Conference of Mayors, which made their way into the final legislation in lightly 
modified form, came from the programs that local governments were already implementing and 
planning to implement. 
 Advocates for local governments, primarily the US Conference of Mayors, pushed for the 
inclusion of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, and succeeded in seeing it authorized through that law. 
They emphasized the idea that many more local governments had the will and the capacity to 
develop and carry out effective climate and energy programs than had yet done so, appealing to 
the new Democratic majority in Congress to frame climate action in a new light.  Potential 
regulatory solutions to the climate change problem were seen as politically dangerous by many 
members of Congress, even Democrats, and the language of sacrifice and reduction was deeply 
embedded in environmentalists’ arguments about the need to respond to climate change 
(McCarty, interview, Washington, D.C., 2018). The US Conference of Mayors argued that “not 
everyone has to wear a hair shirt… There are things you can do that are absolutely painless, that 
are broadly supported, people don’t even know that it’s climate-related, they save you money, 
they save the taxpayer money.”  
 Political support for the authorization of the EECBG program came from members of 
Congress who were sensitive to the concerns of cities and aware of their climate leadership, but, 
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importantly, was broadened by a lowering of the population threshold for cities’ eligibility to 
receive funds through the program. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s support was crucial, 
remembers McCarty: “Nancy Pelosi got it,” he said in an interview, explaining his view that the 
EECBG program had few natural political supporters at the federal level. For Republicans, the 
program put federal resources into programs that would challenge traditional energy power 
structures, but for Democrats, who supported the idea of changing energy systems, the degree of 
flexibility for local governments prevented lawmakers from being able to claim credit for 
specific programs and achievements. “It was only Nancy Pelosi, whose father was the mayor of 
Baltimore, whose brother was the mayor of Baltimore, she understood it from a localized 
perspective. When you talk to her about cities, you’re talking to the right person. She grew up 
with it. She got it. She also got the idea that the flexibility is something you have to embrace.” 
Congressman Albert Wynn, who authored the House bill adding the EECBG program to EISA, 
called mayors the best lobbyists for the program, describing a municipal leader from New Jersey 
testifying about how much more local governments could be doing to increase energy efficiency 
with federal resources for that purpose (Albert Wynn, telephone interview, 2018).  In the Senate, 
Robert Menendez of New Jersey was an important supporter: Debra DeHaney Howard points to 
his background as a mayor, as well as his relationship with the mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey, 
as being key to his advocacy of the program. J. Christian Bollwage, Elizabeth’s mayor at the 
time (and still today) credits the program’s passage to a chance meeting with Kevin McCarty and 
Debra DeHaney Howard of the US Conference of Mayors while Mayor Bollwage and Senator 
Menendez were having dinner together in Washington. DeHaney Howard and McCarty took 
advantage of the encounter to promote the energy block grant program, and according to 
Bollwage, Menendez “picked up the ball and ran with it.” (Bollwage, telephone interview, 2018). 
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DeHaney Howard and McCarty worked to gain the support of members from non-urban districts 
and states without large cities as well, suggesting a low population threshold for municipalities 
that would be eligible to receive funds through the program and pointing to benefits that would 
come to every member’s district. Senator Bernie Sanders was supportive, and saw the benefits of 
the program, but McCarty and DeHaney Howard pointed out that Burlington, Vermont’s largest 
city, had a population of only about 38,000. The suggested threshold of 35,000, along with the 
stipulation that every state would have at least ten recipients, was key to garnering support from 
a broad base of members of Congress.  
 The authorization of the EECBG program through EISA did not appropriate funding for 
the program. Immediately after its passage, advocates began work on pushing for the funding 
appropriations that would actually enact the EECBG program. 
 
Funding 
 Advocates who worked for the passage of the EECBG envisioned it as a thirty year 
program that would receive funding every year. In looking back at the history of the program, 
DeHaney Howard and McCarty describe the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as 
having brought the program to life and killed it at the same time: ARRA was able to fund 
EECBG and make it a reality in record time, but the one-time nature of ARRA funding meant 
that it was viewed as one of many short-term initiatives rather than a way of supporting local 
governments’ climate planning and policy efforts in the long term.  
 In late 2007, when EISA was passed, there was not much momentum behind funding the 
EECBG program through normal appropriations channels. But soon afterward, the economic 
recession hit and discussions began about a stimulus package. Then-candidate Obama talked a 
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lot about green jobs, and the EECBG program was a natural fit for the kinds of green economic 
stimulus programs being discussed. DeHaney-Howard and McCarty stayed in touch with the 
appropriations committee staff, continuing to keep the program on policy-makers’ radar as 
discussions of the stimulus package ramped up. Michael Grunwald describes a frantic search for 
programs that could quickly absorb and deploy funding that would align with Obama 
adminstration priorities (Grunwald 2012). The EECBG program was a natural fit, “the right 
product, the right concept for the time” (DeHaney Howard, interview, 2018). The program, along 
with several other energy efficiency and renewable energy programs, was funded at a higher 
level than anticipated and set for administration through the Department of Energy’s Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Programs.  
 The EECBG program, originally designed in the late 1970’s, was finally funded and 
implemented almost thirty years later in 2009. The history of the local role in United States 
environmental policy, and the way that local sustainability and climate plans spread among local 
governments in the United States, give rise to the motivating questions behind this dissertation: 
how can federal policy effectively build on local leadership? And how are federal policies’ 




Chapter 2: Policy Diffusion, Delegation, and Multilevel Governance 
of Environmental Challenges in the United States 
Urban sustainability policies have spread widely, but unevenly, through local 
governments in the United States. A large body of literature on policy diffusion helps to explain 
which municipalities have adopted such policies and their reasons for doing so, showing that 
leading and lagging municipalities have vastly different motivations for taking on policies. A 
separate body of literature examines how and why federal policymakers develop varying 
delegation arrangements, and yet another set of literature looks at multilevel governance of 
environmental challenges, showing that distributed, overlapping authority can often be beneficial 
in promoting solutions to environmental challenges.  
This chapter argues that more robust thought is needed about how to achieve effective 
management of environmental challenges in a policy environment that is dominated by local 
entrepreneurship and extensive diffusion of environmental policies. 
 
Policy Diffusion and its Consequences 
City-level sustainability policies in the 2000’s spread, first, among entrepreneurial 
municipalities positioning themselves as climate leaders.  Many mayors and other local leaders 
recognized that climate change was an issue of importance to their residents, and wished to 
present themselves as responsive leaders (Gore & Robinson 2009). The US Conference of 
Mayors and ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability were active in creating learning 
networks and promoting local sustainability initiatives, and mayors realized substantial co-
benefits in the form of improved local environmental quality and reduced energy costs. These 
policies were then more widely adopted and spread through many more municipalities. 
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Municipal signatories to the US Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement as well as 
ICLEI membership rose rapidly between 2005 and 2010, with ICLEI’s membership in the United 
States peaking in 2010 with 565 municipalities (Krause et al. 2016).  
The diffusion of local sustainability policies from a few leaders to a larger set of later 
adopters followed a pattern that is described by policy diffusion researchers in multiple policy 
arenas.  Policy diffusion literature tends to separate policy adopters into categories such as “early 
adopters” and “laggards,” and shows that, while competition and self-promotion are important 
for early policy adopters, coercion and pressure to catch up are more likely to be the motivators 
for those who adopt last (Shipan and Volden 2012). Everett Rogers (2003) described a typical s-
shaped curve in the rate of adoption of new innovations—not just policy innovations—in his 
book, originally published in 1962 after studying the diffusion of agricultural innovations 
amongst farmers. He has refined and expanded on his theories in four subsequent editions of the 
book, but the categories he developed have remained: first, a few risk-tolerant innovators adopt 
very early, motivated by the chance to be first and an eagerness to experiment with new 
approaches to a problem. They are followed by early adopters, still few in number but made up 
of well-connected people who are able to assess the innovation’s reliability and advantages 
through exposure to peers who have already adopted. Members of the early majority group 
remain consistently more well-connected and savvy (though less so than early adopters), while 
late majority adopters are more isolated and less well-resourced. Laggards are those who are 
resistant, very isolated, and tend to have many fewer resources than those who adopt the 
innovation earlier. The rate of adoption changes how steep Rogers’ curve is, but if an innovation 
spreads, it seems to follow the general pattern of starting with a few adopters, growing in 
popularity slowly for a time, and then spreading to a large number, with a few laggards joining in 
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over time after the majority of adoption has occurred. When the innovation is a policy, 
jurisdictions that join later are likely influenced by coercion via mandates, grants dependent on 
adopting the policy, or other mechanisms (Shipan & Volden 2012). Perhaps the most important 
insight from such studies is that those promoting the adoption of a policy cannot expect early 
adopters’ rationale for taking action to extend to laggards who adopt the same policy much later. 
Scholars studying the diffusion of local sustainability plan adoption specifically have 
found that the characteristics that make a municipality more likely to adopt a sustainability plan 
include having a larger population, a wealthier population, and having more educated, 
democratic-leaning, and environmentally engaged residents (Salon et al. 2014; Krause et al. 
2016). Some studies have also found that sustainability plan adoption was more likely in places 
that were more vulnerable to climate-induced risk (Zahran et al. 2008). Municipalities with more 
carbon-intensive economies, meanwhile, were less likely to adopt such plans. Adopting a 
sustainability plan and implementing it rigorously, however, are two different prospects: Krause 
and colleagues (2016) found that among municipalities that had joined ICLEI and committed to 
taking on its ten-step climate action process, the average number of steps a municipality had 
completed was just 1.7.  
The policy diffusion literature identifies characteristics of policies that make them more 
likely to spread to many jurisdictions. Five often-cited characteristics originate, again, from 
Rogers (2003): the relative advantage of the innovation, its compatibility with the potential 
adopter, its simplicity, its observability to outsiders, and its trialability—the ability to try out a 
scaled-down version without committing to permanent adoption. Shipan and Volden (2012) 
point out that those factors affect not only how quickly policies spread, but the mechanisms by 
which they spread. A policy that’s highly observable, for example, might spread quickly because 
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policy-makers were exposed to media coverage of its implementation in other cities. With regard 
to sustainability policies, the adoption of a plan is a highly visible action, but the development of 
supporting policies, the follow-through on climate commitments, and the continual updating and 
refining of a sustainability plan are generally far from residents’ awareness. The disconnect 
between the visibility of the initial adoption of the plan and the visibility of its continuous 
implementation may account for the frequent lack of follow-through even among municipalities 
that have voluntarily signed on to climate goals.  
Effective implementation of sustainability and climate change policies is often the result 
of the work of policy entrepreneurs, individuals who work in government bureaucracies who are 
personally motivated to make climate change or sustainability a priority. Barry Rabe’s 2004 
study of climate policy in state governments found that policy entrepreneurs were able to 
develop climate policy expertise and use the bureaucratic discretion available to them to make 
climate issues a greater priority than might otherwise have been expected in state governments 
(Rabe 2004). Scholars of local sustainability, too, have found that policy entrepreneurs play an 
important role in finding ways to make climate and sustainability policies viable and appealing 
within the constraints of their local contexts (Salon et al. 2014). In fact, when those 
knowledgeable about local sustainability plan implementation in California cities were asked 
who were the “leading champions” of sustainability action, respondents identified planning 
department staff and mayors most frequently, showing that both political leadership and the work 
of policy entrepreneurs were important (Salon et al. 2014). The same survey found that 




The essential role of city staff in implementation of sustainability action shows that the 
development of supporting policies falls into the category of low-salience diffusion, where the 
spread of ideas and techniques is more likely to take place through the sharing of ideas between 
city staff than through mass media attention or resident pressure. Koski (2010) shows that green 
building policies, a frequent type of policy developed in support of city climate or sustainability 
plans, are unlikely to garner much media coverage or popular attention. Large cities with high-
capacity governments are most likely to adopt building efficiency policies (Kontokosta 2011), 
but many smaller and less technically adept local governments have adopted them as well. In the 
case of green building policies, a key third-party knowledge broker was essential to the spread of 
ideas and policies among local governments: the US Green Building Association. The US Green 
Building Council played a key role in packaging a highly technical suite of policy changes 
related to energy efficiency—enhanced insulation standards, requirements for regular 
maintenance of heating and cooling systems, etcetera—into the appealing, adaptable idea known 
as “green buildings.” Without a group like the US Green Building Association providing 
advocacy and technical support to municipalities, Koski (2011) shows that many municipalities 
would have been unlikely to spend the time developing and implementing highly technical green 
building policies. Though these policies are exciting to devotees of sustainability policy, they did 
not spread primarily by capturing the broader public imagination. Rather, they spread mainly 
through the exchange of ideas among bureaucrats, industry groups, and issue-specific advocacy 
organizations. The presence of knowledge brokers is key in connecting specific policy ideas to 
the broad sustainability values that local leaders are signaling through more symbolic gestures 
such as joining ICLEI or signing the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement.  
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Third-party organizations’ central role in spreading policies that are less salient goes a 
long way toward explaining such organizations’ prominence in the climate policy arena. Though 
the decision to act on climate change can be a highly politicized one, the details of climate 
policies are often highly technical and don’t hold the public’s attention for long, even in cities 
where there is broad agreement on the merits of acting. Gore and Robinson (2009) show that 
international climate policy networks reinforce social pressure amongst city leaders to take 
concrete steps on climate change, as well as spreading technical information. Hakelberg (2014) 
shows that, in Europe, membership in a transnational municipal network focused on climate 
change policy was a major determinant of whether a city ultimately adopted a climate action 
plan. Rogers (2003) emphasizes that the adoption of any innovation is fundamentally a social 
process, and that a study of how an innovation spreads is incomplete without understanding how 
potential adopters communicate, how they assess new ideas, and how they modify the idea in the 
process. Understanding policy diffusion as a social process allows researchers to gain knowledge 
about how the decision process itself affects policy outcomes. Dolowitz (2003) points out that 
policy-makers often get ideas through casual conversations, from observations made on trips, or 
other informal routes for learning. Transnational climate networks provide social connections 
and channels of communication that allow their members to learn about other members’ 
experiences with various climate policies. These insights about social context are crucial in 
attempting to understand how “laggard” municipalities succeed or fail when they are pressured 
to adopt a policy.  
A major criticism of policy diffusion research is its tendency to focus on success stories, 
thereby helping to advance understanding of the factors that make a particular policy’s adoption 
successful, while ignoring the factors that lead a jurisdiction to be unwilling or unable to adopt 
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that same policy (Rogers 2003, Karch et al. 2016). A related concern that is prominent with 
regard to climate policy is the tendency to study leading municipalities while paying less 
attention to those that have adopted climate and sustainability policies on the later end of the 
diffusion curve. Jonathan Fink (2018) addresses this issue in comparing the climate policies of 
Portland, Oregon and Phoenix, Arizona. Portland is widely considered a strong sustainability 
leader, while Phoenix is generally classified as a laggard, and is rarely studied by those looking 
at sustainability policy. Fink finds a great deal of action with regard to sustainability policy in 
Phoenix, but shows that it has a different character than sustainability action in Portland. There, 
policy entrepreneurs cast policies in technical terms, focusing on cost-savings and other co-
benefits, and do not use any overtly political terms to describe their work.  
In addition to examining how and why it takes place, some scholars of policy diffusion 
ask whether the diffusion of policies among subnational governments achieves the policy 
objective more or less effectively than a federal mandate would. Shipan and Volden (2012) 
suggest that the answer to this question, for any particular policy objective, is a matter of whether 
the costs of diffusion are outweighed by its benefits. Many see the ability to experiment with 
different ways of implementing policies, as well as the ability of local governments to adapt 
policies to their own particular circumstances, as major advantages of a decentralized approach 
to policy-making. A cost of a decentralized approach is the possibility of negative competition—
cities may hesitate to attract those who need a social service that they provide more of than their 
neighbors, or, in the environmental realm, may hesitate to raise environmental standards above 
those of other jurisdictions for fear of driving businesses to those places. Another cost is that 
smaller, less savvy municipalities are less likely to adopt a new policy, evaluate it thoroughly, 
and adopt the version that is best suited to them, as they have less expertise and resources to 
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devote to policy learning. It is inevitable that the proponents of a particular policy objective will 
argue for centralization or decentralization based on the political circumstances at the time—
given an unfriendly local policy environment for a policy goal but a friendly federal 
environment, advocates of that policy will argue for centralization, for example. Nevertheless, 
Shipan and Volden argue that policy-makers should hesitate to centralize a policy arena that 
could benefit from continued experimentation and new approaches, while they should similarly 
hesitate to decentralize policymaking for a problem whose solutions could lead to negative 
competition and inequities between places. 
In the realm of climate policy, many cities have reported benefits from the ability to 
experiment and learn about climate policies in the way that best suits their circumstances. Others 
have not voluntarily taken on ambitious climate plans, and may have missed out on the co-
benefits that scholars such as Gore and Robinson (2009) have shown to be important drivers of 
climate policy adoption. Shipan and Volden (2012) warn that smaller, poorer municipalities are 
likely to be left behind using a decentralized approach to a policy problem, where ideas are 
spread through diffusion. It is worth asking whether the United States’ decentralized approach to 
climate policy has exacerbated inequities between cities, given the research showing that places 
that are already more well-resourced and better connected to global networks tend to do best at 
developing and implementing local policies voluntarily. 
The literature on policy transfer tells us that we should expect policies that are introduced 
coercively to fail at a much higher rate than policies that have been adopted by one municipality 
voluntarily following in another’s footsteps (Dolowitz 2003). Stone (2012) argues that 
knowledge transfer is even more important than the transfer of the policy itself in terms of 
accomplishing the policy’s goal. When policy transfer is coerced, then, this literature would 
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suggest that the key to success is the development of an adequate substitution for the learning 
that happens organically and informally when a policy is transferred voluntarily.  
 
Delegation, Intergovernmental Cooperation, and Fiscal Federalism 
When the federal government does step in to create a policy, it often uses knowledge 
gained through the experiences of innovators and early adopters at the state and local level. It is 
at this moment in the policy making process that it is most relevant to examine how a policy 
changes when it stops being spread through voluntary diffusion and begins to be implemented as 
a result of coercion, either through federal mandates or through fiscal incentives. Federal policy 
makers are also faced with a conundrum when it comes to applying a federal policy to first 
movers on the issue. Policymakers generally want to avoid stifling innovation by punishing first 
movers, but the jurisdictions that have not already adopted a policy are inevitably the places that 
need the most guidance and financial support to do so (Posner 2010). Those who wish to 
accomplish the policy goal most expediently, therefore, may wish to sacrifice the theoretical goal 
of rewarding first movers in favor of spreading a policy more quickly. Additionally, first movers 
often wish for continued flexibility in a policy arena in which they have innovated, but this goal 
is not always realized. Posner (2010) points to examples of state-generated ideas becoming the 
basis of rigid mandates that prevent the very states that developed the ideas from continuing to 
experiment with their policies.  
Research on congressional policymaking and the politics of delegation sheds light on 
how the delegation arrangements within which planners operate come about. The distribution of 
authority between legislative and administrative bodies, between the federal government and 
state governments, and between states and municipalities shapes important aspects of local 
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policy and planning. Understanding these dynamics can make planners better advocates for the 
kinds of policies that further their goals. Urban theorists such as Paul Peterson (Peterson 1981) 
and his respondents debate what types of policies are most likely to dominate urban agendas, and 
what types of policies are likely to be most effective at the local level. Missing from many of 
these arguments, however, is an analysis of which powers and responsibilities have been 
delegated to the local level and why; without this element, it is difficult to fully understand the 
effectiveness of local efforts. 
An extensive literature explores how the legislative branch of the federal government 
makes decisions about delegating powers to administrative agencies. Essentially, Congress faces 
what is known as a principal-agent problem when it delegates tasks to agencies. Congress wishes 
for agencies to implement a policy in a way that stays true to the intent of the legislative process 
that created it, but it has limited time, expertise, and political capital to expend on monitoring 
agencies to ensure that this is so (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Instead of using 
monitoring to control agencies’ actions, scholars have found that Congress tends to institute 
procedural requirements that favor the groups that were most influential in creating the 
legislation. For example, the standard of evidence required to regulate pollutants varies widely 
among environmental laws: the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set a health-based standard for 
air pollution and then determine the regulations required to meet it, whereas the Toxic 
Substances Control Act requires very strong evidence of harm before the EPA is empowered to 
regulate it under the law. These differences reflect the groups that exerted the most power during 
the legislative process: during the creation of the Clean Air Act, environmentalists exerted more 
influence, whereas during the creation of the Toxic Substances Control Act, chemical industries 
did. Additionally, Congress uses “deck-stacking” to ensure that agencies favor the particular 
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combination of interests that came together to pass a law (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 
1987). By choosing to provide an agency with a budget for independent analysis of regulations, 
and making rule-making processes simple and participatory, for example, Congress can tilt the 
balance of power in implementation towards grassroots groups. Denying the agency a budget and 
making procedures complex, on the other hand, tends to force the agency to rely on industry 
analysis and exclude all but the savviest of participants in the rule-making process. 
Scholars also explore when Congress may be inclined to give agencies more or less 
discretion in implementing laws. Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) show that monitoring, while 
imperfect, serves as a backstop that gives Congress the confidence to provide agencies with 
flexibility and discretion in implementation. When the preferences of Congress and the President 
are far from each other, though, Congress is more inclined to be prescriptive about exactly how a 
law must be implemented; when their preferences are close together Congress tends to provide 
for more flexibility. Similarly, when a committee’s preferences are similar to those of Congress 
as a whole, and the Congress as a whole therefore trusts the committee to mimic its preferences, 
a law tends to be more prescriptive (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). When the committee’s 
preferences are more extreme than Congress, more discretion tends to be left to the agency, as 
Congress as a whole does not wish to allow the committee to impose its outlier views on the 
implementation process. 
A related body of literature looks at the conditions under which the federal government 
grants discretion to state governments and when state governments, in turn, grant discretion to 
municipalities. Some important conclusions in this field mirror the conclusions of the literature 
on legislative-administrative delegation at the federal level. Krause and Bowman (2005), for 
example, find that Congress is more likely to decentralize authority over a policy area when there 
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is greater partisan alignment between Congress and state governments. This is a similar tendency 
to that the increased willingness of Congress to delegate to agencies when the President is of the 
same party. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2015) find that state governments, in turn, 
delegate more responsibility for policies to lower levels of government when there is a greater 
degree of partisan alignment between the local government and the state government. States, 
though, also seem to take the capacity of the local government into account, delegating more 
authority to municipalities with greater levels of skill and funding.  
Congress essentially has three options when it wishes to create a national policy while 
granting some discretion to states. It can set standards and the broad outlines of programs, and 
then let states implement the programs and tailor them, within limits, while giving the states the 
option to instead allow the federal government to implement the program. If states choose to 
implement the programs themselves, and most do, they receive EPA funding and enter into a 
delegation agreement. This is the “cooperative federalism” model that most programs within the 
major environmental statutes use.  A second option is pre-emption, wherein a federal standard is 
created and states may not substitute their own standards. Relatively few environmental laws 
take this route, but it is a path that is sometimes defended on the basis of easing regulatory 
burdens for business. For example, energy efficiency standards for appliances were regulated at 
the federal level after businesses complained of a raft of conflicting state standards (Rabe 2009). 
The EPA also sets fuel economy standards under the Clean Air Act, though it has long granted a 
waiver to California, which has set its own, higher standards—in this case, other states can 
choose to comply with the federal standard or with California’s, and auto makers tend to build to 
California’s standards rather than manufacturing different models for certain states. The third 
option for influencing state environmental policy is for Congress to create a grant program, in 
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which money is given to state governments for specific purposes, which must comply with grant 
conditions in order to receive the money. This is often referred to as Fiscal Federalism, and it has 
become an increasingly common way in which federal and state governments share authority 
over a policy area.  
Fiscal Federalism is often viewed as an interplay between state-level actors and federal 
actors, but Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty (2015) argue that a study of federalism that 
limits analysis to two tiers—the federal and the state—is incomplete. The implementation of 
policy, particularly through grant-making, really takes place within a three-tiered system of 
implementation, with local governments playing a key role. Terman & Feiock (2015) point out 
that the use of third-party contractors is an additional element that has become so entrenched in 
implementation strategies that it cannot be ignored either. 
 
Multilevel Governance of Environmental Challenges 
A final body of literature that is relevant to this dissertation examines how effective 
different levels of government are at achieving their environmental goals. The correct level at 
which to tackle the challenge of climate change is the subject of lively debate, with promoters of 
local efforts arguing that local governments are more effective, accountable, and nimble than the 
gridlocked and stagnant federal government in the United States, while others argue that local 
efforts will never go far enough. Coglianese and Starobin (2017a) argue that subnational efforts 
to regulate climate change in the United States face legal constraints that are much more limiting 
than boosters of local action admit. A lawsuit arguing that local energy efficiency laws were 
preempted by federal appliance standards overturned a set of local building codes in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, for example. And even when local laws are more carefully crafted 
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with regard to federal preemption, the authors point out the risk that even a large coalition of 
subnational governments risks simply pushing carbon-intensive industries to the remaining 
locations where there is less climate regulation. Respondents agree that such leakage and legal 
vulnerabilities are potential issues, but believe that even if the federal government does 
eventually create more comprehensive climate policy, a great deal of implementation will remain 
in the hands of state and local governments, and subnational innovation, cultivation of policy 
expertise, and experimentation is essential before and after federal laws are developed (Segall 
and Hultz 2018). 
Given the extent to which subnational efforts have proliferated, most are now in 
agreement that, under any future climate regulation regime, state and local policies will continue 
to be important. Though skeptics argue that city-level climate plans have not made much 
difference in terms of actually reducing emissions (e.g., Millard-Ball 2012), most would argue 
that the solution is to add federal action, not to eliminate local and state initiatives completely. 
Thomson and Arroyo argued in 2011 that federal policymakers should think of potential climate 
laws as following a model of “upside-down cooperative federalism” that acknowledges the 
important role of state and local governments as policy-makers, not simply policy implementers, 
as they were thought of in the cooperative federalism model of the 1970’s. Bulkeley and Betsill 
(2005) argued early in the history of local government climate action that concentrated action at 
the city level risked muting the goals of climate action, and allowing neoliberal principles to 
dominate the climate policy discourse. But in a revisitation of their ideas in 2013, the same 
authors acknowledged that local governments had become a fixture of climate policy debates, 
not a temporary phenomenon, and that policy discourse at the local level had become more wide-
ranging, not simply taking advantage of climate policies with convenient local economic co-
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benefits (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). Lee and Koski (2015) find that state-level influences are 
important in encouraging local climate policy, but that horizontal (city-to-city) influences are 
more important, and that state and local initiatives are complementary, suggesting that there is a 
place for distributed authority over climate policy.  Looking specifically at the EECBG program, 
Fisher (2013) develops a theory of “boomerang federalism,” arguing that subnational 
mobilization is an important tool for advancing federal policy, which in turn advances local 
policy by building on prior local efforts, giving them greater weight using the resources of the 
federal government. Brown and Wang (2015), too, argue that a polycentric system of governance 
over energy issues serves to build policy resilience, with distributed authority helping to make up 
for weaknesses when one level of government finds itself unable to make progress. 
Fisher, though, demonstrates problems with the model of highly uneven levels of policy 
experience, showing that the competitive portion of EECBG grants went overwhelmingly to 
recipients that already had extensive local energy policy and planning initiatives, and that states 
where no competitive grants were received tended to be coal-producing states (2013). Those that 
received competitive grants also tended to have private companies, such as utilities, as partners, 
showing that those that were most successful at receiving the additional funds available through 
competitive grants were those where the impetus and support for clean energy programs was 
already strong. Fisher points out that the diversity of ways in which local entities have 
implemented policies such as EECBG make a coherent national policy more difficult, suggesting 
that overcoming the uneven landscape of policy experience in the United States is more difficult 
than simply replicating what leaders have done elsewhere. 
The level of support provided by a federal program helps to determine whether a federal 
policy exacerbates or evens out differences in policy experience among municipalities. Carley, 
48 
 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Fisher (2015) studied the availability (or lack of availability) of federal 
guidance on ARRA clean energy program implementation. The authors found a relationship 
between the capacity of a jurisdiction (defined as having pre-existing clean energy policies and a 
high financial management score from the Government Performance Project) and its ability to 
implement ARRA’s clean energy programs efficiently. However, that relationship disappeared 
when high levels of federal guidance had been released for programs; in other words, detailed 
federal guidance substituted effectively for jurisdictions’ pre-existing abilities in terms of 
program implementation.  
Questions over whether a grant-based energy program exacerbates, rather than equalizes, 
local jurisdictions’ capacity to implement energy programs are not new. They were, in fact, very 
much present in the debate over the Energy Management Partnership Act (EMPA), the late 
1970’s predecessor proposal of the EECBG program that was never enacted. A workshop 
conducted about EMPA for the Department of Energy in 1980 as the legislation was being 
drafted in Congress raised concerns that a grant program would help the “rich get richer” in 
terms of energy policy (Hopp & Edelson 1980). The legislation held promise for enhancing the 
ability of local governments to develop innovative, locally tailored energy conservation 
solutions, the workshop’s coordinators wrote, but at the same time risked providing the most 
benefits to those that needed energy policy experience least, while leaving inexperienced 
jurisdictions on their own. Workshop participants raised the related concern that evaluating such 
a program’s success would be a monumentally difficult task. With so many component programs 
and a mixture of policy goals, those analyzing the program in advance of its passage warned that 




Policy Diffusion, Delegation Dynamics, and Questions of Multilevel Governance in the EECBG 
Program 
Deeper study of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant provides an 
opportunity to shed light on the complex results of a policy that gained currency through an 
extensive local policy diffusion process and later became part of a federal policy that attempted 
to spread the practices of the innovators to United States municipalities more generally.  
  Questions raised by the policy diffusion literature about a policy that goes from voluntary 
diffusion to coerced transfer include: do laggard municipalities’ leaders eventually participate in 
the networks through which earlier adopters have gained knowledge about policies? When the 
federal government uses a policy idea that originated through voluntary adoptions and coerces its 
implementation in other places, does it adequately substitute for the substantial learning that has 
taken place amongst earlier adopters? Is a lack of adequate substitution for these learning 
mechanisms a predictor of the policy’s failure? What degree of variation exists in the 
implementation style and success of policy laggards, and what can be learned from those that did 
well with the policy when it was coerced? Because all municipalities with a population over 
35,000, and the largest ten cities in every state, regardless of population, were eligible for 
EECBG funding, many cities that had not previously implemented climate policy did so through 
this program. This provides an opportunity to compare cities that already had active programs 
with those taking them on for the first time, looking for differences in how these cities 
approached energy and climate policies they implemented through EECBG. 
With regard to the delegation of responsibility through federal policymaking, the EECBG 
program conforms to some of the well-established expectations of policy delegation research. 
The program was authorized via a law passed by a newly energetic Democratic Congress facing 
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a Republican president that did not support climate policy. The expectation that such a 
circumstance would give rise to a policy that gave little discretion to the Department of Energy 
was realized, with the specific funding formula spelled out in the law and the sets of funding-
eligible activities set by Congress rather than left to the Department of Energy. On the other 
hand, the greater trust in lower levels of government is obvious as well: although the law spells 
out the activities that are eligible for funding, it sets few requirements for lower levels of 
government to receive them, does not require lower levels of government to show a specific level 
of emissions reductions, cost-effectiveness, or any other measure of success beyond developing 
an energy efficiency and conservation plan and pursuing activities that support it. The policy 
thus reflects the politics of climate change at the time, with Democrats at the federal level 
trusting that lower levels of government would execute the program faithfully, but giving little 
trust to the DOE in its implementation. The study of this program provides the opportunity, 
therefore, to observe what constraints this lack of discretion exerted on the DOE’s 
implementation of the policy, and what opportunities and difficulties the large amount of 
discretion for local governments provided to local governments of different characters. The 
EECBG program is also a prime example of fiscal federalism, and provides the opportunity to 
look at the extent to which municipalities continued policies for which they received a one-time 
federal cash infusion. 
Finally, the study of the EECBG program provides the opportunity to contribute to the 
development of a more robust understanding of how various levels of government can most 
effectively combine to address the challenge of climate change. The empirical chapters of this 




Chapter 3: Studying the Path from Diffusion to Mandate: Research 
Approach and Methodology 
This dissertation uses a mixed methods approach to explore how how federal policy can 
most effectively support local climate planning initiatives. To examine this question, it uses the 
case of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, describing the 
implementation experience and outcomes of a federal policy that attempted to spread climate 
leaders’ policies to a broader range of communities in the United States. The study focuses on 
three major questions: first, how did the structure of the EECBG program influence the way in 
which the program was implemented, and what opportunities and barriers did the program’s 
structure create? Second, how did communities’ use of EECBG funds and their outcomes vary 
with community characteristics? And finally, did EECBG programs outlast the funding period, 
and under what conditions did that occur? The dissertation uses differing methodologies to 
answer these three questions, which together contribute to an understanding of the larger 
question at hand: how can federal policy effectively build on local climate leadership, and by 
extension, on policy innovation more broadly? 
 
Mixed Methods Approach 
A mixed methods approach has several advantages in examining the EECBG program 
and its implications for climate policy in the United States. Mixed methods research allows for 
the examination of complex policy questions that involve both outcomes and mechanisms, and 
provides the opportunity to probe the results of each kind of analysis with further exploration 
from another perspective (Lin 1998, Roth & Mehta 2002, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). An 
attempt to explain the success or failure of a federal policy based solely on quantitative 
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information would fail to capture the complexity of the mechanisms by which it succeeded or 
failed. Likewise an explanation based solely on qualitative analysis would be incapable of 
extending its analysis over the vast and varied local governments over which it is applied. 
Because this dissertation is concerned with producing research that informs future policy 
initiatives, a mixed methods approach is particularly relevant. The use of mixed methods is not 
intended to produce a single conclusion based on multiple methods, but rather to provide a more 
holistic analysis of the program’s outcomes, based on multiple kinds of information. Mathison 
(1988) argues that it is a mistake to see mixed methods research as being in search of 
convergence on a single result, instead making the case that triangulating using multiple methods 
creates an understanding of a problem that is more meaningful than research that makes use of a 
narrower set of information about the problem.  
Broadly, this dissertation asks how the EECBG program, a one-time grant program, built 
on local climate leadership in the United States. Although the EECBG program distributed funds 
to states, counties and tribal governments as well as local governments, this dissertation focuses 
on the local government component. Local governments received the majority of funds, and 
states were required to pass most of their funds through to smaller local governments; the 
program was also primarily aimed at building on local leadership that had developed at the city 
and town level, and this research focuses on how well the program did that. To answer the broad 
question of how the program built on local climate leadership, the dissertation looks at three 
more specific questions, and selects methods appropriate to answering each of these component 
questions. Each of these questions, their related hypotheses, and the methods chosen to test them, 




Questions & Hypotheses 
Question 1: How did the level of discretion afforded to the Department of Energy influence 
program administration and outcomes? 
The EECBG program set out to decrease the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions and 
increase energy efficiency by funding state, county, and local governments to conduct their own 
programs (most state funding was required to be passed through to local governments as well). 
But such a program could be designed in myriad ways; understanding the details of the EECBG 
program’s legislative requirements and the resulting way that it was administered is essential to a 
broader analysis of the EECBG’s experiment in building on local climate and energy planning.  
 
Background 
EECBG is characteristic of a policy passed by a Congress that is not aligned with 
presidential goals, in that it provided little discretion to the Department of Energy in its 
implementation of the law. The minimal discretion left to DOE is an important factor in 
understanding the delays and problems EECBG faced; this section focuses on what barriers were 
faced at the Department of Energy and how program administrators attempted to overcome them. 
Prior research on ARRA and its clean energy programs, including EECBG, has found a 
number of local factors that have influenced program outcomes at the grantee level. Scholars 
have found that many of the program’s requirements led to implementation delays, including the 
“Buy American” requirement and the requirement to pay prevailing wages that applied to all 
ARRA programs (e.g. Carley 2016). Researchers have also found that implementation delays 
were more likely among municipalities with lower fiscal and aministrative capacity (Terman & 
Feiock 2015b).  
54 
 
The federal government’s own contemporaneous analyses of ARRA clean energy 
programs revealed many of these implementation challenges as well. A 2010 audit report from 
the Department of Energy’s Office of the Inspector General revealed organizational challenges 
that were preventing program spending from keeping up with spending targets (US DOE 2010). 
In a 2011 report on the EECBG program, the Government Accountability Office found that 
challenges resulted both from limitations in support available from the Department of Energy 
and from the need for grant recipients to acquire new expertise (GAO 2011). Inexperienced DOE 
administrators and multiple changes in reporting and compliance requirements when the program 
was already running were some of the challenges GAO identified from the federal government’s 
end. The need to hire a large number of DOE program officers, and the lack of a permanent 
EECBG program director until April of 2010 meant that communication to grant recipients was 
not always consistent, and the milestones grantees were asked to meet changed as time went on. 
For example, the original funding announcement, released in March of 2009, stated that 
recipients had to obligate all funds within eighteen months and spend all funds within thirty six 
months (meaning that funds should be obligated by Spring 2011 and spend by Fall 2012, 
depending on the exact date on which the awards were made to recipients). However, in April 
2010, DOE, recognizing that many recipients were experiencing delays in obligating and 
spending their grants, set forth a new schedule with several interim milestones. Grantees were 
encouraged to obligate 90% of funds and spend 20% by June 25 of 2010, and meet other interim 
milestones. Recipients reported to DOE that these new dates created scheduling difficulty and 
confusion regarding which deadlines they would be required to abide by. Michael Grunwald 
documents the experience of implementing ARRA programs from the federal side in his New 
New Deal (2012). He describes the Department of Energy’s Office of Weatherization and 
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Intergovernmental Programs, the division that oversaw both the EECBG program and the 
Weatherization Assistance Program, as a sleepy corner of the DOE that was suddenly pushed 
into the spotlight and tasked with spending an unprecedented sum. Long-time staffers used to a 
slower pace, he reports, clashed with new political appointees trying to move as quickly as 
possible, leading to turnover among program leadership and delays in the development of a 
stable staff. 
GAO also reported that recipients experienced challenges stemming from local 
requirements, such as the need to wait for city councils or other local officials to approve 
spending decisions, that recipients had difficulty with the reporting systems they were required to 
use, and that recipients experienced delays in acquiring some materials and products (GAO 
2011). The large infusion of funds for specific items such as efficient lighting, heating, and 
cooling products, and solar energy system components, meant that these items were quickly 
backordered from suppliers. And delays due to the need to buy American-made products and to 
comply with prevailing wage requirements were widely known early in the implementation 
period. 
Chapter four of this dissertation seeks to understand how legislative requirements shaped 
and constrained the program, how administrators attempted to overcome those constraints, and 
what kinds of municipalities were most likely to be affected by those constraints.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The EECBG program structure was more advantageous to climate leaders than 
municipalities with less climate and energy-related experience. 
With prior research showing that municipalities with more fiscal and administrative 
capacity were at an advantage in being able to quickly and efficiently begin their EECBG 
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programs, I expected to find that the program’s structure put climate leaders at an advantage in 
developing successful programs. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: EECBG program administrators’ efforts to assist municipalities were more 
effective for climate leaders. 
The actions of program administrators, while constrained by program requirements, form 
a related but distinct line of inquiry, and I expected program administrators to report being better 
able to assist jurisdictions that were already climate leaders. 
 
Approach 
Answering this question used a single case study methodology, looking closely at the 
details of the EECBG program’s structure through document review analysis, and examining the 
perceptions of the program’s implementation success through semi-structured interviews with 
program administrators. A holistic, single-case study methodology (Yin 2008) allows for a close 
study of program implementation and the opportunities and barriers presented, from the point of 
view of those implementing it at the federal level. Documents reviewed included the text of the 
two bills that authorized and funded the program, program guidance issued by the Department of 
Energy, reports on the program from the Government Accountability Office, Department of 
Energy’s Inspector General, and the final report on the program produced by the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. Other relevant scholarly research on ARRA programs was used as 
available. Interviews with those responsible for implementing the program from the federal level 
were semi-structured, and varied quite a bit based on the role of the DOE staff member and the 
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kind of experience each was able to describe. Field notes were reviewed and manually coded to 
derive insights about topics of interest. 
 
Question 2: How did communities’ use of EECBG funds and their outcomes vary with 
community characteristics?  
Given the expectation that the federal program’s structure would provide an advantage to 
municipalities that were already climate leaders, the second question asks whether program 
outcomes reflected an advantage for these municipalities. This question required the use of 




A number of empirical studies have looked at factors that influenced different 
jurisdictions’ ability to implement ARRA clean energy programs quickly. Carley, Nicholson-
Crotty, and Fisher (2015) studied states’ fiscal and managerial capacity to implement ARRA 
programs, as well as the effect of the federal guidance that was available to states. The authors 
found a relationship between the capacity of a state, defined as having pre-existing clean energy 
policies and a high financial management score from the Government Performance Project, and 
its ability to implement ARRA’s clean energy programs efficiently. However, that relationship 
disappeared when high levels of federal guidance had been released for programs; in other 
words, detailed federal guidance substituted effectively for jurisdictions’ pre-existing abilities in 
terms of program implementation. Terman and Feiock (2015), looking specifically at the 
EECBG program, show that the heavy use of contractors and sub-contractors made 
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municipalities more likely to report that the time to implement EECBG programs was a 
challenge. Their study supports the theory that “third-party federalism,” in which private 
contractors are used to achieve public goals, impedes implementation. 
Research on the cost-effectiveness of ARRA clean energy programs has shown variation 
among both program types and recipients. Joseph Aldy (2013), an economist who helped design 
ARRA’s clean energy programs, provided an initial summary of their results, reporting that the 
clean energy components of the bill had resulted in 720,000 job-years by the end of 2012, 
according to the Council of Economic Advisors. The clean energy programs also contributed to a 
dramatic rise in renewable energy use between 2008 and 2010, and the Department of Energy 
estimated that a total of 600,000 homes would be weatherized through recovery act programs. 
Aldy’s initial findings about the efficacy of various types of funding suggested that grants are 
more effective than loans or tax credits at increasing the renewable energy supply. He also 
discussed the tension between ARRA’s goal of encouraging immediate spending and its 
sometimes-conflicting goal of advancing work on renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
programs that often need time to be scaled up and implemented. Aldy’s analysis came shortly 
after the conclusion of the ARRA funding period, and he noted the need for more rigorous 
analysis of the effectiveness of different programs and implementation strategies. In particular he 
pointed out that the decentralized implementation of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Block Grants program, the State Energy Program, and the Weatherization Assistance Program 
(all programs aimed at increasing energy efficiency) may have yielded natural experiments that 
allow for more detailed evaluation of implementation strategies.  
Additionally, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory commissioned studies of each of the 
energy efficiency programs (the State Energy Program, the Weatherization Assistance Program, 
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and the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants Program) (ORNL 2015). These 
studies reported on amounts of energy reduction and reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
attributable to each of these programs, and looked for factors leading to higher impact levels for 
the programs. In its evaluation of the EECBG program, for example, the ORNL report found that 
factors associated with increased impacts in terms of final energy savings included: using 
financial incentives; funding programs related to lighting, buildings and facilities, energy 
efficiency retrofits, and energy conservation; using direct grants rather than loans or other 
mechanisms; and receiving assistance with performance contracts. Factors with a negligible or 
negative effect on outcomes, according to the ORNL study, included recipients’ receiving 
technical training, conducting technical energy audits, receiving financial assistance from other 
sponsors such as utilities, and having a high level of community support for the EECBG 
programs.  
Many of the ORNL report’s findings on the EECBG program are surprising or 
counterintuitive, and the report leaves these findings unexplored. Of particular interest is the 
finding of a negative correlation between a high level of community support for EECBG 
programs and the level of greenhouse gas emissions that programs led to. Based on the theory of 
policy diffusion, one would expect that leading municipalities, with citizens that are highly 
engaged in environmental initiatives and eager to see better results from programs undertaken 
with federal funds, but the federal government’s analysis of the program found exactly the 
opposite. When asked about this conclusion, Ted Donat, the eventual permanent director of the 
EECBG program, called the finding a “head-scratcher” and wondered if communities with 
residents who were highly engaged in environmental issues were pulled in too many directions to 




Some state governments commissioned their own analyses of their in-state EECBG 
programs. While most EECBG funds went directly to local governments, states managed grants 
for smaller communities; they were required to pass through at least 60% of their state EECBG 
awards directly to small cities and counties, but could retain some funds to develop statewide 
programs. State programs, given their focus on smaller cities and counties that were not eligible 
for direct federal grants, were most likely to focus on communities that could be called 
“laggards” with respect to climate policy from a policy diffusion perspective. California’s 
analysis of its programs, for example, performed by an external consultant, looked at the $46 
million the state received (Gaffney at al. 2014). The study demonstrated that California’s state 
EECBG grant was largely used to initiate energy efficiency and clean energy projects in places 
that would not have had the resources to do so on their own. California’s study found that the 
key to success in such places was targeting low-hanging fruit, a strategy that worked well since 
many of these small communities had yet to undertake the projects that were most likely to yield 
high levels of energy savings at low cost. Replacement of very old HVAC and other equipment 
with more efficient units reliably delivered savings at little cost. Because these jurisdictions did 
not generally have the capacity to perform complex energy audits or analysis themselves, the 
California study found that technical support and assistance from the California Energy 
Commission (which implemented the program) was crucial to success, and that the flexibility of 







I expected that larger, more left-leaning municipalities would have more complex and 
ambitious programs than smaller, more right-leaning municipalities, that these municipalities 
would show greater levels of greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and that muncipalities that 
experienced fewer implementation delays would produce better results in terms of greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions.  
 
Approach 
The analysis of how communities used their EECBG funds and the variation in the timing 
of their spending begins with descriptive statistics based on EECBG program data. Initial 
program data was obtained from fedspending.org, a website maintained by the Project on 
Government Oversight that stores information that was originally made public using 
recovery.gov, the Obama administration’s public-facing site to allow the public to track spending 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. That data was then combined with data 
made available by the Department of Energy pursuant to a FOIA request, which provided the 
program choices as well as metrics and outcome data as of 2015. 
Latent Class Analysis then looks for distinct groupings in how communities used funds. 
Latent Class Analysis uses maximum likelihood methods to seek unobserved latent categorical 
variables by grouping observations based on a set of observed variables (Bonikowski & 
DiMaggio 2016, Linzer & Lewis 2011). The unobserved variable being sought in this case was a 
community’s propensity to pursue ambitious climate planning. Grantees were able to choose 
among fourteen types of programs in their implementation of EECBG; grantees showed wide 
variation in how many kinds of programs they took on through the program and in which types 
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of program they chose to take on. The observed variables used to inform the Latent Class 
Analysis were municipalities’ choices of which and how many programs to implement.  The 
analysis here was done using the poLCA package for R (Linzer & Lewis 2011), which also 
allows for Latent Class Regression (LCR). LCR allows the user to specify covariates that are 
thought to influence the latent class into which an observation falls. LCR was used in this 
analysis, with covariates of population size, the percent of the county’s 2008 major party 
presidential vote going to the Republican, and the number of Heating Degree Days experienced 
by the municipality. The size of the municipality was presumed to make it more likely to be able 
to implement more ambitious plans, because of the sheer size of the award, and because large 
cities had generally all done some level of climate or energy efficiency planning already at the 
time of the program’s implementation. Left-leaning municipalities were thought to be more 
likely to take on more and more varied policies because the goals of the program were more 
closely tied to Democratic priorities. And the number of heating degree days was included to 
account for varying climates and the possibility that certain climates might be more likely to 
choose different kinds of programs (for example, renewable energy installations might have been 
more common in hotter climates).  
Finally, multivariate regression was used to examine influences on implementation 
delays and cost effectiveness of programs across communities, looking at both grantee 
characteristics and program choices as possible determinants of delayed implementation and 
variation in energy savings achieved. 
 
Question 3: What factors did those implementing the EECBG program at the local level perceive 





Chapter six builds on the analysis of federal program administration and the quantitative 
analysis of federal program data, asking what grant managers at the local level perceived as 
opportunities and challenges, and what factors determined whether the EECBG program had a 
long-term impact locally.  
Prior research has found that state and local officials experienced challenges 
implementing energy programs, often resulting from unclear requirements, delayed guidance 
from the Department of Energy about compliance requirements, and the need to learn new 
procedures. In a study completed at the very beginning of the ARRA funding period, Perlman 
(2009) initially found both enthusiasm on the part of state and local officials over a new funding 
stream and uncertainty over the challenge of managing new or expanded programs in accordance 
with the programs’ requirements. Carley (2016) examined state officials’ experiences with the 
implementation after the completion of the recovery act’s spending period, and found general 
satisfaction with respondents’ own ability to implement programs. Several criticisms were 
common among officials responsible for implementation, however. Difficulties complying with 
the prevailing wage requirements and “Buy American” requirements of the recovery act were 
particularly prevalent. Some respondents even stated that the reporting requirements related to 
the prevailing wage provisions were so burdensome that sub-grantees had rejected contracts 
rather than completing the required reports. Recipients also reported frustration with slow-downs 
due to pre-existing laws and regulations like NEPA and historic preservation codes, and 
expressed the difficulty complying with both the recovery act’s aim to get money spent quickly 
and its aim to provide high levels of transparency and accountability with regard to the funds. 
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Another criticism Carley’s respondent’s repeatedly made was that there was not enough federal 
guidance for programs, or that guidance was released after the funds were disbursed, requiring 
retroactive information collection. Carley mentions that many recipients used the same metaphor 
to describe the early days of ARRA programs: that of a plane being built as it was being driven 
down the runway. But she also describes a “Lake Wobegon effect,” in which most recipients 
seemed to view their own programs as being above average in spite of the challenges they faced. 
Compared to the amount of work done looking at implementation delays and cost 
effectiveness, little work has been done on the continuing effects of the EECBG program after 
the end of its funding period. A study on Texas’ EECBG program found that Texas 
municipalities were more likely to say they planned to continue EECBG programs begun with 
federal funding when they had larger numbers of municipal staff, a greater degree of citizen 
participation, and when they participated in a local Council of Governments (Moshier 2017). 
Tang and Hill (2018) review the literature on ARRA clean energy analysis and point out that 
although studies have shown a variety of factors to be important in determining the extent of 
implementation delays, few studies have looked at the link between program design, 
implementation, and program effectiveness, and little rigorous research has looked closely at 
outcome metrics such as energy efficiency, technology innovation, and green jobs. 
Chapters four and five show that evaluating the EECBG program’s outcomes is difficult 
not only because of the enormous number of outcome metrics used for programs, but because of 
the variation in experience of grantees as well and the conflicting goals they were asked to meet. 
Chapter six uses qualitative methods to evaluate the factors that influenced success as perceived 






Municipalities with greater pre-existing experience in climate and energy efficiency 
policy implemented programs that were perceived as more successful locally, and were more 
likely to continue related programs beyond the EECBG funding period. 
 
Approach 
The study of local success used an extensive case study design, looking at twenty six 
municipalities through semi-structured interviews with grant managers, and supplementing 
interviews with federal program data and geographic and demographic data about communities. 
Extensive case study, as opposed to intensive case study, examines a larger number of cases in 
less depth than intensive case study. Because of this study’s focus on how local conditions 
affected the success of grant implementation, extensive case study was more appropriate as a 
way of comparing the experiences of grant managers in different contexts. In particular, the case 
studies were chosen so as to represent variation across political contexts and across community 
size. The study looks at the experiences of twenty six municipalities, with populations ranging 
from just over 6,000 to just over 600,000, and with political leanings ranging from very 
conservative to very liberal.  
The EECBG program additionally lends itself to an extensive design because the program 
was often implemented by only a few municipal government employees, and was rarely much 
remarked on by those not directly involved in its implementation. Although the national 
ramifications of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act were controversial, the 
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implementation of local energy efficiency programs rarely were, and local grant managers were 
able to provide reliable and informed accounts of local grant implementation.  
The twenty-six case studies are selected as typical cases and are meant to show the 
experience that different types of municipalities had with the EECBG program. The analysis of 
the cases uses cross-case comparison, but does not assume that the cases are a representative 
sample. Rather, the case analysis relies on a logic of replication (Yin 2014), seeking to explain 
whether each case confirms the hypotheses being examined.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 further detail the methods used to investigate each of the three main 
questions and describe the results of each component of the study. Together, the three empirical 
chapters provide the basis for a holistic analysis of the effects of a federal program on local 




Chapter 4: EECBG Program Structure and Federal 
Implementation 
This chapter asks how the way in which the EECBG program was implemented at the 
federal level influenced program outcomes. Using government reports on the program and 
interviews with key figures involved in its implementation, it describes the program’s conflicting 
goals and how administrators attempted to overcome the challenges that were created by those 
conflicts. The chapter demonstrates the importance of personal relationships between federal 
administrators and grantees in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, and shows that smaller 
municipalities with less capacity for climate leadership were less likely to benefit from the 
crucial individualized assistance that federal administrators were able to provide.  
 
EECBG Requirements   
The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program (EECBG) was one of a 
number of clean energy programs funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA). ARRA’s clean energy programs consisted of several distinct components: the largest 
allocation was approximately $25 billion of support for renewable energy, consisting of a 
mixture of grants, loan guarantees, and tax incentives (Aldy 2013). Allocations for 
transportation-related investments such as high-speed rail, mass transit, advanced vehicles, and 
fuels and battery technologies totaled about $24 billion, and about $10 billion was set aside for 
electric grid modernization projects. Funding at lower levels was provided for carbon capture 
and storage technologies, job training, and clean energy manufacturing. Almost $20 billion was 
allocated to a set of programs aimed at increasing energy efficiency, including EECBG. Other 
major energy efficiency programs within this group included the Weatherization Assistance 
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Program and the State Energy Program. EECBG was unique in providing funding directly to 
local governments: Congress allocated $3.2 billion for the program, of which approximately $2.7 
billion was allocated to States, counties, municipalities, and American Indian tribes in amounts 
determined by a population-based formula (Federal Register 2009). Within that allocation, the 
majority of funds (68%) went directly to local governments without passing through state 
governments. States received 28% of formula-based funding, and were required to pass at least 
sixty percent of those grants through to smaller cities and counties that were ineligible to receive 
funds directly from the local government. The funds were to be used to “reduce energy use and 
fossil fuel emissions, and for energy efficiency programs and projects” (Federal Register 2009a). 
This represented a massive infusion of cash into local governments’ energy efficiency programs,  
if they had them—many of the entities that found themselves eligible for these grants did not 
have an energy office, nor did they have a history of implementing energy efficiency programs 
of this type (Grunwald 2012).  
The justification for providing this money to local governments was twofold: first, energy 
efficiency projects were perceived to be easy to implement and therefore a good way to get 
stimulus money spend quickly, and, second, these projects were an important part of the Obama 
administration’s push to put the United States on a path to reducing its carbon emissions. 
Obama’s secretary of the Department of Energy, Steven Chu, called energy efficiency “not just 
the low-hanging fruit but the fruit lying on the ground.” (Grunwald 2012, p.369). The idea that 
energy efficiency was something easy to target—easier than, say, changing the source of energy 
we use through a massive ramping up of clean energy production—inspired the use of ARRA 
funds for EECBG programs, and the provision of those funds directly to local governments. 
Beyond achieving short-term energy savings, though, the EECBG program contained a long-
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term aim. In a presentation given by the Office of Weatherization and Intergovernmental 
Programs in April 2009, the office quoted Steven Chu as saying first that the office’s programs 
would create jobs and produce energy savings, but that they would also “empower local 
communities to make strategic investments to meet the nation’s long term clean energy and 
climate goals” (OWIP 2009). The program was bound from its beginning to both achieve 
immediate wins and to fundamentally reshape communities’ approach to energy use, two goals 
that do not necessarily lend themselves to the same implementation approaches. 
 
Program Implementation 
The implementation of the EECBG program began even before the Recovery Act had 
been passed as hints that the program would be part of the recovery act circulated, and continues 
to this day, ten years after the program’s announcement, as some grantees continue to report on 
revolving loan funds that continue to be used to finance energy efficiency projects. Through the 
review of documents and interviews with several individuals involved in federal administration 
of the grant program, this chapter seeks to answer several questions. First, how did those 
responsible for implementing the program manage EECBG’s twin goals of achieving short-term 
energy gains and achieving lasting energy and climate benefits changing how communities used 
energy? Did these goals come into conflict with each other? Second, how did federal support and 
guidance vary across the wide range of communities receiving grants? And finally, what 
evidence did those who interacted with grantees and provided them support see that the program 






A Tangle of Rules 
The language within two federal laws provided the structure of the EECBG program and 
a set forth a variety of limitations that shaped exactly how the Department of Energy 
administered the grant. The first of those laws, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 (EISA), authorized the EECBG program. The second, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), funded the program in 2009. The Department of Energy was 
required to develop regulations that enabled compliance with both laws. EISA was passed by a 
Democratic Congress at a time when a Republican president was in power, and leaves minimal 
discretion to the Department of Energy, a feature characteristic of a law that aligns with 
Congressional preferences but not with Presidential preferences (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  
The EISA provides for the Department of Energy to make grants intended to help eligible 
grantees reduce fossil fuel emissions and energy use and increase energy efficiency (EISA, Title 
5, Subtitle E). The law is very specific about the population thresholds for grantees eligible to 
receive funds through the program and the minimum number of grants to be distributed within 
each state, the percentages of funding required to go to local governments (68%), states (28%), 
and Indian tribes (2%) based on population formulae, and the percentage of funding set aside for 
competitive grants (2%). It requires that the funding allocated based on population be distributed 
according to a formula that uses the overall population of jurisdictions as well as the daytime 
population and other “similar” factors to be determined by the Secretary of Energy, such as, 
possibly, the number of square feet of commercial, industrial, and residential building square 
footage in a jurisdiction. The law also specifies fourteen eligible program activities, enumerated 
in Table 5.1, thirteen of which were defined—for example, “conducting residential and 
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commercial building energy audits,” but the last of which allows for any other appropriate 
activity approved by the Secretary. Even this option, however, requires that the Secretary of 
Energy consult with the Administrator of the EPA, the Secretary of Transportation, and the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.  
Meanwhile, ARRA made certain requirements of all programs it funded. One notable 
requirement was that all entities receiving ARRA grants, along with all contractors and 
subcontractors performing work using ARRA money, receive “prevailing wages” in accordance 
with the Davis-Bacon Act. Davis-Bacon requires the Department of Labor to determine locally 
appropriate prevailing wages to ensure that federal contracts do not undermine market wages for 
a particular task. A second notable requirement was ARRA’s “Buy American” provision, 
requiring that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be 
used for a project for the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or 
public work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the project are produced 
in the United States” unless a waiver was issued by the head of a federal agency and published in 
the Federal Register (ARRA Title 14, Subtitle D, Section 1605). ARRA also did not exempt 
projects from the need to comply with the environmental review required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act, or from any historic preservation requirements or other state or local 
restrictions. 
The task of developing guidance for the EECBG program that complied with EISA 
requirements fell in large part to Pam Mendelson, a longtime DOE employee working within the 
then-small Office of Weatherization and Intergovernmental Programs (Mendelson, phone 
interview, June 2018). The initial process of developing guidance happened before the program 
had been funded by ARRA, as the program was one of those being discussed for inclusion as 
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Congress debated passing an economic stimulus bill. Mendelson painstakingly reviewed the law, 
looking carefully at what is said and what is not said in order to fill in any missing details in 
accordance with the wishes of Congress. Developing the population-based formula for 
determining grantee eligibility was a particular challenge—the Census office, Mendelson 
explained, normally requires a year to get another agency the kinds of population numbers that 
the EISA required DOE to use in its formula. Beyond the translation of the law into specific, 
usable guidance, DOE also had to develop a process they would use to work with grantees. For 
this, DOE relied heavily on advice and feedback from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, on whose Community Development Block Grant Programs the EECBG program 
was loosely modeled.  
Once ARRA was passed, a new level of pressure was on DOE’s Office of Weatherization 
and Intergovernmental Programs to get the EECBG program, along with the vastly increased 
funds they received for the existing Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy 
Program, off the ground as soon as possible. 
 
Building the Plane While Flying It 
When asking questions of those involved in EECBG implementation, it is only a matter 
of time before someone mentions the running joke that “we were building the plane while we 
were flying it” or another variant on that theme. This frequent metaphor, noted by researchers 
studying many of ARRA’s clean energy programs (e.g., Carley 2016), reflects a collective 
memory of a time of extraordinary pressure to implement ARRA programs in the face of 
obstacles that simply did not allow for the kind of speed that politics required.  
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ARRA was aimed at putting money into the economy as quickly as possible, funding 
projects termed “shovel-ready.” ARRA stated that “The President and the heads of Federal 
departments and agencies shall manage and expend the funds made available in this Act so as to 
achieve the purposes specified in subsection (a), including commencing expenditures and 
activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent management.” (ARRA, Section 3, part 
b). But it also aimed to remake the way the nation used energy, putting more funding into clean 
energy than was done at any other time in US history (Aldy 2013). This was a much longer-term 
and slower goal, and EECBG requirements reflect that reality. EECBG, as authorized by EISA, 
required each grantee to submit an energy efficiency and conservation plan to DOE, and gave 
them a year to do so; it required that these plans take into account the plans of neighboring 
jurisdictions, and coordinate between states and local governments (EISA). Moreover, EISA 
called for the EECBG program to be funded annually, envisioning these plans serving as the 
strategy for multiple years of funding. DOE’s obligation to create a clear process for the 
program, to make sure that the money was being spent wisely and in accordance with program 
goals, “was in direct conflict with the shovel-ready goal,” said Mendelson. The kind of pressure 
to deliver results that the “building the plane” metaphor describes resulted from the inherent 
conflict between the goals of the recovery act and the need for careful planning in order to 
develop the kind of energy programs it funded.  
The result of these conflicting mandates was that the EECBG program, along with other 
DOE programs, attempted to adhere to a rapid implementation schedule but experienced 
seemingly inevitable delays getting projects off the ground. The Office of Weatherization and 
Intergovernmental Programs experienced a funding increase from approximately $11million to 
approximately $11billion dollars, and the effort required to scale up their work by an order of 
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magnitute was, by all accounts, enormous. An extensive literature describes this experience in 
detail, including Michael Grunwald’s New New Deal (2012) and Conlan, Posner, and Regan’s 
Governing Under Stress (2017). Long-time employees used to a sleepy pace of work came into 
conflict with political appointees attempting to implement programs at a superhuman pace; and 
EECBG ran through five program directors in its first two years, with one director leaving under 
the cloud of investigation by the DOE’s Inspector General (see note1). EECBG implementation 
was made particularly challenging by the large number of grantees the program had: the program 
eventually provided funds to 2,187 grantees, comprising cities, counties, states, territories, and 
Indian tribes (ORNL 2015).  
The initial EECBG Funding Opportunity Announcement was made in March of 2009, 
and program administrators were responsible for quickly obtaining, reviewing, and approving 
funding from grantees, many of whom had never applied for federal grants before. Applications 
were due from states by the end of May in 2009, and from local governments by the end of June 
2009. DOE had 120 days to review applications once they came in, and DOE was required to 
obligate all funds by September 30, 2010. The September 2010 obligation deadline was met, but 
a report issued by the Government Accountability Office in April of 2011 criticized the program 
for delays in actually getting the money to recipients and getting grantees’ projects started. The 
report summarized the challenges that EECBG continued to face, both at the federal level and at 
the recipient level. At the federal level, GAO reported a lack of experience among DOE program 
administrators, most of whom did not have a background in financial assistance and many of 
                                                
1 The IG report found that the director had improperly hired a deputy, and that the deputy had already been 
performing government work in a capacity as a contractor, including writing the job description for the job he was 
then hired to do (IG report September 2010).  
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whom reported a steep learning curve (GAO 2011). Challenges on the recipient level included 
inexperience among those receiving the grants, delays due to the requirement for local decision-
making bodies such as city councils to approve ARRA-funded programs, and shortages in 
materials such as efficient HVAC systems that were suddenly in high demand due to ARRA’s 
clean energy funding.  
Interviews with federal program administrators make clear that the large number of 
grantees and the variety among grantees’ expertise and needs were a major source of the 
challenges they faced in getting the program launched quickly. The large cities, says Mendelson, 
knew what to do, what they wanted to spend their money on, and how to manage applications 
and interactions with the federal government. For smaller local governments, Indian tribes, and 
more remote grantees, though, the applying entities had much less capacity to submit acceptable 
applications using federal online application systems. Some did not have even have an internet 
connection—Mendelson recalls accepting faxes, deciphering barely-legible handwriting, 
working around some Indian tribes’ hunting schedules when they conflicted with grant 
deadlines, and making other accommodations to make it possible for every eligible grantee to get 
an acceptable application in and get their funding.  
Describing the whirlwind of the program, DOE staff recall stress, but also a sense of 
exhilaration and possibility resulting from an influx of funding and people devoted to clean 
energy. Ted Donat, program director from February 2010 through the program’s end, described 
it as “like working in a start up, crazy hours, groups of people huddled in the hall, papers 
everywhere… I used to say if you ever hear that government workers don't work hard, you can 
punch them in the nose for me.” A project officer who began in 2010 to work on the EECBG 
program said, “It was a crazy time. It was fun, and exciting, I got there in July 2010 and it was 
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all happening so fast” (Stricker 2018). EECBG program staff were at one point working out of 
“swat team” rooms to approve applications as fast as possible, but Mendelson mentioned that 
some staff members took the initiative to decorate the room, provide snacks, and recognize peers 
when they met milestones, describing it as “the kind of thing you’d see in a start-up” (Mendelson 
2018). In spite of the massive challenges, investigations into employees for potential violations 
of contracting rules, and other problems, many of the staff who worked on the program 
throughout its implementation period describe excitement at the federal government taking on a 
program with the potential to accelerate and transform local governments’ energy use. 
 
Working With Grantees 
In working with grantees, EECBG program staff aimed to ensure that projects carried out 
with EECBG funds complied with federal mandates, and to provide support and guidance where 
needed. Their work began with helping entities that had been designated as eligible for funding 
to apply for the funds, and it continued through the close of the grants. 
For formula-based grants, DOE program staff review of EECBG applications was limited 
to ensuring that local plans conformed to federal requirements. Program staff conducted a 
financial and technical review of each application, but the activities pursued were determined by 
local goals, as long as they fell within the 14 eligible program areas. “The way a grant works,” 
said Mendelson, ”there are eligible recipients and there are eligible activities; you can’t pick 
who’s got good programs or not, they just get the money.” When grantees needed support in 
shaping their programs, however, program staff did provide input. One program officers recalls 
that “it was their money, but if they were unsure I’d provide them with examples of how other 
people had spent their money. One of the things that really got them was streetlights. You save 
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every year if you do that. You can parlay that money into doing the next 6 blocks, the next 6 
blocks. Some were almost able to use the EECBG money as seed money.” (Stricker, phone 
interview, 2018). Program staff often stated that the larger cities that were more experienced with 
energy projects had much more precise ideas of what they wanted to do with their funds than the 
smaller or less experienced ones. In those cases, project officers recalled having conversations 
with grantees about exactly what kinds of projects were eligible, as well as discussing the 
projects that other grantees were pursuing. The advice and ideas that project staff were able to 
give depended somewhat on their backgrounds—one project officer mentioned that in the 
Golden, Colorado field office, which managed the larger grantees (over $1million) many staff 
came from renewable energy backgrounds, and were able to use their experience to discuss those 
projects in greater depth with grantees (Gomes, phone interview, 2018).  
As grantees received funding and began implementing their programs, project officers 
began working with them (Glaize, phone interview, 2018). Each project officer was assigned a 
number of grantees, and served, for those grantees, as the primary point of contact with DOE. 
The project officer monitored progress, ensuring that each grantee was meeting milestones and 
complying with reporting requirements and conducting site visits to check on their progress. 
DOE’s oversight plan included three types of monitoring: desktop monitoring, involving project 
officers’ reviews of recipient financial and technical reports, on-site monitoring, where project 
officers traveled to grantees and conducted in-person reviews of projects, and worksite 
monitoring, where project officers reviewed the worksites of the projects themselves (GAO 
2011). All grants were required to be reviewed using desktop monitoring quarterly, while the 
frequency and likelihood of on-site monitoring depended on the size of the grant. For all grants 
larger than $2 million, on-site monitoring was required 1-2 times per year, and for all those 
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between $1million and $2million it was required once during the lifetime of the grant. For grants 
between $250,000 and $1million, 25% of grants were required to receive an on-site visit once 
during the lifetime of the grant, and for those smaller than $250,000, 10% of grants received on-
site visits once during the lifetime of the grant. For all grants, the frequency of worksite reviews 
depended on the need for additional oversight, as determined by DOE program staff. DOE’s 
rationale for the increased frequency of monitoring for larger awards was based on an assessment 
of risk: 70% of project funds were allocated to recipients receiving over $2million, and DOE 
attempted to mitigate the risk of funds being misspent by monitoring the larger amounts more 
closely.  
In interviews, project officers described working to establish cooperative relationships 
with grantees, and seeing their primary role as overcoming obstacles to the projects’ 
implementation when they came up. “I wanted them to think of me as an advisor” said Glaize, “I 
think a lot of them were expecting a strict federal monitor. We did a lot of site visits, you’d start 
off and meet everyone and they’d be afraid of you, like you were from the IRS. I found ways to 
get around that, be friendly, nice, interested in what they were doing.” Stricker echoes the 
importance of obtaining the trust of grantees: “Some of them said ‘Oh my god, you really do care 
what we’re doing, you’re not just some bureaucrat.’ They loved it when we listened to their 
ideas. That got them motivated.” Project officers readily admit that this was not always effective 
at preventing grantees from becoming frustrated, remembering some grantees’ anger at 
discovering that equipment they had purchased was not eligible for reimbursement or that other 
plans did not comply with the many rules of the EECBG program, DOE staff at every level 
emphasized that these relationships were essential to making the program go more smoothly. 
Nick Kong, who worked on the EECBG program in a data analysis and audit role, credits project 
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officers’ relationships with grantees as being the primary factor in keeping the level of fraud and 
misuse of funds low. Ted Donat, the program manager, called the project officers “coaches, 
mentors, advisors”—emphasizing their interest in and commitment to seeing the grantees’ 
projects be successful.  
Asked what kinds of problems grantees experienced and needed assistance with, project 
officers mostly brought up issues with grant management rather than challenges related to energy 
efficiency or renewable energy expertise. As a project officer who managed grants of under 
$1million explained, most grants were not for activities that were particularly innovative or 
technically complicated—grantees mostly changed light fixtures, replaced boilers, and pursued 
other relatively simply projects. Challenges were more likely to arise when grantees had trouble 
managing the implementation of the grant than designing the project. Grantees had trouble 
finding the right contractors to do the work they wanted to do, writing a contract that would give 
the grantee assurance the work would be done on time, finding sources for the machinery needed 
(Glaize 2018). Delays were more likely to result from a lack of experience with grant 
management than a lack of expertise in energy efficiency. To overcome these hurdles, project 
officers recalled work such as going over the specific equipment needed with grantees and 
examining whether various products met ARRA’s Buy American requirement, and whether a 
waiver was possible when such products were not available from American-made sources 
(Stricker 2018). They recalled than any time the local grant manager had previous experience 






Guidance and Technical Assistance 
While the project officers worked with grantees to ensure that projects complied with 
EECBG program requirements and to solve problems with grantees as they came up, DOE 
program staff also worked to educate grantees proactively and to issue formal guidance when a 
particular issue became a problem for many grantees. “Whenever guidance was written, that was 
because that was what was holding people up at the time” said Mendelson. Each time guidance 
was issued, however, the existence of new protocols resulted in renewed needs to educate 
grantees. The effort to educate and work with grantees to comply with the various rules 
associated with the program continued throughout the implementation period. “We had these 
road shows,” remembered Ted Donat, ”where we'd go to municipalities and we'd have a crash-
course on Davis-Bacon, historic preservation, NEPA, ARRA rules. We'd set up in a local federal 
government office and invite regional grantees to come to the meeting; we had conferences and 
grantee meetings. Every opportunity we had we'd talk to grantees about what's the latest 
guidance, etc. It was a huge education, that's one of the reasons it didn't get off the ground for a 
year, it was very low at the beginning and then it went up quickly.” (Donat, interview, 
Washington, D.C., 2018)  
DOE also worked to provide any needed technical assistance to grantees throughout the 
implementation period, using a network of contractors with expertise in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. Zach Abrams, an employee of ICF, which handled a major technical 
assistance contract for the program, describes his role as trying to understand the barriers to 
implementing energy efficiency projects help grantees to overcome them (Abrams, phone 
interview, 2018). One aspect of the technical assistance ICF and other firms provided was the 
ability to connect grantees with experts in energy efficiency and renewable energy, including 
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scientists at Lawrence Berkeley National Labs and subject matter experts within ICF and other 
private companies. If a grantee had a question about the particular technology that would be best 
suited to a local facility or to achieve a local goal, the technical assistance providers were able to 
find the right person to advise the grantees, according to Abrams. If a grantee was setting up a 
revolving loan fund for energy efficiency projects, for example, they might be connected with an 
expert in municipal finance; if there was a question about the most effective renewable energy 
system for a local facility, they might be connected to a renewable energy expert.  
Another crucial aspect of the technical assistance provided was to facilitate peer-to-peer 
information exchange, both in a group format and on an individual basis. Group peer exchange 
occurred through monthly calls for regional groups of grantees; grantees could call in to discuss 
the progress of their programs, with topics emerging from grantee concerns and questions of the 
moment. Individual peer exchange involved putting grantees in touch with each other more 
intentionally, by finding a grantee that had dealt with a similar challenge as the one with the 
question. Individual connections were made by both the technical assistance contractors and the 
project officers working directly with grantees. “The best outside resource I could give them was 
another grantee working on a similar project and having better success,” said one project officer 
(Glaize 2018). “The team of project officers was very close, it was almost always possible to find 
another grantee that was doing a similar project and had advice. We often shared their contact 
information. That was probably the most help we could be for them.” Other project officers 
echoed this, mentioning coordinating conference calls between grantees in different places doing 
similar projects or just putting them in touch.  
In some cases, technical assistance contractors developed initiatives designed to help 
grantees based on the needs that they had seen continuing to arise. One such project was the 
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development of an RFP library at ICF (Abrams 2018). Contractors could not write local 
governments’ requests for proposals for them, but they saw many local governments being 
inundated with offers from firms that wanted to secure as much business as possible from entities 
receiving ARRA funding, and local governments did not necessarily have the necessary 
expertise to be able to state clearly what they needed from these firms. ICF began to put together 
an RFP library, choosing those that had already been well-researched and resulted in good 
proposals from companies in other jurisdictions so that local governments did not all have to 
spend the time researching and writing complex RFPs, but could instead tailor existing ones to 
their own needs. 
Although a wealth of assistance and guidance was available to grantees, the extent to 
which grantees took advantage of it was highly variable. Consultants tasked with providing 
technical assistance had to do a lot of outreach to get grantees to take the firms up on the 
assistance they offered, and Abrams recalls the outreach not always being well-received, with 
grantees often facing too many constraints on their time to be willing to participate in group calls 
or investigate what other resources were available to them. Those that were not spending their 
money received additional outreach, but others were spending their money at a reasonable pace 
and simply chose not to engage with technical assistance providers, giving little indication of 
why they chose not to respond to those offers. Abrams could not identify any specific pattern to 
which grantees took him up on offers of technical assistance, but did mention that there were 
some individual grant managers that just seemed more eager for information and knowledge 
about energy topics. Asked whether grantees who had received technical assistance once were 
more likely to engage again, Abrams agreed that some grantees seemed to come back multiple 
times after receiving helpful assistance once. 
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Grantees’ Hiring of Contractors 
Contractors hired locally performed much of the work that grantees did. ARRA required 
that grantees use their standard local bidding processes to procure services performed with 
ARRA funds, and federal program staff frequently mentioned that they were required to allow 
grantees to request proposals and choose among them as they saw fit. Program staff reported 
many grantee relationships being positive, remembering contractors who were doing good work 
for local governments being hired on a full-time basis in some cases (Glaize 2018), and in others 
remembering being contacted by the contractors directly. Though program staff did need to 
confirm that the contractors were truly contacting DOE or technical assistance providers on the 
grantee’s behalf, they did report in some cases providing information directly to the contractors 
when appropriate to help with questions they had (Abrams 2018). Nevertheless, federal program 
staff and technical assistance providers often saw contractors making unrealistic promises or 
selling grantees services at seemingly inflated prices. “They get a couple bucks and they’re 
inundated with entities promising the moon,” said Abrams (2018).  In these cases, they described 
trying to provide additional information to grantees without inappropriately intervening in local 
procurement processes. Technical assistance providers could use the network of experts they had 
access to for this purpose: “None of us considered it our mandate to be the sheriff, say no you 
shouldn’t work with this group. We could use subject matter experts to validate claims or 
invalidate claims that ESCOs [energy service companies] or other vendors were promising too 
much” (Abrams 2018). Project officers described attempting to show grantees that they were 
getting a bad deal from contractors when needed:  “I had a couple of grantees that were using 
contractors that were obviously not motivated to do the best with those funds. You can’t really 
come right out and say you’re being swindled, but you could let them know that doing this only 
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cost this much—let me get you in contact with someone else who can get this done cheaper…” 
(Glaize 2018).  
Some project officers recalled contractors attempting to exert an inappropriate level of 
influence over what grantees did with their EECBG funds. “Lots of companies… they would 
come in and tell the cities ‘we’ll tell you what to do’… some of the work the contractors were 
telling them to do wasn’t allowable” said Stricker. Stricker recalled working with grantees to 
ensure that the work contractors were promising complied with the program rules in these cases. 
Another project officer recalled that “I do think where we did run into some problems is where 
grantees allowed subcontractors to dictate their programs. I do think that’s where we ran into 
more problems… Most of these places have some capacity to do infrastructure projects; they’re 
able to plan to it. It’s where people don’t have the capacity to plan it for themselves that that 
occurs…” (Gomes 2018). Though rare, there were cases that rose to the level of fraud as well. 
Donat recalled that “a contractor had written a report for one city, stuck a new cover letter on it 
and submitted a report for a different city, charged 200 grand for each city…” which staff 
reported to the Inspector General’s office.  
Because all ARRA requirements flowed down to sub-grantees and contractors, hiring 
contractors was further complicated by grantees’ need to enforce contractors’ compliance with 
those rules. Stricker remembered that some contractors became frustrated and withdrew their 
bids to do work for grantees when asked for documentation showing that they were complying 
with prevailing wage and other requirements, even when the documentation being asked for 






An essential duty of DOE program staff was to identify problems on an ongoing basis. 
Problems that staff identified included those of a routine nature, such as delays obtaining 
necessary supplies for a project, as well as suspected fraud or violations of program terms. In 
addition to the program staff’s duty to identify and correct these problems, the program was 
subject to oversight by the DOE Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office, 
which reported on the program to Congress. Each of these offices took its oversight 
responsibilities seriously and regularly reported on the program, making recommendations for 
improvement. Reports on the program’s performance were particularly critical with regard to the 
speed of implementation. A report from the DOE Inspector General’s Office in August of 2010 
noted, for example, that grant recipients had spent only 8.4% of the $3.2 billion authorized for 
EECBG, and expressed concern that spending had not kept pace with the program’s anticipated 
expenditures (US DOE 2010). Program staff worked with the Inspector General’s office to 
address these concerns, while disagreeing that funds spent was the correct measure of program 
progress—the Inspector General report noted that program staff felt that recipients’ progress in 
obligating their funds was a better indication of work being performed, since actual program 
spending often followed the completion of the work grantees were doing. In September of 2011, 
the Inspector General’s Office criticized the program further, issuing a “Management Alert” 
regarding the status of recipients’ obligations and again expressing concern about the pace of 
program implementation, noting that recipients had made significant progress but that the ability 




Pressure to ensure that grantees were on-track to complete their projects within the 36-
month implementation period for EECBG led DOE to establish new milestones for spending in 
2010. The initial grantee requirements were to obligate all funds within 18 months of the 
effective award date, and spend funds within 36 months; but in April 2010, DOE encouraged 
recipients to obligate 90% of funds by June 25, 2010, and to ensure that 20% of funds were spent 
by September 30, 2010, and 50% by June 30, 2011 (GAO 2011). In an effort known as 
“Operation Clear Path,” DOE conducted additional outreach to the recipients of larger grants to 
speed up spending, in some cases encouraging grantees to shift funds to projects with shorter 
implementation timelines—GAO gives the example of one city that moved $600,000 from a 
revolving loan fund project to a lighting retrofit project, bringing the city’s percent spent figure 
up to 31% and helping to satisfy pressure to increase the pace of EECBG program spending. In 
spite of these efforts, many recipients continued to show slow rates of spending, particularly 
those with larger grants, and GAO reported that many recipients expressed frustration and 
confusion at the addition of a new set of spending milestones when the grant period had already 
begun. 
Recalling the level of scrutiny the program faced, Donat described being “sort of called 
to these tribunals every few months to defend our actions.” Donat acknowledged that an 
acceptance of that high level of scrutiny was essential to working at the DOE and overseeing 
large taxpayer-funded programs, but nevertheless expressed irritation at the impediment that a 
heightened level of scrutiny presented to achieving the simultaneous goal of rapid 
implementation. Grantees, for example, were required to submit their weekly payrolls to show 
their compliance with the Davis-Bacon act’s prevailing wage requirements; a contractor for 
DOE’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at one point interpreted that requirement as 
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meaning that grantees had to submit their payrolls to DOE every week, an onerous frequency of 
reporting, and criticized EECBG program staff for failing to collect this information on a weekly 
basis. Program staff appealed and succeeded in convincing the Inspector General’s office to 
agree that weekly payrolls could be submitted with quarterly reports, not every week, but the 
appeal process took time and exemplified the types of time-consuming work required to handle 
the high level of oversight over the program. Grantees, too, were subject to OIG oversight, with 
contractors auditing many of the larger grants intensively. Faults found through this oversight 
included insufficient documentation of job creation numbers reported by sub-grantees (OAS-RA-
13-14) and inadequate progress in meeting goals for energy saved within the timeframe expected 
(OAS-RA-13-16). Grantees and federal program staff were required to respond and take 
corrective action, though in some cases this was difficult. For example, when Connecticut was 
criticized for failing to adequately scrutinize its subgrantees’ reports of numbers of jobs created, 
the state’s response included the statement that since the projects were completed, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to go back to subgrantees and their contractors and request documentation 
on the exact number of jobs created, especially given the limitations of the state energy office’s 
staff time.  
Though oversight was generally accepted as an essential part of conducting a taxpayer 
funded program, the two types of oversight seemed to come into conflict with each other. 
Continuous evaluation of the program for compliance with the complex array of rules to which it 
was subject tended to slow down implementation, exacerbating the degree to which the program 




Staff Perspectives on Program Successes and Shortcomings 
Overwhelmingly, federal program staff interviewed for this project saw EECBG as 
having achieved a great deal for energy efficiency and renewable energy in the United States. 
Staff mentioned the program having played an important role in making new efficient 
technologies commercially viable, due to the high demand for things like LED lights and 
efficient equipment. “EECBG was very instrumental in making some of those early stage 
technologies viable,” said Gomes.  
Mendelson commented: 
“Every city I go to I see a bike share program—that wouldn’t be there without the 
recovery act. Major infrastructure changes, many things we use every day wouldn’t have 
been there without the recovery act. There’s so much out there that we now live with and 
consider normal that just wasn’t there before the recovery act. I see the big belly trash 
compactors; I say to myself, would they even have been a company without the recovery 
act? It was the mainstreaming of many different efficiency mechanisms.”  
Program staff did have criticisms of the program, which varied depending on who was 
speaking—some saw the number of allowable activities as being too large, and would have 
recommended creating a smaller list and requiring projects to meet a threshold Return on 
Investment (Kong 2018). But mostly, staff saw the challenges the program experienced as 
having been inevitable due to the conflicting needs to push money out the door as fast as possible 
while doing a daunting amount of grantee education and program start-up work. 
Although program staff felt that the program successes were well-known by grantees and 
advocates for sustainability in local government, the benefits seemed to them to be underreported 
and unappreciated throughout the federal government. “I would go with project officers on the 
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audits sometimes. Most of the time we'd roll into town and it would be like the thank you tour. It 
was like, thank you so much for the money, the wave of gratitude was overwhelming…” said 
Donat; “EECBG was such an amazing program and the weird thing is that outside of DOE, it 
was beloved… but inside DOE it was total red-headed stepchild.” Donat attributes the lack of 
pride in EECBG at the federal level to the unrealistic time frame in which recovery act programs 
were expected to show results. “It didn't show success quickly enough, and in the environment at 
the time there's no possible way it could have” he says, due to the time required to launch the 
program, educate grantees, and get their projects started locally.  
Much of the disconnect, according to those who worked on the program, also had to do 
with how difficult it was to quantify the far-reaching benefits of the program, beyond what was 
able to be captured in the energy saved and number of jobs created that was reported in grantee 
filings. On the evaluation of the program conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Donat commented: 
“Even though I think some of the outputs of the evaluation are pretty staggering, I think 
it was just the tip of the iceberg. I know we created many many more jobs indirectly, 
think of all the HVAC people, the plumbers, the electricians, putting up lights, I think 
that report only scratched the surface of how many jobs we funded. That money was a 
force multiplier that created a lot of other jobs, and I don't think that report came 
anywhere close to what we did.” 
Many grantees, for example, filled out zero as the number of jobs created on their projects, rather 
than calculating the fraction of a job the work they had done created. So many of the grants were 
small, and the jobs they funded in combination were simply unaccounted for, according to 
Donat’s comments. Data quality, an issue that GAO reported on several times and that program 
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staff worked to address, was part of the problem with being able to definitively show success, 
according to program staff, but more fundamentally, the indirect job creation and support of 
emergent technologies that many program staff related as likely effects were simply not captured 
in grantee reports or the federal program evaluation. 
Additionally, the outcomes reported on by grantees and in the federal evaluation of 
EECBG did not capture long-term changes to energy policy and planning by grantees—gains 
that many program staff cite as being most important in terms of lasting effects. Changes in 
capacity to take on energy efficiency projects, and the confidence to pursue similar projects in 
the future are among those that program staff emphasized as being key to the program’s success, 
even more than the popularization of efficient products and the short-term energy savings. They 
emphasized the learning that happened through grantees’ experiences with efficiency and 
renewables, when many had never taken on projects like this before. Asked what he saw as being 
the biggest impact of the program, Abrams, who has continued to work with local governments 
in the years since EECBG, said “the legacy of confidence and experience.”  Donat, similarly, 
discussed learning as being key, commenting that he saw one of the biggest program successes 
as being “the demystification of energy efficiency, proving the case that energy efficiency 
investment yields real money savings that you can then put into your treasury and use as you see 
fit…” and leading local governments to try those strategies again later. Discussing the impacts 
on policy and planning at the state and local levels, Mendelson commented:  
“So many people learned how to do a procurement for energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
That’s huge because it removes a barrier to doing that in the future. Similarly, all these policies, 
they learn so much about benchmarking—a lot of people did these peer exchanges; people got 
smarter, that’s an impact we’ll never be able to quantify.” 
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An additional barrier to the program’s successes being more widely recognized, 
according to federal staff, was simply that the program was not re-funded. Having been funded 
by the Recovery Act, the program had little chance of being funded again, especially after its 
initial delays in showing success, and according to Donat, once it is clear that a program won’t 
be re-funded, it is difficult to gain much recognition for it within a federal agency. Although the 
program staff that saw it through were proud of its achievements, higher-level DOE staff simply 
did not see the value in promoting a program that was, for all immediate purposes, over. When 
the Oak Ridge report came out, showing that the program had created 62,902 jobs, that the 
program saved $5.2 billion on energy bills, and that it avoided 25.7 million metric tons of carbon 
equivalent (ORNL 2015), there was no press release, a major disappointment to those who saw 
those findings as being indications of enormous success. 
This chapter’s examination of the implementation of EECBG at the federal level reveals 
several things. First, the goal of creating a long-term re-orientation of state and local energy 
planning and policy conflicted with the ARRA’s short-term mandate to show immediate energy 
and job creation gains. Second, in implementing this program, the federal government developed 
a massive store of knowledge about working with local governments, ramping up energy 
efficiency programs, and sharing knowledge, much of which was lost as a result of the program 
not being re-funded. Those who worked on the program wished to see the development of a 
library of renewable energy and energy efficiency RFP’s, the development of a public database 
of local government contracts so that local governments could easily see how much particular 
services cost similar municipalities and what they should be able to get for their money—these 
were never realized, or were never made public, because the program ended after a single round 
of funding. Third, the level of peer-to-peer networking among grantees that was facilitated by the 
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federal government was hugely important and was a largely invisible aspect of the program 
except to those working on it. While many peer-to-peer networks exist outside of the federal 
government on climate change and related topics, program staff experience hints at the federal 
government’s unique ability to bring in those who would not normally participate in such 
networks. And finally, the experience of the program staff raises questions about whether their 
perspective matches with the experience of grantees and the outcomes they reported, questions 




Chapter 5: Analysis of Nationwide Data on EECBG Implementation 
at the Municipal Level 
The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program was unique in providing 
funding for energy efficiency programs to every community in the United States with a 
population over 35,000 and to many smaller communities in states with few large cities and 
towns. It also produced large datasets that should, in theory, provide a rich body of knowledge 
on which to judge the program’s successes and challenges. Prior research, however, has 
produced limited lessons for future climate policy drawn from the experiences of more than 1200 
municipal-level EECBG grantees. Scholarly research has focused on implementation speed 
rather than energy savings or climate policy development. The federal government’s own 
evaluation of the program focused on job creation and energy and greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions, but the evaluation’s analysis of factors that led to greater success were puzzling and 
went largely unexplored. The evaluation found that certain EECBG activities, including lighting 
programs and energy efficiency retrofit programs, were associated with more documented energy 
savings per dollar than other types of activities (ORNL 2015).  But some factors that would seem 
sure to improve program outcomes were in fact associated with negligible or negative effects on 
cost-effectiveness. These included a grantee’s having received technical training, having 
conducted technical energy audits, receiving financial assistance from utilities that was combined 
with EECBG funding, and having a high level of community support for the EECBG program. 
In effect, some of the very factors that emerge in lists of “best practices” and lessons learned at 
the community level were found to have no effect or a negative effect on programs’ ability to 
save energy and greenhouse gases in this evaluation. 
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This chapter is motivated in part by the puzzle that the federal EECBG program 
evaluation presents. It uses nationwide data on grants made to municipalities to ask not only 
what relationships can be found between community characteristics and outcomes, but also what 
characteristics of the federal program make learning from the experience difficult. The analysis 
finds that there are community characteristics—such as leftward lean and large population size—
that influence the type and complexity of programs that grantees took on. But it finds little 
explanatory power in the variables tested to determine the cost-effectiveness of communities’ 
programs, with the exception of states’ support for renewable energy policies leading to 
increased cost-effectiveness for local grantees’ renewable energy installations.  It points to the 
difficulty of showing success in a program with huge variation how it is implemented, and the 
difficulty of comparing results across municipalities with enormous ranges in size, capacity, and 
experience in the relevant policy area.  
The chapter points to the need for qualitative research to understand how programs were 
designed and implemented and what long-term effects they had. Its findings lead to the 
hypothesis that quantitative analysis of a program that operates on municipalities of such widely 
varying abilities will erroneously show negative results for leading municipalities because 
leading municipalities choose to implement more complex programs, a hypothesis that is 
explored further in Chapter 6. 
The specific question examined this chapter was how communities’ use of EECBG funds 
and the outcomes they achieved varied based on communities’ characteristics. Measuring the 
success of the EECBG program is complex due to the large number of metrics that were used to 
track program outcomes and because of the conflicting goals of the program described in 
Chapter 4. The program aimed to get energy efficiency programs implemented quickly and spur 
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job creation, while also achieving both short-term and long-lasting improvements in energy 
efficiency and conservation. Prior academic research on the program has looked at factors 
influencing implementation speed as an indicator of municipalities’ success in complying with 
grant requirements, while the federal government’s program evaluation focused on job creation, 
energy savings, and carbon emissions reductions, as described in Chapter 2. The choices that 
communities made in designing their programs have received less attention. The analysis in this 
chapter treats grant recipients’ choices as being interrelated with outcomes, looking at patterns in 
communities’ choices and their influence on outcome data. Three key sub-questions help to 
answer the overarching question of how municipalities’ use of funds varied: 
1. What did communities do with their funds?  
2. What factors led to implementation delays?  
3. What factors led to increased cost-effectiveness?  
A detailed description of the variables examined and the methods used is available in Appendix 
A. 
 
Community Program Choices 
I expected that communities showing characteristics typical of climate leaders would lead 
to the choice of more complex EECBG programs, including activities that have less immediately 
realized energy savings.  
Communities that received EECBG funds designed energy efficiency programs 
encompassing activities that fit into fourteen distinct categories of eligible activities. Table 5.1 
shows the number of communities that chose to implement each of these activities (many 
communities pursued multiple activities, or pursued multiple projects that fell into the same 
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activity category—this table simply shows how many municipalities undertook any project 
within a given category). Energy efficiency retrofits was the most popular activity, and only 35 
communities undertook activities falling into the “other” category—any activities that did not 
fall into the first 13 required special permission from the Department of Energy. 
Table 5.1. Fourteen activities were eligible for EECBG funding, thirteen of which 
were pre-defined. 
1. Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 420 
2. Technical Consultant Services 295 
3. Residential and Commercial Buildings and Audits 200 
4. Financial Incentive Program 207 
5. Energy Efficiency Retrofits 864 
6. Buildings and Facilities 356 
7. Transportation 322 
8. Codes and Inspections 74 
9. Energy Distribution 31 
10. Material Conservation Program 99 
11. Reduction/Capture of Methane/Greenhouse Gases 22 
12. Lighting 439 
13. Onsite Renewable Technology 253 
14. Other 35 
 
Because I expected a number of variables to influence both the number and type of 
activities that municipalities pursued, I used Latent Class Analysis to look for and describe 
clusters of communities pursuing similar combinations of activities. Latent Class Analysis uses 
maximum likelihood methods to group data into user-specified numbers of “classes” whose 
observed behavior with regard to discrete variables is most similar to each other. I used the R 
package “poLCA” (Linzer and Lewis 2013) to create classes of communities that created 
programs with similar combinations of activities, and that pursued a similar overall number of 
overall activities.  
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The five-class model yielded 5 groups of communities with distinct clusters of behavior. 
Class 1, accounting for 10.4% of grantee communities, was the most active group, pursuing 
between 6 and 11 different types of activity. These communities were highly likely to include 
energy efficiency retrofits within their plans, but also included a number of other activities along 
with it. Class 3 was the second most active group, pursuing 4-5 distinct activities spread across 
the spectrum of eligible activities. Class 4 pursued 2-3 activities, with energy efficiency retrofits 
again the most common choice. Classes 2 and 5 each pursued just one activity, but for class 2 it 
was always energy efficiency retrofits, whereas for class 5 it was one activity other than energy 
efficiency retrofits.  
Table 5.2. Communities were separated according to the type and number of activities 
they pursued using latent class analysis. 
Class Number Description Number of 
Observations Percent of Total 
1 Most varied programs. Pursued 6-11 





Four to five activities, with highest 
probability of doing energy efficiency 
retrofits and lighting, but a variety of 
other things too. 
288 23.1% 
3 
Two to three Activities— most likely did 
energy efficiency retrofits and one other 
activity. 
463 37.2% 
4 One activity other than energy efficiency retrofits. 160 12.8% 
5 One Activity: just energy efficiency retrofits 182 14.6% 
NA Did not report data 24 1.9% 
 
Analysis of the factors that led communities to fall into one of these groups showed that 
class 1 had a much higher mean population than the other classes; those with larger numbers of 
Heating Degree Days (indicating colder climates) were more likely to pursue solely energy 
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efficiency retrofits (i.e., be members of class 5); and the rightward lean of a community 
decreased the variety of activities that communities pursued. There was no clear relationship 
between the amount of funding retained, rather than being used to pay subcontractors, and class.  
The analysis confirmed that larger and more leftward leaning municipalities were more 
likely to pursue more complex programs, and indicated that a municipality’s climate exerted a 
small influence on the types of programs pursued. 
 
Planning vs. Building 
Beyond the general outline of what communities spent money on, another major question 
was whether community characteristics would influence whether a local government used its 
money on planning versus solely on hard infrastructure. Though each grant recipient was 
required to submit an energy efficiency and conservation plan to the Department of Energy, 
these plans varied in their level of detail; and communities had the option of spending a portion 
their funds to create a plan. Because spending some funds on the creation or development of a 
plan may indicate an intention to continue program activities on a long-term basis, I wondered if 
factors such as the community’s partisan lean and its population size would influence how likely 
the community was to spend some money on planning rather than solely on hard infrastructure. 
Spending money on technical consulting services, too, seemed a possible indicator of a 
municipality’s intention to continue its energy efficiency activities in the longer term, as these 
services were often engaged in order to prioritize many possible projects. I therefore performed 
logistic regressions on the use of program funds for an energy efficiency and conservation 
strategy, as well as on the use of program funds for technical consultant services. Community 
characteristics that were associated with using some money on both energy efficiency and 
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conservation strategy and technical consultant serves were a larger population size and a lower 
level of republican vote, as expected (Table 5.3, Table 5.4). These variables remained significant 
in models that included the community’s form of government, the state it was in, the number of 
renewable energy policies in the state it is in, and the form of government of the municipality, 
none of which were significant variables themselves. Although communities could use funds 
marked as going to ‘energy efficiency and conservation plans’ and ‘technical consulting 
services’ in a variety of ways, these relationships do indicate that, holding population size 
constant, more conservative places spent less money on planning and analysis than did more 
liberal-leaning municipalities. 
Table 5.3. Logistic regression shows that larger population size and lower level of 
republican vote are associated with higher likelihood of spending some money on planning 
(n=1222, AIC=1497.8). 
 Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Population Size 0.31 0.077 6.3e-05 *** 
Percent Republican Vote 
in 2008 -1.4 0.51 0.0061 ** 
 
Table 5.4. Logistic regression shows that larger population size and lower level of 
republican vote are associated with higher likelihood of spending some money on technical 
consultant services  (n=1222, AIC=1267.5). 
 Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Population Size 0.49 0.085 7.41e-09 *** 
Percent Republican Vote 





Past research posits that the efficiency of grantees’ implementation of EECBG programs 
is a valid metric of success with this program, since spending funds quickly was an explicit goal 
of ARRA and because implementation delays are an indicator of difficulty in managing ARRA 
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funds. Interviews with DOE program officers for EECBG indicate that implementation 
efficiency may not be an accurate indicator of a well-executed energy program (see Chapter 4), 
but extreme delays in program implementation nevertheless remain a likely indicator that a 
municipality was not able to use EECBG money effectively. I expected that larger, wealthier, 
and more liberal cities would have fewer implementation delays because those are the cities that 
tended to have adopted sustainability and climate plans before the ARRA period, and could be 
expected to have more experience with this type of program. Prior research also indicates that a 
greater percent of funds retained locally is associated with more expedient implementation 
(Terman and Feiock 2015). I used multiple regression to look at the effect of all of these factors 
on the percentage of a community’s grant that was spent throughout the implementation period, 
and compared the explanatory power of these factors on the percent of the grant spent at each 
reporting quarter. These factors had the most explanatory power for spending at the ninth 
quarter, though they left most of the variation in community’s spending speed unaccounted for 
even at the ninth quarter (r-square=0.063). Using the ninth quarter as a point at which to examine 
implementation speed is also theoretically sound since it is slightly over two years from the 
beginning of the grant period, which was originally intended to be the end of the spending 
period. All variables were significantly correlated with the percent of the community’s money 
that was spent at the ninth quarter, though all in the opposite direction from what was expected 
(Table 5). 
Table 5.5. Factors expected to be associated with a higher percentage of grant money 
spent in the 9th quarter actually went in the opposite direction (adj. R-square 0.063). 
 Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
Percent of Funds 
Retained Locally 
-0.11 0.021 1.44e-07 *** 
County Mean 




Vote in 2008 0.23 7.6e-02 0.0028** 
Log(population) -0.065 0.011 1.56e-08*** 
 
 When using the class of communities obtained through Latent Class Analysis, 
communities falling into Class 1 in the Latent Class Analysis—those communities that pursued 
the most varied programs and tended to be the largest and most liberal—experienced the greatest 
implementation delays (Table 6). 
Table 5.6. Communities pursuing the most complex programs showed greater delays 
in spending at quarter 9 of the program (adj. R-square 0.052). The reference group is Class 1, 
the group with the most complex programs; each next highest number moves to a simpler 
suite of programs, and each shows a stepwise increase in the typical percent of funds spent at 
quarter nine. 
 Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
Intercept 0.53006 0.02840 < 2e-16 *** 
Class 2 0.07035 0.03415 0.039620 * 
Class 3 0.10937 0.03210 0.000679 *** 
Class 4 0.20157 0.03817 1.52e-07 *** 
Class 5 0.26190 0.03712 2.89e-12 *** 
 
All of these associations are small, but overall, the results show a consistent pattern: 
factors that were expected to have a positive effect on implementation speed tended to actually 
have a negative effect. Characteristics associated with communities that would be expected to 





Cost & Outcome Analysis 
A final analysis looks at the relationship between community characteristics and the 
reported outcomes of communities’ grant spending. This analysis is based on data provided in 
response to a FOIA request for program outcome data from the Department of Energy. The 
Department of Energy provided a spreadsheet entitled “EECBG_Grantee Data_Costing and 
Metrics_9.6.18.” Metadata within the spreadsheet indicated that it included cumulative data on 
metrics and costs for grantees’ EECBG activities, and that it was last updated June 30, 2015.  
The number of different metrics used to track projects makes it extremely difficult to 
compare projects’ outcomes. Over 100 metrics are used, with many projects being tracked using 
multiple metrics. Table 5.7 shows the list of EECBG metrics and number of projects for which 














Table 5.7. Communities used a huge variety of metrics to track EECBG program 
outcomes. The full list, shown here, demonstrates the challenge of comparing grantee 
outcomes. 
 
In order to look at project outcomes, I joined the cost and metrics data to the datasets 
based on FedSpending data that I used for the previous analyses. I then selected activities that 
were tracked using common metrics for substantial numbers of projects to create three subsets of 
community projects: renewable energy installations with the metric “total capacity of systems 
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installed” in kilowatts; building retrofits measured in square feet retrofitted; and LED streetlight 
installation measured in number of streetlights installed.  
For all of these projects, I expected that a variety of community-level relationships would 
affect costs. Larger communities were expected to have lower costs, as they were expected to 
benefit from economies of scale, and variables capturing state-level action on renewable energy 
and energy efficiency building codes were expected to reduce costs as well, given that 
communities would be able to benefit from state and utility subsidies in these places, and might 
have more experience complying with state-level building energy requirements. Climate 
variables were expected to experience decreased cost in different ways: sunnier places may have 
had better-developed networks of solar energy installers and experienced lower renewable 
energy costs, while colder and communities might have more experience with building retrofits 
intended to save heating energy, and therefore decrease the cost of those projects. Communities 
with higher levels of republican support were expected to have increased costs for all projects, 
since renewable energy and energy efficiency was a Democratic priority and more liberal areas 
may have had more experience with these projects and access to renewable energy supply 
networks. Communities with more complex plans for their EECBG funds were expected to 
experience lower costs, as complex energy efficiency planning may have indicated that the 
community was savvier with respect to energy and climate projects.  
 
Renewable Energy Installations 
The renewable energy subset contained 193 observations, after removing observations 
reporting 0kw installed or 0 dollars spent. I calculated the cost per kw of installed capacity for 
105 
 
those remaining, and tested its relationship with several factors that I expected to influence the 
cost per kw of grantees’ installed renewable energy using multivariate regression.  
Models of the relationships between these predictors and cost per kW of capacity 
installed were weak, with all regressions resulting in r-squares of less than 10%, but some 
variables were significant (Table 5.8): most notably, variables that captured state-level policies 
relating to renewable energy were consistently associated with reduced cost per kw. This was 
true in models that used a dummy variable representing whether a state had a mandatory 
Renewable Portfolio Standard policy in 2009, but models improved slightly when that variable 
was replaced with ACEEE’s score for state-level energy efficiency policies, as that variable 
allowed for variation among states’ level of support for renewable energy. Larger municipality 
size, on the other hand, was consistently associated with increased cost per kW installed. This 
was surprising, as I had expected larger communities to benefit from economies of scale when 
installing renewable energy systems; instead, larger communities paid more per kW installed. 
The typical number of annual heating degree days a community experiences had no significant 
relationship with cost per kW, nor did the partisan lean of the community. Models that included 
the LCA class membership of the municipality also showed no relationship between the 
complexity of the community’s EECBG plans and cost per kw installed, and models that 
included whether a community was an ICLEI member showed no relationship between ICLEI 
membership and cost per kw. Models that tested whether implementation efficiency led to lower 
cost per kw hour showed no relationship between having spent money earlier and lower costs, 
undermining the idea that communities that were slower to get their EECBG funds spent had 
worse results. Additionally, for renewable energy projects, no relationship between having 
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retained a larger portion of funds (rather than hiring contractors) and lower cost was found. 
Household income variables were not significant either.  
 
Table 5.8. Variables significantly associated with varying cost per kW of renewable 
energy capacity installed (standard errors in parentheses). 
   
Log of population 969.4** 
(316.2) 
State with Mandatory RPS policy  -1666* (659.9) 
Heating Degree Days 0.679 (1.298) 








Building Space Retrofits 
No models that tested relationships between various factors and the cost per square foot 
of retrofitting buildings were significant; variables tested included population, heating degree 
days, LCA class, ACEEE building code score for the state, and county mean household income. 
The lack of any significant models is likely due to the highly variable nature of both building 
costs and the scope of projects that used “square feet retrofitted” as an outcome metric. 
Retrofitting an older building with new heating and cooling equipment, new insulation, and 
perhaps other items is quite a different prospect than making smaller upgrades to a newer space; 
the failed attempt to find any factors with a significant relationship to the cost per square foot of 
these projects underscores the difficulty of using quantitative metrics to compare highly variable 




Models testing the relationship between various factors and the cost per streetlight retrofit 
showed that state-level policies supporting renewable energy and energy efficiency, as measured 
by the state’s ACEEE score, were associated with reduced costs per streetlight retrofit. In some 
models, ICLEI membership was associated with a lower cost, while the use of technical 
consulting services was associated with higher costs in some models. These models were not 
greatly compelling, and community-level associations with reduced cost were not consistent 
across different models. These results again emphasize the important advantage that 
communities have when they are located in a state with strong support for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency policies. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter’s findings demonstrate, first, the difficulty in evaluating a program that 
measures outcomes using over 100 metrics. This difficulty is perhaps an inherent part of the 
trade-off between providing the flexibility for grant recipients to choose their own suite of 
programs to implement and the accompanying variation in the kinds of outcomes that result. This 
chapter, moreover, focuses only on municipal-level grantees; the entire set of grantees presents 
an even more complex picture, as states implemented their programs in unique ways, and passed 
much of their funding on to local governments with varying additional restrictions, depending on 
the state’s priorities.  
The analysis of what grantees did with their funds suggests that a program that engages 
local governments should consider the capacity and desire of smaller local governments to take 
on complex programs. For the EECBG program, a goal was to spread the energy efficiency and 
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conservation practices of local leaders to more municipalities, and to enhance the existing 
programs that local governments were already undertaking. By using a population-based 
formula, the program ended up distributing the bulk of the funding to relatively few places, but 
because of the goal of getting to even very small municipalities, the vast majority of the 
individual grants were for small amounts. The analysis in this chapter shows that most grant 
recipients pursued just one or two activities, with most recipients doing some energy efficiency 
retrofits on municipal facilities, some of those pursuing one or two other programs. The 
correlation between a community’s population size and the number of activities it pursued was 
weak, showing that many smaller governments do have the ability to plan for more complex 
programs; no set of easily available factors had much explanatory power for the variety and 
combination of programs that communities pursued. This lends support to the importance that 
other scholars have pointed out of the “policy entrepreneur,” and additionally simply reflects that 
when given a large degree of choice, communities will tailor programs to their local needs and 
capacities. The reality that more complex programs are likely to constitute a minority of 
municipalities in the United States means that future programs should consider creating options 
for those that wish to implement simpler programs that recognize their more limited capacity to 
plan complex programs. 
An interesting and surprising finding of this chapter’s analysis on implementation 
efficiency was that larger, wealthier municipalities that were more likely to be ICLEI members, 
were more liberal, and those that implemented more complex programs were those most likely to 
have had long delays in spending their funds. This is contrary to the expectation that these 
municipalities, for many of which climate and energy planning was already a local priority, 
would be more likely to get their programs going quickly. Delays in program spending were a 
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continual source of bad publicity for the EECBG program and, according to some advocates, 
explain to some extent why the program was never renewed. The analysis in this chapter also 
shows that larger, more liberal communities were more likely to spend a portion of their funds on 
creating or developing an energy efficiency and conservation strategy, and on technical 
consulting services. If implementation delays were an indicator of less successful programs, a 
relationship would have been expected between implementation delays and decreased cost-
effectiveness of programs, but no such relationship was found. These factors, taken together, 
lead to the hypothesis that communities with greater capacity to implement climate and energy 
programs were simply attempting to do harder, more complex things with their EECBG funds 
than those with less experience, which may have required more planning and analysis before 
beginning. These municipalities may already, at the time the EECBG program funds were 
distributed, have done many of the “low hanging fruit” activities that were quicker and easier to 
implement. The next chapter explores this hypothesis further using qualitative analysis, primarily 
interviews with local grant managers, to assess how communities made decisions about which 
programs to pursue and what kinds of programs were most likely to result in long-term 
environmental benefits. 
Finally, the analysis in this chapter showed the importance of supportive state-level 
energy policies to allowing communities to take full advantage of any funding they have for 
climate and energy programs. Though few relationships could be found between community-
level factors and cost-effectiveness of federal energy efficiency dollars, state-level policies 
showed a consistent relationship with decreased local cost for the renewable energy and lighting 




Chapter 6: Community-Level Analysis 
Some communities were able to turn EECBG funds into robust programs that continue to 
offer new local benefits to this day, while for other communities the funds did no more than fill 
immediate holes in capital improvement funding streams. This chapter uses interviews with 
EECBG grant managers in 26 communities to evaluate how the EECBG program affected local 
energy priorities and planning efforts, and whether the program spurred continued action. The 
majority of grant managers interviewed for this chapter still work for the municipality in which 
they implemented EECBG programs, and conducting interviews with these grant managers 
almost ten years after the initial funding of the program provides the opportunity to understand 
whether and how the programs started during the EECBG funding period were sustained. 
Through these interviews, it becomes clear that understanding what factors led to the former 
outcome rather than the latter is essential for building future climate policy, and more broadly for 
understanding what makes local implementation of federal policy effective. 
It is impossible to evaluate how the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant 
Program affected local energy planning without speaking with those responsible for 
implementing the program at the community level. Quantitative analysis provides crucial 
information about who received funds, how they spent it, and how well they complied with the 
mandate to spend it on eligible activities within a specified time frame. It does not, however, 
address the broader question of whether the program achieved the Recovery Act’s goal of 
“laying the foundation for a clean energy future” (Grunwald 2012). The primary goal of the 
EECBG program as originally conceptualized by its promoters was to build the capacity of local 
governments to enact climate and energy policies; evaluations of the immediate, short-term 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions and the number of jobs created do not tell us whether this 
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was successful, nor does it provide information about how communities made decisions about 
what to prioritize in using their funds.  
 
Interview Structure 
By studying a small set of municipalities and their experiences implementing the EECBG 
program, I hoped to answer several key questions. Those included: were grantees with no or very 
little experience with energy programs able to implement local energy programs that were 
effective in the short term? Were municipalities across the range of experience with such 
programs able to use the infusion of federal cash to create sustained interest in and work on local 
energy initiatives? What factors led local officials to turn a short-term infusion of cash into 
longer term energy programs, and what factors led them to make more time-limited use of the 
money? I hypothesized that the opportunities presented and obstacles faced in implementing 
EECBG grants would vary by community size and the political orientation of the area, and that 
pre-existing climate and/or energy efficiency plans would make municipalities more likely to 
turn EECBG funds into long-term programs that did not end at the end of the grant 
implementation period.  
Interview questions were designed to capture qualitative information that would be 
unlikely to be available from federal records or municipal reports on the EECBG program, but 
that is important in understanding how local policy ideas were developed and implemented, how 
federal goals translated into local planning and policy-making, and how the program may or may 
not have changed communities’ approach to energy policy and planning. To that end, interviews 
were semi-structured, and questions attempted to capture details about how the grant program’s 
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local implementation was conceptualized, what the experience was like, and what kinds of 
effects the grant managers have seen in the time since.  
Interviews with grant managers all started by asking the interviewee to describe his or her 
role in the EECBG process, including how the program came to his or her attention and whether 
the interviewee was involved in deciding how to spend the money. Interviewees were asked to 
describe the program design and implementation process as best they remembered, with prompts 
often including:  Who was involved in deciding what to spend the funds on? Were non-profit 
organizations, peer municipalities, regional groups, industry organizations, or any other outside 
entities involved in the process of developing grant-funded programs? Once the decisions had 
been made about what to spend the money on, what was the experience of implementing the 
programs like? What are some of the major benefits the program brought, and what challenges 
did you experience? Did the grant lead to any follow-up work or inspire further energy or climate 
planning in your municipality? 
Some offered the caveat that the program took place almost ten years ago and their 
memories may not be 100 percent accurate, but several of those who said that mentioned that 
they remembered more details as they discussed it. Other subjects had no trouble recalling 
program details and referred to their files and notes as we spoke, or recalled the details of 
programs easily as they were still ongoing. Subjects were asked to elaborate on portions of their 
programs that were particularly interesting, unusual, controversial, or problematic. And subjects 
were asked whether the activities begun with EECBG program funding had continued, inspired 
similar projects, or changed energy planning and policy in any other way since the end of the 





In recruiting interview subjects, I sought to speak with grant managers across a range of 
community sizes, geographies, and political ideologies in order to understand what it was like to 
attempt to implement the energy and climate programs that EECBG funded across the wide 
range of communities in the United States. Though there are exceptions, communities that had 
implemented climate and sustainability plans without federal intervention tended to be larger and 
politically more left leaning than the average local government in the United States. A major 
question of interest is what happened when local energy and climate policies that were developed 
by climate leader municipalities were implemented in those without the capacity, interest, or 
ability to have implemented similar policies without federal intervention.  Therefore, I paid 
particular attention to ensuring that I interviewed grant managers in small communities and those 
located in conservative parts of the country, where pressure to take on local climate and energy 
planning was unlikely to have been as strong before the EECBG funding period as it was in 
larger, more liberal communities.  Table 6.1 provides a list of the communities whose grant 
manager was interviewed, along with the amount of the award and a summary of the activities 
that were undertaken with the EECBG funds. The amounts range from $50,000—the minimum 








Table 6.1. Communities interviewed ranged widely in geography, population size, 
and choice of program activities. 




OF AK 6080 $50,000 LED streetlights 
ELSMERE, 










CA 41,114 $159,700 
Climate Action Plan, LED 
streetlights, Residential building audit 
& retrofit program 
TEXARKANA, 
CITY OF TX 36,411 $173,256 
Government building retrofits, energy 
efficiency strategy, energy education, 
revolving loan fund program 
HAGERSTOWN, 
CITY OF MD 39,662 $179,500 
LED streetlights, LED retrofits for 
municipal parking garage, 
distribution of LED bulbs to residents 
GREENWOOD, 
CITY OF IN 49,791 $193,900 
LED traffic signal replacement, 
development of energy efficiency 
strategy 
JACKSON, 
TOWNSHIP OF NJ 54,856 $464,500 LED streetlights 
MIDWEST CITY, 
CITY OF OK 54,371 $526,600 
Community center roof replacement 
& LED lighting retrofit 
CARMEL, CITY 
OF IN 79,191 $633,000 LED streetlights 
LAKEWOOD 
TOWNSHIP NJ 92,843 $678,200 
Municipal facility retrofits, design and 
engineering work for solar project 
WESTLAND, 
CITY OF MI 84,094 $731,100 
Municipal facility retrofits, LED 
streetlights, asbestos abatement, 
energy efficiency education 
BEND, CITY OF OR 76,639 $745,500 
Energy efficiency and conservation 
strategy; municipal facility audit; 
municipal facility retrofits; energy 
efficiency coordinator; revolving loan 
funds for energy star homes and 
residential renewable energy 
systems; energy education; traffic 
signal efficiencies 
SURPRISE, AZ 117,517 $812,800 PV demonstration project, audit of 
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CITY OF city facilities, retrofits of city facilities 
MURRIETA, 
CITY OF CA 103,466 $881,500 
Climate action plan; solar financial 
incentive program; building codes 
and standards; computer automation 
project; LED lighting retrofits in city 
facilities; traffic light synchronization; 
building retrofits 
NORMAN, CITY 
OF OK 110,925 $1,001,400 Municipal wastewater facility retrofits 
CITY OF 
YONKERS NY 195,976 $1,823,200 
Energy conservation & sustainable 
management plan; green building 
code development; city hall window 
replacement; performing arts center 
lighting retrofit 
FREMONT, 
CITY OF CA 214,089 $1,891,200 
City building retrofits, streetlight 
retrofits; energy audits for residents; 
hybrid vehicles for city fleets; design 
of net-zero-energy library; green 
revisions to zoning code; energy 
efficiency grant program 
MONTGOMERY
, CITY OF AL 205,764 $2,053,000 
City hall window replacement; 
municipal HVAC system 
replacement; recycling infrastructure 
RENO, CITY OF NV 225,221 $2,142,800 Municipal facility audits and retrofits 
ORLANDO, 
CITY OF FL 238,300 $2,683,200 
Hire energy manager; internal 
revolving loan fund for municipal 
facility retrofits; grant to retrofit local 
science center; electric vehicle 




HI 953,207 $3,863,700 Renewable energy & street lighting projects 
MESA, CITY OF AZ 439,041 $4,219,900 
Energy audits and retrofits of city 
buildings and facilities; LED 
streetlight replacements; transit-
oriented development planning; solar 
energy installation at water treatment 
plant; Energy Code Adoption 
SEATTLE, CITY 
OF  WA 608,660 $6,142,300 
Residential audit program and retrofit 
grants; electrification of diesel 
streetcar; LED streetlights; energy 






Assessing the Level of Pre-Existing Climate Policy 
Because I expected municipalities with pre-existing climate-related policy to be more 
likely to turn short-term funding into long-term programs, I asked all interviewees whether their 
municipality had undertaken any climate, sustainability, or comprehensive energy efficiency 
planning prior to the distribution of EECBG funds, and coded their responses in four categories. 
Those coded “Active” were already actively engaged in implementing climate and sustainability 
plans; those coded “Poised for Action” had made climate or sustainability plans but had not yet 
devoted substantial funding to them or had not yet begun actively implementing programs; those 
coded “In Discussion” had articulated the desire for a climate or sustainability plan, or had done 
some investigation or brainstorming of related activities, but were not actively creating or 
implementing a broader energy or sustainability plan. And finally, those who simply answered 
“none” or “very minimal” were coded as “None”. Figure 6.1 shows where each municipality 
falls on this spectrum, with those categories labeled in green, yellow, orange, and red, 
respectively. Only three municipalities within this set of respondents are coded as “active.” 
Because the experiences of large, liberal cities with sustainability planning are already well 
documented, interviewees were recruited with attention to speaking with grant managers in 
smaller communities and communities with more Republican-leaning populations. The 
respondents reflect that strategy and the distribution of the extent of pre-existing climate policy is 
not intended to be representative of US municipalities overall, but instead to capture the 
experiences of municipalities across the spectrum of climate policy experience. The range here 
extends from one of the pioneers of sustainability policy, Seattle, all the way through small 




Respondent Municipalities’ Size and Political Orientation 
Figure 6.1 shows where each respondent falls along two axes: the size of the grant 
received (these are all formula grants, whose size was directly tied to the population of the city) 
and the percentage of the county’s major party vote in 2008 that went to the Republican 
presidential candidate. Both variables are consistently shown to be important predictors of a 
municipality’s likelihood to undertake climate planning (Salon et al. 2014). The median grant of 
$526,000 is much smaller than the average grant size due to the large size of big cities’ grants. 
*Not shown in Figure 6.1 is Caguas, Puerto Rico, which received a grant of $1,380,000. Because 
voters in Puerto Rico do not vote in presidential general elections, and political parties in Puerto 
Rico differ from the dominant Republican/Democratic party division of the states within the 
United States, it is impossible to place the city along the x-axis. That pattern is reflected in 
Figure 6.1, with municipalities coded as “none” clustering in the lower right-hand quadrant of 
the chart, indicating smaller grants and more republican-leaning populations. The large spread of 
grant sizes in the upper portion of the chart is also reflective of overall grant patterns: the median 
grant of $526,000 is much smaller than the average grant size due to the large size of few big 






Three cities whose grant managers were interviewed had a population over 300,000: 
Seattle, Washington; Honolulu, HI; and Mesa, AZ. I expected that these cities would be those 
best-positioned to take on, implement, and sustain local climate and energy policy, and these 
Figure 6.1. Communities interviewed ranged widely in geography, population 
size, and choice of program activities 
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cities did describe achieving the most with EECBG funds of the municipalities I examined. All 
three reported having started programs with the funds that are ongoing to this day, and reported 
perceiving the program as very successful.  
The three cities had varying political contexts and levels of experience with climate and 
sustainability policy: Seattle is among the pioneers of the concept of urban sustainability in the 
United States, and had a longstanding and robust sustainability program at the time that the 
EECBG program began. Honolulu had established a climate plan, but it was much newer and 
less fleshed-out. Mesa began a sustainability office just as the EECBG program was announced, 
but was not new to the concept of integrating energy efficiency into its planning.  Seattle and 
Honolulu are both quite liberal, while Mesa is by one analysis the most conservative large city in 
the United States (Tausanovich and Warshaw 2014).  
The experience of these large cities show that large cities with high capacity for pursuing 
innovative programs were able to make extremely effective use of EECBG funds, tailor the 
programs to local priorities, keep the initiatives started through this program going for much 
longer than the program implementation period, and further build local expertise and capacity 
using the federal funds.  
 
Seattle 
Seattle, by many accounts the originator of urban sustainability planning in the United 
States, is perhaps the best illustration of how an already-savvy city used federal funding to 
further its existing work. According to Sara Stiltner, Seattle’s project manager for the EECBG 
formula grant for the majority of the implementation period, the city’s extensive and ongoing 
energy planning made developing its list of projects for EECBG funding a relatively simple 
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matter once the funding was announced. Not only did the city have a citywide sustainability plan 
to draw on, but each agency also had its own internal sustainability plan. The city had recently 
put together a “green living commission” bringing together city sustainability officials and 
external subject-matter experts to develop a slate of dream projects that would reduce energy use 
and increase sustainability in the city. The city government, in short, was rich with expertise in 
energy efficiency, conservation, and sustainability strategies, and did not need to spend time 
getting up to speed about what kinds of projects would be most useful locally. Stiltner’s account 
of how the city prioritized projects for EECBG funding was that many of the projects were “wish 
list” items that had broad conceptual support, but for which it would have been difficult to find 
adequate funding in the city’s budget. Putting $1 million towards retrofitting streetlights with 
energy-saving LEDs, for example, allowed the city to make a big change that would otherwise 
have happened more slowly. Stiltner also discussed using grant funds to reach neighborhoods 
where residents would normally be unlikely to take advantage of energy efficiency rebates, 
weatherization programs, and other incentives to upgrade homes for reduced energy use. In low-
income and majority-minority neighborhoods, existing incentive and rebate programs available 
through Seattle’s municipal utility had very low rates of uptake. An EECBG-funded program 
that gave out free, energy efficient light bulbs to residents, therefore, used door-to-door 
canvassers, targeting neighborhoods with historically low rates of uptake for energy incentives. 
A rebate program for lighting fixture upgrades increased Seattle’s existing rate of rebate from 
80% to 100%, providing a way for even those unwilling to pay any upfront amount for energy 
improvements to make lighting upgrades that would deliver lasting reductions in energy use. 
And a revolving loan program established in partnership with a local bank was specifically 
designed to make loans for energy efficiency upgrades based only on a resident’s record of 
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utility bill payment, not the resident’s credit score, in order to expand the pool of eligible 
recipients. Likewise, the electrification of a trolley bus that had been using diesel fuel, doing 
audits for city buildings, and the development of a residential energy score system were projects 
that the city wished to accomplish but were not immediate priorities for local budgeting.  
 
Honolulu 
Honolulu’s grant manager echoed Seattle’s comfort with allocating EECBG funds. 
Though they did not have quite the same level of pre-existing sustainability planning and 
expertise, the programs’ goals fit well within its interests and abilities. In the city and county of 
Honolulu (a combined government), Allyn Lee, who had primary responsibility for determining 
funding priorities, described a relatively simple process of finding projects that fit both local 
priorities and federal grant guidelines. Because the grant guidelines required that projects be 
new, rather than pre-planned projects where federal money simply displaced local funding, Lee 
identified projects that the city’s energy and sustainability task force had expressed a desire to 
take on, but for which there were not yet concrete plans or funding. The two projects selected in 
Honolulu were lighting retrofits of municipal facilities and a photovoltaic system to be installed 
on the roof of a municipal bus depot. Lee did not consider programs that included residents or 
private entities, focusing instead on the “low-hanging fruit” of municipal lighting, which would 
achieve significant energy savings with a relatively short and easy implementation period. Lee 
discussed project options with the DOE project officer and with other local government staff, but 
not with outside organizations or contractors. After discussing the options, Lee and the energy 
and sustainability task force easily reached consensus on how to spend the money. Approval 
from the city council was required, and was easily obtained, with little public awareness or 
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involvement beyond the knowledge that there was federal money coming in. Lee described both 
projects as successful in having been implemented on time and continuing to save the city money 
in reduced energy bills. With a small amount of leftover funding at the end of the grant period, 
the city decided to create a small pilot program testing the conversion of 200 streetlights to 
LEDs. Though the streetlight project represented a small portion of the city’s funds, and was not 
originally part of the planned use, Lee credits this pilot program with starting the much longer-
term project of retrofitting streetlights island-wide, a project that was ongoing as of June 2018. 
EECBG funds provided a jump-start to this project and proved the value of doing it. Honolulu 
continues to pursue sustainability projects; the EECBG funding was used for several distinct 
components of its sustainability efforts, and did prompt some long-term change, but was neither 
the origin nor the main impetus for these efforts. 
 
Mesa 
In Mesa, no explicit sustainability plan existed prior to EECBG, but the city’s grant 
manager described the projects that were undertaken as fitting in with long-standing goals. Scott 
Bouchie, who had been appointed the city’s sustainability director not long before EECBG funds 
were made available, said that although having a sustainability department was new for the city 
in 2009, the work of making city systems run as efficiently as possible was not. “We’ve been 
doing sustainability forever, but we just never called it that,” he said in an interview. Projects 
such as improving the energy efficiency of the city’s water filtration system, switching to LED 
streetlights, and developing more a more walkable, transit-oriented downtown were existing city 
priorities, but a 2009 reorganization in the midst of city layoffs caused by the recession 
consolidated them under the umbrella of sustainability. The funding made available through 
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EECBG made these projects possible, said Bouchie, but the ideas were there beforehand. 
Bouchie mentioned being part of a sustainable cities network run by Arizona State University 
that met once a month, and using that network as a way of discussing project ideas, sharing best 
practices, and serving as resources for each other when questions about the grant program arose. 
Bouchie describes the projects pursued with EECBG funds as having long-lasting impacts. 
During our June 2018 interview, Bouchie said he had just come from a meeting about the 
planned construction of an anaerobic digester that had been proposed as part of the study done 
with EECBG funds on energy savings opportunities, demonstrating that priorities established 
under the EECBG program are still actively being implemented. Explaining the impact of the 
funds, Bouchie said that the projects they pursued were successful in terms “we were able to 
show significant savings on the projects we did, took advantage of utility rebates, reinvested 
those funds back into sustainability projects. We were able to learn more how to measure, verify, 
how to present the projects, what are the low-hanging fruit, how do you package them with 
things that are harder. It was our training wheels, by the time we spent the 2.4 million we were 
able to take the training wheels off, ride that bike by ourselves.”   
 
Impacts on Large Cities’ Continuing Energy and Climate Planning 
Common to all three of these large cities’ process was a high level of comfort with 
finding projects that fit both the EECBG program criteria and local priorities. None described the 
program as spurring entirely new ideas, but all welcomed the grants and the opportunity to do 
more than they otherwise would have been able to do with the additional funding. All three 
mentioned using the products of already established sustainability plans or task forces, though 
they took different shapes. Mesa, the smallest of the large cities and by far the one with the most 
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conservative population, did not have the same pre-existing level of activity around sustainability 
or climate planning as the other two cities, but nevertheless had staff that were very aware of 
trends in what other cities were doing with regard to sustainability, was already a participant in a 
network of sustainable cities, and was in the process of consolidating its energy efficiency and 
sustainability work into a single city department.     
Seattle, Honolulu, and Mesa reported few problems implementing the projects they had 
selected, and all affirmed that some aspect of work begun through the EECBG grant program is 
ongoing. For all of these municipalities, EECBG was an important way to accomplish energy-
related goals that may not have happened without the external funding, or at any rate may not 
have happened as quickly. Mesa, the city with the least active sustainability agenda prior to the 
receipt of funding, attributed the most follow-up action to the funds out of the three places.  
 
Mid-Size Cities 
The experiences of a group of nine small to mid-size cities, with populations between 
100,000 and 300,000, were in many cases quite different from the experiences of larger cities. 
Those cities are Surprise, AZ; Murrieta, CA; Norman, OK; Yonkers, NY; Fremont, CA; 
Montgomery, AL; Orlando, FL; Reno, NV; and Caguas, PR. Recipients in this category were 
expected to, and did, show more variation in their experiences with EECBG grants. Within this 
group, all recipients reported success in implementing programs with their EECBG funds, but 
long-term impacts were dramatically different in the different cities, with some starting programs 
that became national models, and others reporting that once the project was completed it was all 
but forgotten. The municipalities for which EECBG programs turned into long-term programs 
had two elements in common: an enthusiastic champion of sustainability programs, and access to 
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external supports that allowed programs to draw on knowledge and resources beyond federal 
cash.  
 
Mid-Size Cities With Existing Climate or Energy Plans 
Two cities in this group, Orlando, FL, and Reno, NV, had already created local energy or 
sustainability plans at the time of the EECBG grant program, but did not yet have funds devoted 
to major energy efficiency or sustainability projects. These two cities can be considered as 
“poised for action” when they received grant funds. In Orlando, the Greenworks Orlando 
program had been initiated in 2007 by a mayor who wished to see the city pursue sustainability 
initiatives. Ian Lahiff and David Dunn, who still work on Orlando’s sustainability initiatives, 
describe the status of the Greenworks program at the time that EECBG grants were announced as 
having identified goals for the city, but not specific projects. Dunn remembers himself and the 
other leader of the Greenworks division at the time being teased by other municipal employees, 
who called them “Mr. Green Jeans” and “The Queen of Green,” and did not take the 
sustainability initiative seriously or think it would remain part of the city’s priorities for long. 
The announcement of EECBG funding, though, allowed the division to implement major 
projects and show others within municipal government that Greenworks could achieve large 
cost-savings and lead to successful long-term programs. In Reno, NV, there was no named 
sustainability plan at the time that EECBG funds were announced, but Jason Geddes, who was 
the city’s environmental services manager, or what he called “basically the green czar position,” 
was already looking into hiring an energy services company to implement a variety of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects. A green summit in the city in 2007 had brought 
together energy efficiency and renewable energy experts from other cities, as well as local 
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experts, and a list of energy priorities had been developed. The recovery act money was used for 
the first phase of a much larger project that the city of Reno eventually completed. As with 
Orlando, the EECBG money was used to prove the value of this type of project and begin a 
series of long-term efforts that had already been envisioned, rather than being considered enough 
funding for a complete project on its own. 
In Orlando and Reno, where the EECBG funds essentially provided the seed funding to 
start long-term sustainability plans that had already been envisioned, the managers credit the 
program with jump-starting those initiatives. Orlando, according to its sustainability directors, 
has “unintentionally become a poster child” for local sustainability planning, and its 
sustainability directors present regularly at conferences and meetings to show other cities how 
they achieved what they have. With EECBG funds, the Orlando’s Greenworks managers were 
able to put funding behind their ideas and analysis, hiring an energy manager to do audits of city 
facilities and choosing retrofit projects that ended up saving the city even more energy than it 
had anticipated. Energy grant managers tracked those savings carefully and capitalized on them 
in two ways: first, they used the proven success of the initial energy efficiency retrofits to justify 
the issuance of $17.5 million in municipal bonds, an amount that dwarfed the initial $2 million 
funding from EECBG, and which was used to pay for additional energy efficiency retrofits in 
more city facilities. Second, the savings realized from the energy efficiency retrofits were 
reinvested into additional energy projects. The city’s budget office required the agencies 
receiving retrofits to their facilities to continue budgeting for energy as if the facility had not 
received upgrades for seven years, with the difference between the agency’s energy bills and its 
prior energy budget constituting payments to an internal revolving loan program. As of the 
summer of 2018, this internal revolving loan fund is still continuing to fund energy efficiency 
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and clean energy projects in Orlando’s city facilities, and the city employees who ran the 
EECBG grant credit the program with jumpstarting the program, giving it legitimacy, and 
allowing them to prove the ability to save money and improve city operations through 
comprehensive energy planning. In Reno, similarly, the two million dollar project funded by 
EECBG proved the value of the larger, twenty million dollar package of energy efficiency 
retrofits that city energy managers had envisioned. The initial work funded by EECBG showed 
greater energy savings than anticipated and eliminated the hesitation that city council members 
had felt at authorizing the city’s own capital funds to be spent on a much larger project. In both 
cities, energy managers credit EECBG with proving the value of what they already wanted to do 
and providing the last push for comprehensive energy plans to be implemented. 
 
Mid-Size Cities In Discussions About Climate or Energy Plans 
Five of the mid-size cities interviewed were in discussions about possible energy or 
sustainability plans at the time that EECBG grants were awarded, but had not yet formalized a 
plan. These were Yonkers, NY, Fremont, CA, Surprise, AZ, Murrieta, CA, and Caguas, PR. In 
Yonkers, for example, a city council green task force had been discussing ideas, and the mayor 
had had green initiatives on his mind for several years. In Fremont, the city was in the midst of 
updating its general plan and was working to incorporate the theme of becoming a sustainable 
city. Essentially, these cities were interested in sustainability and energy efficiency planning, but 
had not yet decided on the exact strategies or processes that would be used locally to get there. In 
these cities, the EECBG funds spurred more specific discussions about what energy efficiency 
planning would mean locally, and prompted the cities to formalize ideas that had been talked 
about. The content of the plans they made to use grant funds varied, with many of these cities 
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taking on multiple projects. Murrieta, for example, took on seven separate initiatives: drafting a 
climate action plan, starting a residential solar incentive program, updating building codes and 
standards, automating municipal computer energy savings, retrofitting LED lights in municipal 
parking lots, synchronizing traffic lights, and conducting a comprehensive energy audit of 
municipal facilities.  
Several of the mid-size cities that were in discussions about energy or sustainability 
planning also reported being able to create long-term programs that are in some cases still active 
almost ten years later. However, there is variation in this group, perhaps best expressed by the 
difference between the long-run effects of the grant in Surprise, AZ, and Murrieta, CA, two cities 
with similar sizes (117,517 and 103,466, respectively, in 2010) and grant amounts ($812,800 and 
$881,500, respectively). They are both composed of politically mixed populations, with about 
half of county residents’ for each having voted Republican in the presidential election in 2008. 
They each experienced precipitous declines in municipal revenue when the real estate industry 
crashed in 2008, and were experiencing heavy municipal layoffs when they received funding 
through the EECBG program. In Murietta, CA, though, the grant manager for the program rattled 
off several projects that are currently taking place that he connects directly to the city’s 
sustainability efforts begun under the EECBG program, whereas in Surprise, the grant manager 
describes the program as having been primarily “available cash to accomplish a specific need,” 
expresses certainty that the program didn’t change local policy, and mentions that the newly 
created sustainability division of the city’s government was disbanded soon after the end of the 
implementation period. Several important differences help to explain the differences in how the 
grants affected local policy. First, Murietta drew on outside resources to help plan, prioritize, and 
share knowledge about effective use of EECBG money. The municipality and several others 
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nearby spoke multiple times about various aspects of their EECBG grants, and eventually formed 
a formalized regional energy group that is still in existence. The grant manager mentioned that 
each municipality was overwhelmed by the number of calls from contractors and organizations 
that wanted to help them spend the EECBG money, and that each municipality within the 
regional council of governments was able to refer those calls to the COG, which created a shared 
information source with all of those potential resources. In Surprise, on the other hand, grant 
managers limited their focus to city buildings, and called exclusively on internal city agency 
expertise in managing the grant, ensuring that projects met the program criteria, and developing 
ideas. Second, Murietta was in California, and was under pressure to update its building codes to 
align with California’s progressive energy efficiency requirements, providing additional 
motivation to use some of the money to update policy, not just hard infrastructure. Grant 
managers in Surprise mentioned no such outside pressures, and mentioned that in cash-limited 
times, they would have been unlikely to find additional sources of revenue for energy projects 
and did not foresee EECBG money being useful in securing other funds.  
Two more cities that had discussed climate and sustainability plans but had not yet 
developed comprehensive plans were Fremont, CA and Yonkers, NY. These cities, each with a 
population of about 200,000, are both located near major climate policy leaders—New York City 
and San Francisco—and seemed to benefit from the wealth of resources, networks, and support 
available from nearby and within their borders. Both created multi-faceted climate plans and 
used EECBG money to begin efforts that are ongoing to this day. Mario Caruso, the grant 
manager for Yonkers, remembers that a brainstorming process around climate and energy 
planning had been taking place between the planning and development department and the 
mayor’s office, and that the EECBG funds were allocated at the perfect time for the city to take 
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the kind of action that had been discussed, but not yet acted upon. A “green city task force” had 
recently been set up that had generated ideas, and one of the first things Yonkers did with their 
funds was to hire a sustainability coordinator to manage the various “green” initiatives and create 
a climate action plan. The city also contracted with the New York Power Authority to upgrade 
inefficient windows in City Hall, hired Pace University to draft a local green building law, and 
partnered with Sarah Lawrence College to upgrade inefficient lighting in a campus arts center. 
The sustainability coordinator, who was hired as a consultant with EECBG funds, was hired as a 
permanent staff member after the grant period was over, a decision that Caruso credits with 
helping to establish sustainability as a long-term priority for the city. Caruso also saw that the 
existing constituency for green initiatives helped the EECBG funds to have a maximum 
impact—because there was already a task force, as well as broad support for developing a 
climate plan, the funds provided the final push the city needed. Without the EECBG program, 
according to Caruso, the city had many other priorities. The city was not applying for energy 
efficiency or related grants and was not organized about identifying other funding streams for the 
kinds of programs that were begun with EECBG. 
Dan Schoenholz, The EECBG grant manager for Fremont, CA, describes the effects of 
the EECBG funds in that city in similar terms. Although Schoenholz himself was very 
experienced with environmental and energy work, and there was interest in doing more at the 
city level in Fremont, he describes his work before EECBG on energy efficiency as being very 
small projects: “I’d find a little money here, a little there to relamp a building, that kind of 
thing.” EECBG, he says, “took it to the next level,” allowing those working on sustainability to 
more effectively make the case for devoting city resources to pursuing bigger projects. After 
EECBG, Schoenholz worked on a solar energy project as part of a regional collaborative, and 
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attributes the approval for the city to participate in that project to having demonstrated smaller-
scale successes with EECBG. More important than the financial impact of the EECBG funds 
themselves, according to Schoenholz, was the chance to provide tangible results from the 
projects that the program funded, in order to make the case for doing more sustainability work 
and hiring a full-time city staff member devoted to coordinating the city’s sustainability work. 
Asked if the program led to continued work, Schoenholz named some specific activities that had 
taken place after EECBG, but emphasized that “more generally it launched us on this path of 
looking for ways to achieve our climate goals.”  
Finally, the EECBG grant manager for Caguas, Puerto Rico described the successes that 
the city of Caguas had with the program, emphasizing that a head start in planning for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy had given the city an advantage compared to other Puerto Rican 
municipalities in implementing the program. In 2006, the city had partnered with a local 
university to envision how the city could drastically reduce its energy consumption. The report 
produced then generated ideas for projects, and although the city began some smaller projects on 
its own, the EECBG program was the first chance to implement a substantial chunk of the work 
that the city had envisioned. Guillermo Rivera Cruz, who oversaw the program, praised all seven 
projects that the city undertook, particularly a project that provided grants to individuals for solar 
systems in residences. He remembered Department of Energy representatives asking the 
municipality to share its experience with neighboring towns, and has done so, attempting to share 
Caguas’ successes with others in the area.  
 
 
Mid-Size Cities Without Prior Sustainability Initiatives 
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The remaining two mid-size cities interviewed—Norman, OK, and Montgomery, AL—
had no active discussions of climate or sustainability planning at the time that EECBG funds 
were awarded, though there were energy and environmental issues that the cities had been 
wanting to address. In both of these cities, grant managers report the programs having been 
successful but spurring little to no further energy programs or policies after the fact.  
 In Norman, OK, the city’s capital projects engineer had identified the need to replace 
engines and motors that were driving very high energy use at the local wastewater treatment 
plant, and proposed using grant funds to complete two projects that would deliver substantial 
energy efficiency improvements there. The projects were chosen for their ability to deliver 
substantial energy savings and because they were “shovel-ready.” Asked to describe the level of 
experience Norman had with climate or energy efficiency policy before the program, Charlie 
Thomas, the engineer who led the EECBG projects, said that it was simply not something the 
city prioritized at the time. Thomas relates successful implementation of the projects that were 
chosen for EECBG, but when asked if similar work continued after the grant program was over, 
commented that the projects were self-contained and did not lead directly to any additional work. 
The projects did, according to Thomas, begin a conversation about sustainability in the city, 
which had led, at the time of our interview, to discussions of potentially hiring a sustainability 
manager. Thomas gives EECBG about 25% of the credit for beginning that conversation, but 
does not attribute any specific new programs or policies to the EECBG experience.  
In Montgomery, AL, a set of projects representing a variety of city energy and waste 
management priorities were pursued. First, pressing needs for energy improvements at City Hall 
were obvious to all who worked there: many broken panes of glass and an old, inefficient HVAC 
system had gone unrepaired for so long that certain parts of the building were closed to city staff 
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due to mold. Montgomery also dealt regularly with large amounts of tree damage from strong 
storms, and had no ability to mulch or compost the resulting debris, instead landfilling tree 
waste. The city used its funds to replace city hall windows and HVAC equipment, and purchased 
a large wood chipper that allowed the city to create mulch from its tree waste and divert a huge 
amount of organic material from the landfill. The city also installed public recycling bins, 
developed a school recycling education program, and retrofitted some traffic signals with LED 
lights. Lynda Wool, the EECBG grant manager for Montgomery, remembers the planning 
department developing a list of priorities, of which the deputy mayor selected five. Cost savings 
were a major priority in selection, as the city was struggling financially and wished to show as 
much economic benefit to the city as possible from the program. Wool describes the city’s pre-
existing attitude toward energy and sustainability program as indifference. The city’s leaders, she 
said, were so focused on economic development that sustainability was not a priority, and many 
initiatives that would be considered standard practice in other places, such as having municipal 
recycling available, were not present in Montgomery. To some extent, Wool saw EECBG 
piercing that indifference. In particular, the retrofit of traffic signals produced such a dramatic 
energy savings that the city went on to retrofit streetlights as well. The city is finally, according 
to Wool, making some amount of progress on sustainability, but still has a long way to go, and 
EECBG did not turn sustainability into a high priority for the city. 
 
Impacts on Mid-Size Cities’ Continuing Energy and Climate Planning 
All of the grant managers within the group of mid-size cities reported success in 
achieving energy savings locally, but the extent to which they reported the programs having 
changed their cities’ approach to energy planning in the long-term was very varied. Cities that 
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were already taking steps to prioritize climate and energy programs saw the EECBG program as 
having been essential to proving ideas and securing broader support. Those that were on the 
verge of taking action, but had not yet been able to garner support to take on major projects, 
seemed generally to see the biggest impacts from the funds, giving those cities the final push 
they needed to put their ideas into action. Those that did not already have some level of 
sustainability planning saw short-term gains but more limited long-term effects, with their efforts 
being more contained to the projects directly funded by EECBG funds. 
 
Smaller Cities and Towns 
Municipalities with populations under 100,000 showed the increasing administrative 
burden that communities experienced with decreasing size, and the more limited reach of 
EECBG projects. Thirteen municipalities that were interviewed for this analysis fell into this 
category, with populations ranging from 6,080 to 76,639. The range of population size in this 
group is large, and their capacities for program implementation varied quite a bit. As a group, 
these communities were more politically conservative than the groups of larger communities 
interviewed, though with a great deal of variation between them.  
These smaller communities tended to concentrate their funds in one or two projects, with 
LED streetlights and municipal facility retrofits dominating the list of projects undertaken. In 
general, these communities reported successfully implementing projects but did not report long-
lasting changes to how the community approached energy planning. For the most part they did 
not report the kinds of structural changes, such as being able to create a permanent sustainability 
coordinator position, that some of the larger municipalities mentioned having been able to do 
after the EECBG program ended. Asked if the program brought any long-lasting benefits to the 
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community, grant managers for these communities generally reported savings from reduced 
energy costs that continue to accrue to the local government, and by extension, the taxpayers. 
Some reported the projects having created increased awareness of energy efficiency, and many 
said they’d welcome the chance to do similar projects again if federal dollars were to become 
available. This was true regardless of the experience the community already had with climate 
and energy planning. In fact, the mayor of Carmel, Indiana was at the time the co-chair of US 
Conference of Mayors’ Climate Protection Task Force, and the city had done extensive work on 
its sustainable communities initiative. Unlike larger communities, though, that tended to use 
EECBG funds to test new ideas, start pilot programs, or fund the beginnings of long-term 
projects, Carmel, along with other cities of similar size, kept its EECBG projects limited to 
executing projects they could fund completely with the grant. David Huffman, the manager of 
Carmel’s EECBG grant, described it as something that fit in well with existing priorities and 
accomplished local goals, without seeing any specific long-term effects beyond the continued 
saving of energy from the LED streetlights that were installed at the time.  
Some communities in this group did express that the desire to create longer-term 
programs was there, but it simply was not feasible given the program’s limitations. Terri Craft, 
the grant manager for Midwest City, OK, brought up the limitations to the city’s ability to 
institute long-term projects with the funds, explaining that the city would have liked to create a 
revolving loan fund or find another way of providing energy savings directly to residents. But 
without an ongoing source of funding, the city needed to be realistic about what it would be able 




Bend, Oregon, the largest of the group, completed a more complex set of projects that 
was closer in character to the typical set of programs carried out by larger communities, a 
decision that Heidi Kennedy, the grant manager for Bend, describes as having made the 
administration of the program “probably harder than it needed to be.” Particularly difficult to 
administer was a revolving loan program—though many of the larger communities reported 
revolving loan funds being one of the more successful projects, the program created an ongoing 
headache in terms of reporting for Bend. Kennedy questioned whether the benefits the program 
provided were worth the complex set of transactions that the city had to follow for each loan. 
Each loan involved a home inspection, a deed restriction, and other transactions that created 
work each time the money was paid back and lent out again. 
In these municipalities, managers often didn’t have an easy way of showing what the real 
cost savings of projects were—separating utility bills for different facilities and comparing use 
over time was not a simple task. Unlike larger municipalities, that were able to document savings 
and use their results to advocate for continuing to pursue similar projects, communities that were 
unable to track their savings had no more evidence of such programs’ effectiveness than when 
they began.  
The smallest communities within this group expressed the most skepticism of the 
EECBG program’s value and the highest levels of confusion about the goals of the program, the 
reporting requirements, and how the program was set up. Some managers of the smallest 
communities were extremely enthusiastic, but in general managers of the smallest communities 
expressed far less praise for the opportunity to get projects done and showed much less 




Sources of Support and Challenges for Grantees 
Across municipalities, the kind of support that grant managers saw as essential and the 
kinds of challenges that stood out varied greatly. Larger municipalities tended to make use of 
networks of municipalities, non-profit organizations, and universities’ expertise, while smaller 
municipalities tended to make use of private contractors’ advice and input. In all communities, 
policy entrepreneurs were important to accomplishing program goals, but their ability to create 
lasting change depended on the context in which they worked. Program complexities and 
requirements additionally created many more obstacles in small communities than large. 
 
Networks, Contractors, and Federal Assistance 
A substantial body of scholarship is devoted to why municipalities take action on climate 
planning when they are under no mandate to do so; scholars have found that information and 
advocacy from non-governmental organizations and exposure to networks of fellow local 
officials who are pursuing climate action are important determinants of action. This chapter 
shows that smaller communities are much less likely to be influenced by those networks. 
Overwhelmingly, the large cities in this study mentioned non-profit organizations, universities, 
peer municipalities, or other sources of support and discussion about energy planning, while 
smaller municipalities did not. Asked who they relied on for advice, smaller communities’ grant 
managers were much more likely to reference professional associations such as engineering 
associations, or to have relied on the input of local energy or engineering contractors. 
Scholars have found that the extensive use of contractors has limited local government 
learning (Portney 2015) or created greater implementation delays (Terman and Feiock 2015).  
Interviews with federal employees (Chapter 4) additionally indicate that there was a wide range 
138 
 
of skill and good intention among EECBG contractors, with some less scrupulous firms offering 
cookie cutter plans to all municipalities without truly taking the community’s particular needs 
into account. In interviews with grant managers, all were asked whether they used contractors, 
and the extent to which contractors informed their decisions and helped implement their 
programs. For much of the work done through EECBG, local governments have to use 
contractors, as they do not have full-time work for someone who installs solar panels, retrofits 
boilers, or performs other required tasks. In a small town in particular, limited municipal staff 
would be extremely unlikely to do the audit and retrofit work, know how to set up a revolving 
loan program, or fulfill other program goals.  
The description of contractors’ contributions to EECBG programs by local grant 
managers was uniformly positive among respondents in this study. Grant managers in small 
communities in particular described contractors as being essential to working through the goals 
of the EECBG program and the options that the community had to implement it. Many smaller 
communities’ grant managers mentioned specific individuals from private companies and 
attributed much of their success in complying with the grant program to those individuals. Often 
the individual was able to bring experience with energy efficiency, green construction, or other 
relevant skills that were lacking among government employees and among the wider pool of 
contractors. A typical description of the help received from a key contractor came from a grant 
manager in Westland, MI: “ At the time the grant came out… he had already moved into a lot of 
green projects, he was able to teach us about a lot of energy efficiency” (Joanne Campbell, phone 
interview, July 2018). This reliance on specific trusted contractors was described only by smaller 
communities; no larger towns or cities described having relied on contractor input to select the 
kinds of projects they would include in their EECBG programs. Large communities did, 
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however, often speak in positive terms about the contractors they hired to do program work, and 
no respondents in communities of any size mentioned contractors having introduced problems to 
their program implementation that affected their success. 
Managers of grants in large, liberal, high-capacity cities were those who most frequently 
remembered receiving meaningful support for their projects from their DOE project officers and 
from DOE contractors who were hired to support municipalities as they worked through the 
EECBG process. DOE devoted substantial resources to supporting grantees through regular 
conference calls and on-demand technical services that were made available to grantees. Based 
on the answers of grantees within this study, DOE’s services seemed most often to be used by 
those who already had the most experience and knowledge of the area.  
 
Policy Entrepreneurs 
The presence of a “policy entrepreneur” who is able to influence others from within a 
local government is often found to be key to adoption of climate policies in the scholarly 
literature. This study found evidence that the presence of policy entrepreneurs is a necessary but 
insufficient element of creating an ambitious, long-lasting climate agenda. Within the group of 
large, liberal cities, plentiful evidence can be found for the importance of policy entrepreneurs. 
Strong support of city leadership for sustainability plans was often mentioned as being crucial to 
creating viable long-term programs, and several cities’ grant managers emphasize the importance 





Grant managers who were successful at using EECBG funds to create long-lasting 
programs were usually employed by the local government before the program came along; 
without dedicated resources to implement these programs, though, they had been unable to turn 




Asked to describe their interactions with the Department of Energy and their contractors, 
grant managers generally praised the project officers they worked with, while expressing varying 
degrees of frustration with the process itself.  Smaller communities almost without fail described 
being overwhelmed and burdened by the reporting process, whereas large communities were 
generally unfazed by it. Larger communities that had experience with federal grant programs 
compared the reporting requirements favorably to other experiences with federal grants. A 
common sentiment among these municipalities’ grant managers was that the reporting did take 
some work, but that for the amount of money the federal government was providing, you 
couldn’t really expect fewer requirements to ensure accountability. Additionally, smaller 
communities more frequently reported frustration with turnover of their assigned project officers, 
with some saying that they continually had to explain what they were doing to whoever was 
currently assigned to their case in DC. No large cities reported a similar sentiment. In general, 
reporting requirements and administrative challenges made up a much larger portion of what 
grant managers in small communities remembered about the EECBG program, whereas grant 




Uneven Benefits of EECBG Funds 
The study of local experiences implementing EECBG programs showed that, overall, the 
program was appreciated locally and led to local successes. It also shows, though, that the kinds 
of successes experienced by municipalities depended in large part on pre-existing desire to 
implement similar programs—their relative position, in other words, on a spectrum of leadership 
with regard to climate and energy programs.  
• Leaders: For municipalities with active climate policy programs, and pre-existing 
experience analyzing their local needs in the area, federal funding was a way to extend, 
expand, and gain more support for existing programs. The federal funding was 
appreciated and allowed local climate and energy leaders to start new programs that often 
did outlast the funding period.  
• Poised for Leadership: For those that had begun work on climate and energy policy but 
had not yet built extensive programs, federal EECBG money was often a way to get 
planned programs going and to demonstrate results from pilot programs in order to build 
up to more ambitious schemes. In these municipalities, EECBG arguably had the most 
transformative effects, as it was able to take well-developed ideas that did not have 
funding or dedicated resources and make them into reality.  
• Thinking About It: A third category of municipalities had thought about, discussed, or 
formally set out the intention to take on climate and sustainability planning, but hadn’t 
done much beyond that. In these municipalities, the EECBG program had the potential to 
be transformative or to be a self-contained program without much long-term effect. 
Among this group, the skill of policy entrepreneurs and the ability to draw on outside 
resources and build support for the program during the implementation period seemed 
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key to turning it into a long-term program rather than simply using the funds and going 
back to business as usual.  
• Not on the Radar: Finally, a group of municipalities I spoke with was not really thinking 
about climate, energy, or sustainability planning in any concrete way and would have 
been unlikely to consider the possibility without EECBG funding. For these 
municipalities, which tended to be smaller and with less capacity for non-essential 
policies and programs, the program brought some successes but none are continuing to 
implement similar programs, and based on their experiences it seems unrealistic to think 
that a one-time infusion of federal money has the potential to create long-term programs. 
Grant managers within this group expressed a range of opinions about the program, from 
enthusiastic memory to wondering if the program was a worthwhile use of the federal 
government’s money.  
These categories are closely related to the size of municipalities, with all large cities 
falling into the leaders or poised for leadership group and all small towns falling into the “not on 
the radar” group. The results indicate that for this policy area, large cities all face pressure to take 
action; small towns, on the other hand, almost never do, as their limited capacity prevents them 
from taking on non-essential government activities. The middle categories are least closely 
related to size, however, with municipalities in the mid-range seeming to represent a size and 
capacity with the potential, but not the mandate, to take on ambitious climate planning. In these 
mid-size communities, which also tend to be in middle positions on the spectrum from climate 
leader to climate laggard, the EECBG program had the greatest and most varied impacts: where 
there was a policy entrepreneur and some existing desire to pursue this type of program, a 
dedicated funding stream and the resources that it brought with it allowed the municipality to 
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multiply the effect of the funding it received. With less enthusiasm and local support, the funds 
were used to competently accomplish the program’s energy-saving objectives, but did not launch 









 The experience of the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program 
in United States municipalities teaches important lessons about making federal environmental 
policy work locally. The program shows, first, the value of communities’ participation in 
voluntary policy initiatives related to climate and energy, as municipalities that had spent time 
thinking about how to implement climate and energy efficiency programs locally prior to the 
program were better-positioned to turn a one-time infusion of federal funding into long-lasting 
programs. At the same time, the program’s outcomes demonstrate the enduring power and 
influence of the federal government. Local and state initiatives have driven much of the 
innovation and progress around U.S. climate policy and planning over the past 20 years, but the 
experience of municipalities that participated in the EECBG program demonstrates that many 
communities faced structural, political, or other barriers that had previously prevented them from 
joining a system of locally led climate governance. When provided with the funding and 
guidance to implement energy efficiency strategies, many municipalities were able to overcome 
these barriers and create initiatives that are ongoing to this day. Other municipalities, however, 
implemented EECBG programs and did not turn this one-time funding stream into a lasting 
commitment to local climate and energy planning. The lessons from these communities are as 
important in understanding how future federal policy may build on local initiatives as those 
communities that did translate the funds into long-term programs.  
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More broadly, the program demonstrates some advantages and limits of using federal 
grants-in-aid to accomplish policy goals. Although much is made of the power of local 
government to act, a large number of United States municipalities do not have the capacity to 
initiate and sustain climate and energy policies in the absence of a mandate or strong incentive to 
do so. Whether because of lack of political support, lack of financial or administrative capacity, 
or lack of knowledge of the subject matter, municipalities with less experience had good reasons 
not to have undertaken energy efficiency or climate policies. For many of these municipalities, 
the federal government’s resources were necessary to get these programs going. In addition to 
providing the funding, the federal government also served as an important connector when the 
EECBG program was taking place. Program administrators found peer municipalities to share 
their experiences when grantees were experiencing problems, created trainings and materials 
when they noticed common stumbling blocks, and otherwise took advantage of their position as 
coordinators of a nationwide program. The ability to collect information and see knowledge 
transfer opportunities across grantees is an advantage of a federal grant program that may not be 
fully appreciated. While voluntary networks are helpful, they miss those who do not opt in, 
whereas a government grant program with wide uptake reaches a much larger array of 
municipalities. Program administrators and their consultants generated ideas such as keeping an 
energy efficiency RFP library for all municipalities to be able to access in order to decrease 
grantees’ administrative burdens. Another program administrator suggested that grantees should 
be able to see the pricing that other municipalities received so that they would have a better 
understanding of how their consultants’ cost proposals compared to their peers’. Because 
EECBG was only funded one time, the opportunity to develop these ongoing resources was 
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limited, but the opportunity provided by the federal government’s ability to oversee many 
municipalities’ activities was evident. 
While federal grants can have a powerful influence, it is also uneven. Municipalities with 
limited capacity to expand the functions of their local government are very cautious about 
committing to anything beyond what is funded by the federal grants, whereas those that believe 
they will be able to continue to find ways to implement successful programs are more willing to 
use external funding to try new things. Grant-in-aid programs such as the EECBG, therefore, 
expose the risk of further stratifying local governments’ abilities in the policy areas to which 
they are applied. Rather than evening out the playing field, it is possible for such programs to 
increase the disparities between policy leaders and the rest. On the other hand, giving a broad 
swath of local governments experience in a new policy area provides opportunities for 
municipalities that had the interest, but not the capacity, to take on a new program. Nicholson-
Crotty (2012) shows that when there are multiple goals for a federal grant program, the goal that 
is most aligned with the recipient’s own goals will be furthered, while others will not. That 
conclusion is supported through this study, with the EECBG goals of short-term energy savings 
being accomplished across the board, while the longer-term goal of a changed approach to local 
energy policy was selectively achieved in municipalities that shared that goal.  
The program’s outcomes additionally demonstrate the difficulty showing success in 
federal programs applied across an enormous range of municipalities. In many ways, the 
concerns of those who analyzed the effects of a local energy grant program in the late 1970’s and 
early 1980’s were borne out in the experience of the EECBG program. Hopp & Edelson (1980) 
warned that a local energy grant program would derive its benefits from the flexibility it afforded 
to local governments, but that same flexibility would make the program nearly impossible to 
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evaluate. The evaluations of the EECBG program demonstrate this quality: quantitative analysis 
of the evaluation metrics often shows no clear patterns. When they do, those patterns sometimes 
contradict the results of qualitative evaluations. This dissertation shows that grant managers 
reported being able to do more and make programs last longer in places with greater experience, 
whereas quantitative indicators capturing municipalities’ prior experience with similar programs 
sometimes had a negative effect on outcomes. The qualitative analysis in this dissertation shows 
that those with more experience simply took on more complex projects that did not provide as 
much certainty of easy wins, since they either had already done the projects considered “low-
hanging fruit” or found that federal funds justified testing new ideas that they might not have 
been able to test with local funds. Advocates for the EECBG program marveled that the program 
was unable to create a constituency at the federal level (see Chapter 4), but the design of the 
program in effect created the difficulty garnering support from the beginning. Its attempts to 
achieve multiple goals and to provide a great deal of local flexibility made it very difficult to 
evaluate and demonstrate success. 
Future programs with similar goals might learn from the EECBG experience. First, 
program evaluation would be more effective if built into the program structure from the 
beginning. One grant manager from a small town said in an interview that by the time he had 
finished with the program, he was so frustrated with navigating its regulations that when he 
received a phone call from a federal evaluator he refused to answer their questions. Federal 
program administrators described putting together a program evaluation with resources more 
limited than planned late in the program implementation process. Rather than conducting after-
the-fact evaluations, future programs should have surveys and evaluation criteria designed ahead 
of time and administered as part of the grant completion process. Additionally, metrics for 
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success should explicitly take the starting position of the local grantee into consideration. 
Beyond evaluation, future program design might consider creating multiple pathways for 
grantees. California’s state EECBG program took this route, offering a simplified process to very 
small municipalities and more options to those with more experience and the desire for 
flexibility. Creating multiple pathways and allowing grantees to choose the one best fitting their 
needs might strike a balance between providing flexibility and limiting administrative 
requirements for municipalities for which those requirements would constitute larger burdens. 
Ultimately, climate policy in the United States must regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
comprehensively in order to make a difference on the global scale that is necessary to tackle 
climate change. But even under a comprehensive climate policy, local governments will have a 
role to play: the infrastructure that local governments are responsible for needs to be retrofitted, 
upgraded, and made more efficient in order to achieve meaningful greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. Understanding how the EECBG program worked in municipalities throughout the 
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Appendix A: Further Detail on Quantitative Analysis 
This appendix provides further details on the variables and methods described in Chapter 5.  
Grantee Characteristics 
 EECBG funds were made available to four classes of grantees: states, counties, cities, and 
tribal governments. This chapter focuses solely on recipients at the city level, where the bulk of 
the money was allocated, and looks only at cities that received funds directly from the federal 
government. States additionally were required to pass on at least 60% of the funds they received 
to municipalities that were not eligible to receive direct federal grants, but because each state 
designed their own EECBG programs differently, the grants that city-level recipients received 
through states are left out here. The reason for focusing on city-level grantees was to look at how 
a wide range of municipalities created programs within the same framework laid out by the 
Department of Energy. A total of 1268 city-level recipients received funds, according to federal 
grant reporting data; however, the Department of Energy’s data on metrics and costs contained 
no information for 22 municipalities; therefore a total of 1246 municipalities are included in the 
dataset used for this chapter’s analyses. 
 Several grantee characteristics were expected to influence how grantees chose to spend 
their EECBG funds as well as the outcomes of their programs. Those factors included 
population, geography, the partisan lean of the community, whether or not the community was a 
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member of ICLEI, and the community’s form of government. Grantees are described here with 
respect to those characteristics. 
Grantee Population 
 The populations of city-level grantees ranged from 5,285 (New Castle, DE) to over 8 
million (New York City), with an average population of 111,712. A small number of very large 
cities, though, skew the average grantee size far higher than the median population size of 
59,300. A histogram of city-level grantee population sizes (Figure A.1) shows the large 
concentration of grantees with smaller populations.  
 
Figure A.1. Grantee population distribution. 
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Grants were awarded using a population-based formula, with award amount highly correlated 
with community population size; award amount is therefore not included as a separate variable 
from population in remaining analysis (Figure A.2, r-square 0.99). 
 
 
Figure A.2. Population size of grantees correlated closely with award amount. 
Geography 
 Grantees were situated geographically throughout the United States and its territories. 
Figure A.3 shows the distribution of grants within the Continental United States, with circles 
increasing in size as grant size increases. Grants were made in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and 
US territories; those are not shown here as the purpose of Figure A.3 is simply to show that 







Figure A.3. Geographic distribution of EECBG grantees. 
 
Partisan Lean 
 The partisan lean of communties receiving EECBG funds was measured at the county 
level, using the percentage of the county’s majority-party vote in the 2008 presidential election 
going to the republican candidate to create the variable “Percent Republican” (Congressional 
Quarterly Voting and Election Series). Grantee communities had a mean of 43.54% of their 
major party vote going to the republican candidate, and a median of 42.86% , compared to 
46.31% for the United States overall, reflecting the more liberal lean of more urban populations. 
Because they do not vote for president, models that include percent Republican as a variable 
unfortunately leave out communities in Puerto Rico and US territories.  
 Although as a group, the communities with populations high enough to secure EECBG 
grants were slightly more left-leaning than the country as a whole, the relationship between 
community size and partisanship is highly varied. The correlation between population and 
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percent republican is negative and highly significant (p=0.000016), but very small (r-
square=0.015). 
 
Figure A.4. Population size has a small but significant relationship with percent 
republican residents. 
Heating and Cooling Degree Days 
 A community’s average number of heating degree days (HDD) is a measure of the length 
and intensity of cold weather it experiences. One heating degree day indicates that a 
community’s weather would have required interior space to be heated by one degree in order to 
keep the space at sixty-five degrees for one day. Similarly, a cooling degree day (CLDD) 
indicates a need for an interior space to be cooled for one day by one degree. HDD and CLDD 
vary widely in grantee communities (Table A.1). 
Table A.1. Heating and cooling degree days of grantees. 
 n mean sd median min max range 
HDD 1246 4145.47 2398.96 4613 0 13287 13287 
CLDD 1246 1454.2 1163.53 1016 0 5855 5855 
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Form of Government 
 Some research indicates that the form of government used by municipalities influences the 
capacity of local governments to implement programs; using the Municipal Form of Government 
Survey from ICMA, that information was added to this dataset, though the majority of 
municipalities within the dataset did not respond to that survey, so the form of government 
variable was of limited use (Table A.2). 




Representative Town Meeting 2 
Town Meeting 1 
Did Not Respond 24 
NA 618 
              
Membership in ICLEI 
 A variable indicating whether a municipality was a member of ICLEI Local Governments 
for Sustainability was obtained from the Integrated City Sustainability Database (Feiock et al. 
2014). The ICLEI variable is based on a 2010 survey of local governments’ sustainability 
practices conducted by ICMA; of the municipalities in the EECBG dataset, 249 municipalities 
reported ICLEI membership, 784 reported not being members, and 213 NA values represented 
communities with no ICLEI membership information available. Because the survey was 
conducted after EECBG grants were distributed, this variable does not necessarily represent pre-
existing membership in ICLEI, but is an indicator that the municipality participated in 




Municipalities with larger populations tended to pursue more activities, though much of the 
variation in the number of activities pursued by municipalities is unexplained by population size 
(Figure A.5).  
 
 
Figure A.5. Population size only explains a small portion of the variation in the 
number of activities communities pursued. 
 
Further Details on LCA Analysis 
The LCA analysis described in chapter five uses a five-class model both because it shows the 
lowest likelihood ratio and because the five classes described create the most logically coherent 
sets of grantees of all models produced. Table A.3 compares 2-class, 3-class, 4-class, 5-class, and 
6-class LCA models. 
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Figures A.6, A.7, and A.8 show further detail on the distribution of the number of activities 
pursued and the probability of pursuing such activities in each class. The defining feature 
separating the classes is the number of activities they pursued: with the exception of classes 4 














Figure A.8. Award Amount vs. Number of Activities, by Class 
 Latent Class Analysis is also useful in assessing the factors that predict class membership. 
In LCA regression models, classes are determined by a mixture of outcome variables and 
covariates that predict class membership. LCA regressions showed small but significant 
relationships between the type and number of activities pursued and covariates including: size of 
community population, number of heating degree days, partisan tilt of the county in which the 
community was located, whether the community was a member of ICLEI, and whether the state 
in which the community was located had instituted a Renewable Portfolio Standard requirement 
at the time. These regressions change the class composition somewhat, though the major change 
in the classes is simply the cut-point between the number of activities composing each class.   
 Figures A.9 through A.11 show variation in the characteristics of communities that fell into 
the five classes created using the five-class LCA model without covariates. Figure 10 shows that 
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class 1 was composed of many more large communities than the other classes; Figure 11 shows 
that those with larger numbers of Heating Degree Days (indicating colder climates) were more 
likely to pursue solely energy efficiency retrofits (i.e., be members of class 5); and Figure 12 
shows that the proportion of the 2008 major party vote going to the Republican presidential 
candidate increases inversely to the variety of activities that communities pursue. Figure 13 
shows no clear relationship between the amount of funding retained, rather than being used to 











































Figure A.12. Percent of funding retained (not used by subcontractors) by class. 
I also ran LCA models and LCA regressions on community program choice using only the type 
of activities pursued, without including the number of activities as a separate variable. The best 
fit of these models showed a similar pattern to those using the number of activities in addition 
(Figures A.13 and A.14): three classes are found, with one class composed of communities 
pursuing more and more varied program activities, one class pursuing primarily energy 
efficiency retrofits, and one class pursuing a smaller number of activities beyond energy 
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efficiency retrofits. These models, though, were unable to group communities into a larger 
number of classes, and I chose to use the models that included the number of activities as a 










Figure A.14. Number of activities pursued vs. award amount, by class, using three-
class model based only on activity choice. 
